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1 General Introduction
Over the last 25 years, the number of ﬁrst-generation immigrants living in OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries has doubled.
The total number rose from 63 million immigrants in 1990 to over 120 million in
2015. Figure 1.1 shows the evolution of the stock and the average share of immigrants
between 1990 and 2015. Whereas immigrants represented on average 8.6% of the
total population in 1990, the share increased to almost 13% in 2015. Moreover,
immigrants are not equally distributed over and within the countries. Whereas
countries like Mexico, Japan or Poland have shares below 2%, Australia, Canada
or Luxembourg have more than or are close to 30% of immigrants within their
populations. Within most countries, immigrants cluster in larger cities or speciﬁc
regions with the result that the share of immigrants in these areas is signiﬁcantly
above the country average. These ﬁgures underline the increased importance of
immigration over the last decades. The integration of immigrants into the domestic
societies is thus a key challenge for the future development of these countries.
At the same time, we often observe that the labor market performance of im-
migrants is weaker than the performance of natives, even after having spent sev-
eral years in the host country. Immigrants are more often unemployed, have lower
earnings and work in less secure jobs (OECD/EU, 2015). Economic research on the
causes for the lower performance of immigrants has identiﬁed several reasons. Firstly,
immigrants lack country-speciﬁc human capital, in particular language skills (see,
e.g., Chiswick and Miller, 1995; Bleakley and Chin, 2004; Dustmann et al., 2010).
Using various empirical designs, all respective studies agree on language skills rep-
resenting a key determinant for economic success of immigrants. Secondly, there
is a diﬀerence between the educational level of immigrants and natives. A large
fraction of immigrants is low educated, immigrated from countries with lower qual-
ity of schooling or suﬀers from non-recognition of foreign credentials (e.g., Eckstein
and Weiss, 2004; Dustmann et al., 2013). And thirdly, discrimination reduces the
1
labor market opportunities of immigrants compared to natives (e.g., Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2004; Kaas and Manger, 2011).
Figure 1.1: Immigrants in the OECD
The ﬁgure shows the stock and the average share of immigrants in the recent OECD countries. The estimates refer either to the foreign-
born or foreign citizens within the population. In 2016, the OECD consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and the United States.
Source: Own calculations based on the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Aﬀairs (2015).
An immigration policy which tries to improve the labor market performance of
immigrants can inﬂuence all these areas. Several countries, for instance, introduced
free language courses, implemented speciﬁc residence titles for high-skilled immi-
grants (e.g., the Blue Card in the EU), facilitated citizenship acquisition or adopted
strong anti-discrimination laws. Yet, we often do not know the direct and indirect
eﬀects and the overall eﬃciency of such policies. Furthermore, we need to take
into account that the group of immigrants is very diverse and some subgroups may
need to be targeted diﬀerently. In any case, it is relevant to analyze and evaluate
immigration policies to understand their impact on the assimilation of immigrants.
In this thesis, I primarily focus on one main element of immigration policies: The
opportunity for immigrants to stay permanently in the host country. It builds on
the idea that integration is an investment decision. After their arrival, immigrants
face the decision if and how much to invest in country-speciﬁc human capital. As
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every investment induces costs at the beginning, the size of the expected returns
in the later periods determines the amount of investments. As a consequence, the
willingness to invest in country-speciﬁc human capital depends on the expected
duration of stay (see e.g., Dustmann, 1993).
Policy makers often ignore this determinant when designing immigration poli-
cies. The guest-worker program in Germany is a good example of such a policy that
intended to recruit immigrants for a short period of time. However, a large fraction
settled in Germany permanently, but immigration policy did not react to the chang-
ing realities. The currently weak labor market performance of former guest workers
and their descendants (see, e.g., Algan et al., 2012) is most likely a consequence of
the missing adjustment.
This thesis empirically investigates three diﬀerent aspects of such prospects of
permanent residency on the integration of immigrants. In Chapter 2, I analyze
whether the economic assimilation of refugees diﬀers from the assimilation of eco-
nomic immigrants. To create and implement eﬀective immigration policies, it is
necessary to understand the heterogeneity of diﬀerent immigration groups. As a
large part of low-skilled immigrants in the OECD originates from asylum seekers
and low-skilled immigrants are a main target of immigration policies, a deeper un-
derstanding of that group is of high relevance. Moreover, immigration via the asylum
system will most likely present an important channel for immigration in the future,
given events like the recent refugee crisis in the European Union. If immigration
policy tries to improve the economic integration of refugees, the peculiarities of the
group of refugees should be taken into account designing policy measures.
Chapters 3 and 4 analyze the eﬀects of a particular policy instrument, the ac-
quisition of citizenship. Naturalization grants an immigrant the citizenship of the
host country by giving the immigrant the equal rights as the native population. It
is predominantly directed to immigrants who have spent several years in the host
country and requires speciﬁc criteria to be met. The third chapter which is joint
work with Christina Gathmann investigates the eﬀect of citizenship acquisition on
the economic integration of immigrants. Making use of a novel identiﬁcation strat-
egy which is based on two policy reforms, we identify the causal eﬀect of citizenship
on various economic outcomes. An earlier version of this paper was circulated in the
IZA Working Paper series (Gathmann and Keller, 2014). The fourth paper which
is joint work with Christina Gathmann and Ole Monscheuer broadens the scope on
the eﬀects of citizenship acquisition and analyzes the impact of naturalization on
the social integration of immigrants. In particular, we investigate the eﬀects of nat-
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uralization on fertility and marriage patterns of immigrants. Despite the primary
interest in the labor market eﬀects of immigration policies, these policies might also
have signiﬁcant impact on other dimensions of integration. Previous research has
shown that attitudes of natives toward immigrants and immigration in general are
not only shaped by their economic impacts (i.e., on wages and taxes), but also
on social and cultural diﬀerences (e.g., Card et al., 2012; Dustmann and Preston,
2007). Thus, the eﬀects of immigration policies on social integration outcomes are
also highly relevant, especially for policy makers which are conﬁned by the public
perception of immigration in general.
1.1 The Economic Integration of Refugees: New
Evidence from Germany
It is one of the main challenges of immigration policy to select immigrants. Most
countries like Canada or Australia have set up explicit criteria for immigrants to
enter their countries. These criteria are mostly based on attributes which are directly
linked to a favorable labor market performance. For the group of refugees, none of
such criteria has to be met and their admission is based on humanitarian criteria.
As a consequence, one would expect that the labor market integration of refugees
is the weakest among the group of immigrants. On the other side, refugees might
have no opportunity to return to their home country and have to stay in the host
country permanently, whereas economic immigrants might only plan a temporary
stay. The planned duration in the host country is a key determinant for human
capital investments, in particular country-speciﬁc human capital investments. Thus
in the long run, the relative performance of refugees compared to the performance
of economic immigrants is ex ante not clear. It only shows that the labor market
integration of refugees has diﬀerent requisites and characteristics compared to the
labor market integration of immigrants who migrate for economic reasons.
The aim of this paper is to compare the labor market assimilation proﬁles of
refugees relative to the assimilation proﬁles of economic immigrants. Using two
diﬀerent data sets from Germany, I estimate the assimilation proﬁles for employment
and earnings. Unlike previous studies, I can use information on the reasons for
immigration and directly identify refugees in my data sets. The direct identiﬁcation
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allows to compare refugees and economic immigrants from the same region of origin
and hence, to disentangle the refugee eﬀect from other eﬀects based on the regional
composition across the groups. In addition, I extend prior research on refugees'
labor market integration by studying the situation in Germany which has been one
of the world's largest refugee receiving countries over the past decade (UNHCR,
2014). But Germany is not only an interesting example due to its relevance, it also
presents an institutional environment which is very diﬀerent compared to previous
studies, in particular in terms of selection of refugees and institutional framework
(e.g., Cortes, 2004 for the US; Chiswick and Miller,1994 for Canada).
The results suggest that refugees have lower employment rates and earn lower
wages, but they catch up over time spent in Germany. After about 13 years, the
employment rate has almost reached the level of economic immigrants. Regarding
the earnings of refugees, the duration of the assimilation process takes more time.
The gap closes after about 17 years. A more detailed analysis of the mechanisms
behind the assimilation shows that refugees do not only have diﬃculties ﬁnding their
ﬁrst job, they also have more problems applying their skills. With more time spent
in Germany, refugees reduce their disadvantages in language skills and increase their
productivity, thus reaching a better labor market performance.
The results reveal two important implications: Firstly, the process of labor
market integration is heterogeneous across groups and when designing immigration
policies, policy makers should be aware of these diﬀerences. Secondly, an assess-
ment of the economic capacity of refugees is heavily dependent on the timing of the
assessment.
1.2 Returns to Citizenship? Evidence from
Germany's Recent Immigration Reforms
Acquiring the citizenship of a country gives immigrants the same privileges as
the domestic population. Naturalized immigrants can, for instance, participate in
political elections or gain diplomatic protection of the host country. Economic the-
ory suggests various channels why citizenship could also improve the labor market
performance of immigrants. Naturalized immigrants get access to certain jobs in the
public sector or are less discriminated in the labor market. In addition, citizenship
gives immigrants the prospect of staying permanently in the country and thus incen-
tives to increase investments in country-speciﬁc human capital. These investments
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might later translate into higher productivity and into a better position on the labor
market. Employer might be willing to invest more in naturalized immigrants as the
immigrant expresses her willingness to stay in the host country.
Although previous studies have tried to investigate the causal eﬀects of citi-
zenship acquisition on labor market outcomes, the question has not been answered
comprehensively. Firstly, it is diﬃcult to disentangle the citizenship eﬀect from the
general assimilation eﬀect as the eligibility of citizenship acquisition is linked to a
certain residency in the host country. Secondly and the major challenge for evalu-
ating the eﬀects of citizenship acquisition is the endogeneity of the naturalization
decision. Immigrants who decide to naturalize are a selective sample of the immi-
grant population (see, e.g., Chiswick and Miller, 2008 for the United States; and De
Voretz and Pivnenko, 2006 for Canada). Hence, it is not suﬃcient to compare natu-
ralized and non-naturalized immigrants. To circumvent the endogeneity problem, we
make use of two policy reforms which took place in Germany and which introduced
age-dependent eligibility criteria regarding the required duration of residency. We
use the access to citizenship to create exogenous variation in the duration of eligibil-
ity. To be more precise, younger age cohorts were able naturalize after eight years
in Germany whereas older age groups had to wait for 15 years to become eligible.
Our results show that access to citizenship has a substantial and signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on the earnings of female immigrants, whereas the returns for male
immigrants are, if any, few. Eligible women experience occupational upgrading and
work in jobs with higher quality and in larger ﬁrms. Yet, the economic returns are
not distributed evenly across all groups of immigrants and some groups beneﬁt more
strongly whereas other groups do not. More recent immigrant cohorts have larger
returns than older cohorts.
Overall, naturalization seems to be one channel to speed up the economic in-
tegration of immigrants. Given the substantial returns, immigration policy should
analyze how to promote citizenship acquisition and thus increase the labor market
integration of immigrants.
1.3 Access to Citizenship and the Social Integration
of Immigrants
Assimilation theory assumes that immigrants adapt to the native population
not only in terms of economic outcomes, but also in terms of social and political
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outcomes. Even more relevant than for the economic integration, cultural norms
and traditions inﬂuence the behavior of immigrants, in particular the marriage and
fertility pattern of immigrants (Fernández and Fogli, 2009). The role of citizenship
acquisition as part of the social assimilation process has not been investigated until
now. Firstly, access to citizenship might aﬀect fertility and marriage behavior via
a stronger labor market performance of female immigrants. Secondly, citizenship
acquisition could also loosen ties to the culture of the home country which often are
more traditional regarding the role of women.
Using the same exogenous variation induced by the two policy reforms in Ger-
many, we evaluate the eﬀects of eligibility on fertility, marriage patterns and partner
characteristics. In a next step, we then try to disentangle the economic channel from
the cultural impact and determine their relative shares of the overall eﬀect of access
to citizenship.
We ﬁnd that eligibility for citizenship has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the fertility and
marriage patterns of female immigrants. The option to naturalize delays marriage
to later ages and reduces the likelihood of marrying someone from the country of
origin. Female immigrants also have lower fertility overall and tend to postpone
their ﬁrst birth, especially when they are high-skilled. The analysis of the potential
mechanisms suggests that higher earnings are important for fertility and marriage
choices. Immigrants from a more traditional cultural background have overall higher
fertility and marriage rates, but they also assimilate faster than immigrants from
EU member countries.
In sum, the results suggest that citizenship acquisition has an impact on the
social integration of immigrants and fosters the assimilation of immigrants. Natu-
ralization policy can thus not only contribute to a better economic integration of
immigrants, it also induces adjustments in other dimensions of integration.
7
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2 The Economic Integration of Refugees: New
Evidence from Germany
2.1 Introduction
For 2015, the OECD predicts up to one million asylum applications in Europe,
about three times as much as each year over the past decade (OECD, 2015).1 Yet,
this tremendous number seems to be too low as, for instance, the German govern-
ment expects 800.000 applicants only in Germany (Federal Oﬃce for Migration and
Refugees (BAMF), 2014). For the destination countries, the question arises how to
react to the large inﬂow of foreigners given that in the past a large fraction of asylum
seekers has stayed in the countries. In particular, the integration into domestic labor
markets is a key challenge. A successful labor market integration not only reduces
the ﬁscal costs for the destinations countries, it also has a positive impact on the
social and cultural integration (OECD/EU, 2015). At the present state, we only
have limited information who these people are and which skills and expectations
they bring along. The scope of the large inﬂow and the associated challenges are
thus not clear yet. At the same time, immigration is no new phenomena in most
OECD countries. Many countries experienced large immigration waves in the past
and have substantial shares of foreign-born in the domestic populations (e.g., 12%
in UK, 13% in Germany, or 16% in Sweden). Thus, can we consider this inﬂow
of asylum seekers as a new wave of economic immigration? Or should we consider
them as a distinct type of immigrants which we need to assess diﬀerently?
Hence, the aim of this paper is to investigate the labor market integration of
1I thank Christine Binzel, Christina Gathmann, Ole Monscheuer, Jens Ruhose, the participants at the Spring
Meeting of Young Economists 2015, the ZEW and the doctoral seminar in Heidelberg for valuable comments
and discussions.
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refugees.2 Thereby, we ﬁrstly provide evidence on a group of immigrants we know
very little about, but which is relevant in size. Secondly, we contribute to a literature
which has studied refugees, but in very diﬀerent institutional settings (Cortes, 2004
in USA; Edin et al., 2003 in Sweden and Damm, 2009 in Denmark). Thirdly, we
explore the situation in Germany, a country which is one of the largest refugee
receiving countries in the world and, at the same time, has an immigration policy
which is characterized by very restrictive access to the labor market. And ﬁnally,
in contrast to previous studies, we can identify refugees directly in the data and
circumvent the diﬃculties distinguishing refugees from economic immigrants.
Economic theory suggests various reasons why we might expect a diﬀerent as-
similation pattern of refugees. First and most importantly, refugees are not selected
with respect to labor market relevant attributes, both on the supply and the demand
side. As refugees do not decide to leave their country voluntarily, they are less self-
selected in terms of favorable labor market characteristics and have no or less time
for preparation. Economic immigrants on the other hand can make their migration
decision based on labor market considerations. The migration process often takes
several years which allows to make country-speciﬁc human capital investments prior
to migration (Chin and Cortes, 2015). On the demand side, the admission to the
host country is determined by humanitarian criteria. It does not include labor mar-
ket relevant entry characteristics as part of the selection process. Previous research
on refugees has conﬁrmed the theoretical consideration that refugees are less (self-
)selected than economic immigrants and closer to a random sample of the source
country's population (Cortes, 2004).
Moreover, ethnic networks are a major channel through which newly arrived
immigrants learn about the host country's institutions (Bertrand et al., 2000) and
ease the labor market integration (e.g., Beaman, 2011 for the USA; Edin et al.,
2003 in Sweden and Damm, 2009 in Denmark). It is very likely that refugees have
less access to such networks as they often cannot choose their residential location
independently and are accommodated in areas where no family and friends or even
large ethnic communities reside.
The experience of persecution or war might also lead to physical and mental
trauma and mistrust toward public institutions. Previous studies have shown that
refugees do report higher rates of health problems which will most likely aﬀect
their labor market performance (Chin and Cortes, 2015). After arrival, a long
2We follow the most common deﬁnition that an asylum seekers is someone who is still in the asylum process
whereas a refugee or humanitarian immigrant is oﬃcially recognized (OECD, 2015).
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and complicated asylum procedure up to the ﬁnal decision might be associated
with uncertainty due to the fear of rejection and removal. As a consequence, these
fears can prevent refugees from integrating into the host society and labor market.
Moreover, the uncertainty reduces the incentives to invest in physical and human
capital.
Restricted access to the labor market after arrival could also hamper the labor
market opportunities of refugees. The human capital might depreciate over time.
Previous research on the impact of economic conditions at labor market entry of
immigrants has emphasized that the ﬁrst years in a new country are especially
important for the further labor market career (Chiswick and Miller, 2002).
On the other side, there are reasons to believe that refugees may catch up or out-
perform other immigrant groups in the long run. The key argument for a favorable
performance is the diﬀerent expected length of stay in the host country. Dustmann
(1993) shows that return intentions of immigrants in Germany are important de-
terminants of the steepness of the age-earnings proﬁle. Since refugees have escaped
from persecution, they have neither the opportunity nor the willingness to return to
their home country. Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that the return probabil-
ity of refugees is low (Klinthäll, 2008) or lower than for other groups of immigrants
(Dustmann and Görlach, 2014). The perspective of permanent residence increases
the beneﬁts of investments in country speciﬁc human capital and higher qualiﬁca-
tions (Cortes, 2004). It might also lead to higher investment in human capital due
to higher returns from increasing the transferability of skills (Chiswick and Miller,
1994). Thus, these human capital investments might compensate the initial disad-
vantages of refugees after some years in the country and lead to similar or favorable
assimilation proﬁles as in the case of economic immigrants. Refugees might also be
more motivated and eager to integrate as response to discrimination and repudiation
in the home country.
The empirical analysis focuses on Germany which has been one of the world's
largest refugee receiving countries over the past decade (UNHCR, 2014). Asylum is
one of the main channels for immigration to Germany from outside the European
Union. The total number of individuals who entered Germany as asylum seekers
and still reside in Germany are, at a rough estimate, 650.000 individuals.3 In addi-
tion, Germany has followed an immigration policy that is very diﬀerent to that of
3 Own calculations based on the Microcensus 2008.
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traditional immigration countries like the United States or Canada. For economic
immigrants from outside the European Union, only a few channels to immigrate ex-
ist. In fear of misuse of the asylum system as a channel for low-skilled immigration,
the institutional setting for refugees was rather designed to discourage economic
immigrants from using the system to enter Germany than to promote refugees' inte-
gration. Consequently, the labor market access was highly restrictive and has only
been liberalized in recent years.
Diﬀerences also exist in the selection within the group of refugees. Asylum
seekers in Germany have to claim asylum after entering the country by themselves.4
In the United States or Canada, the majority of refugees enters via refugee programs
designed for individuals or families in the home countries (or neighboring states) and
selected by the UNHCR (Department of Homeland Security, 2015). This might have
important consequences on the selection of refugees. Credit constraints or physical
problems of potential refugees might hamper the escape to Germany and lead to a
diﬀerent sample of refugees.
Geographic proximity is another important determinant explaining the origin of
refugee ﬂows and creates a diﬀerent sample of origin countries (Hatton, 2009). From
2011 to 2013, Serbia, Afghanistan and Syria were the top three source countries in
Germany (BAMF, 2014), whereas the largest source countries in the United States
were Iraq, Burma and Bhutan (Department of Homeland Security, 2015). In sum,
refugees in Germany are very likely to diﬀer in their composition across and within
countries compared to the situation in America where previous studies have been
conducted.
A major advantage of our analysis is the possibility to identify refugees directly
in our data since we have information on the reason for immigration to Germany.
Previous studies analyzing refugees and their labor market integration have not
directly observed the refugee status and had to rely on an indirect identiﬁcation.
The most common approach is to construct a refugee indicator via a combination of
country of origin and year of arrival (see e.g., Cortes, 2004). However, this procedure
captures refugees who escape from wars and civil conﬂicts, but not, for example,
members of political groups or minorities who escape from political persecution.
One example to illustrate the shortcoming of this approach is migration from Turkey
to Germany. The majority of Turkish immigrants arrived as guest workers or their
relatives, but a sizable number of Turkish Kurds migrated to Germany as refugees,
4Germany also implemented a resettlement program in 2003, but the size of the program is very small. (BMI,
2013).
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too. Yet, using the indirect identiﬁcation approach, Kurdish refugees would not be
assigned to the group of refugees. Until 2011, Turkey was always one of the 10
major source countries of asylum applicants in Germany (BAMF, 2014). Hence, the
direct identiﬁcation approach gives us the opportunity to detect variation between
refugees and economic immigrants within the same country or region of origin. As
refugees' sending countries are arguably not a random set of all immigrants sending
countries, a comparison across immigrant groups fails to adjust for these country
diﬀerences. Within country or region variation allows us to disentangle the region
of origin-eﬀect from the refugee status-eﬀect.
Our results suggest that the economic assimilation of refugees diﬀers signiﬁcantly
from the assimilation of economic immigrants. The most important diﬀerence is the
pace of the integration. All analyzed economic outcomes reveal that refugees need
more than a decade to attain a similar level as the comparison group. Refugees start
with a large gap in employment. After ﬁve years, 60 percent of the gap is closed.
After 12 years in the host country, the employment rate of refugees is only slightly
smaller than the employment rate of the comparison group. Regarding the earnings
of refugees, we observe a similar pattern. The level of earnings is signiﬁcantly lower
than that of economic immigrants, but it catches up over time. The reason for
the higher wage growth of refugees are increased working hours, but also a rise
in productivity. After 17 years spent in Germany, the gap is almost closed. An
explanation for the long duration of the assimilation process is the diﬃcult entry
into employment. Refugees work more often in low quality positions or jobs which
do not match their qualiﬁcation. A lack in formal qualiﬁcations, language skills and
social capital is most likely the reason for the delayed assimilation.
Empirical research on the economic integration of refugees are scarce. The major
obstacle is the absence of adequate data allowing to separate genuine refugees from
other types of immigrants. A small strand of literature compares the labor market
integration of diﬀerent visa categories (Constant and Zimmermann, 2005a and 2005b
for Germany and Denmark; Jaeger, 2000 for USA; Chiswick and Miller, 1994 for
Australia; Aydemir, 2011 for Canada; Akgüc, 2013 for France). The results for
the visa category which includes refugees indicate that refugees perform worse than
immigrants who arrive with employment or student visa. The evidence on the
diﬀerences between family immigrants and refugees are mixed. In sum, the studies
provide clear evidence on the heterogeneity of the labor market integration across
immigration groups but focus mainly on short-term labor market outcomes.
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Studies with an explicit focus on refugees can be broadly divided into two main
methodological approaches: They either compare refugees relative to other immigra-
tion groups or use the placement of refugees into localities as exogenous variation.
The general ﬁnding in the comparison approach is a so-called refugee gap which
shall describe the worse labor market performance of refugees compared to other
immigrant groups regarding employment, wages or welfare dependency (see Cortes,
2004 for the USA; DeVoretz, Pivnenko and Beiser, 2004 for Canada). Edin et al.
(2003) and Damm (2009) use placement policies in Sweden or Denmark to analyze
the eﬀect of ethnic enclaves on labor market outcomes. They do not address the
potential problem of selectivity within their sample and consider their results as
representative for all groups of immigrants.
Closely related to the labor market integration of refugees is the literature on
human capital investment of refugees. Due to the long term perspective of staying
in the host country, Cortes (2004) shows theoretically and empirically that refugees
invest more in human capital in the ﬁrst years after arrival and thus catch up or even
outperform other immigrant groups. Khan (1997), using a similar argument, ﬁnds
higher post-immigration investment in education among refugees in the U.S. relative
to economic immigrants. In contrast, Chiswick and Miller (1994) also report that
higher skilled immigrants do invest more in human capital after arrival, but they do
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the group of refugees. A more general literature
on human capital investments of refugees and temporary migration shows that the
expected duration of the stay has a large impact on the human capital investment
decision and thus on the career path of immigrants (Dustmann, 1999; Adda et al.,
2015).
Finally, our results contribute to the general literature on immigrant assimi-
lation. A large literature studies have analyzed the labor market integration of
immigrants relative to natives (for a survey, see Dustmann and Glitz, 2011). Evi-
dence on Germany has so far been weak, most studies do not ﬁnd assimilation eﬀects
(Pischke, 1993; Dustmann, 1993; Schmidt, 1997; Bauer et al., 2005; results in Fertig
and Schuster, 2007 and Gathmann and Keller, 2014 are mixed). However, the aim
of our paper is to show how assimilation pattern diﬀer between immigration groups
and will not focus on the overall assimilation of immigrants in Germany.
This article proceeds as follows: The next section describes the institutional
background of asylum in Germany. Section 3 introduces the data sources. The
empirical strategy to identify the assimilation proﬁles of refugees and the deﬁnition
of the comparison group are explained in section 4. Section 5 discusses the empirical
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results including a number of informal validity checks to test the robustness of our
results. Section 6 discusses the policy implications of our ﬁndings and concludes.
2.2 Asylum Policy in Germany
The number of asylum claims is erratic and predominantly determined by exogenous
events in the source countries. The inﬂow of asylum seekers depends on the political
situation in the sending countries and only subordinate on the asylum procedures
of the host countries. However, countries have - via their asylum regulations - an
impact on the numbers of asylum claim (Hatton, 2004). As shown in Figure 2.1, the
number of claims in Germany follows the global trends and decreases in the mid of
the 2000s continuously to only 28.018 applications in 2008. Since 2008, the numbers
increase again up to 441.800 applications in 2015, the largest number for the last 20
years.
The importance of asylum as a channel of immigration started in the 1980 when
the number of asylum claims exceeded 100.000 applications (107.818). Trying to
reduce the numbers of asylum seekers, German authorities decided to reduce eco-
nomic incentives deterring future applicants (Tränhardt, 2015). They implemented
restrictions on accommodation and public transfers (from cash to food vouchers)
and, most importantly, banned asylum seekers from the labor market for one year.
Beforehand, asylum seekers were allowed to work immediately. In 1981, the duration
of the working ban was extended to two years. (Tränhardt, 2015). The restrictions
became even more severe in 1987 as working was prohibited for the ﬁrst ﬁve years
(Gesetz zur Änderung asylverfahrens-, arbeitserlaubnis- und ausländerrechtlicher
Vorschriften, 1987). In the early 1990s, the numbers of applicants increased again
due to the war in Yugoslavia. 438.191 asylum seekers came to Germany solely in
1992. An agreement between the main political parties led to the so-called com-
promise on political asylum (Asylkompromiss). In return for a liberalization of
the citizenship law, the Social Democrats (SPD) accepted further restrictions of the
asylum legislation. The main part of the amendment was the introduction of the
safe third countries-concept (Brücker et al., 2015).5
5 Asylum seeker who travel to Germany via these safe third countries are then not eligible for asylum in Germany
as they have to claim asylum in the ﬁrst secure country they enter. Considering the geographical location
of Germany, traveling to Germany without crossing other European Union countries is almost impossible.
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Figure 2.1: Asylum Claims, 2000-2015
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the total numbers of asylum applications. Industrialized countries follow the deﬁnition of the UNHCR and
include all European countries (38 countries), Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the USA. EU includes the
member countries of the respective year.
Source: Own calculations based on UNHCR (2015).
Refugee protection has constitutional status in Germany and is part of the Ger-
man Basic Law. Article 16a subsection 1 grants everyone political asylum who
escapes from political persecution. Besides the entitlement of political asylum, Ger-
many ratiﬁed the Geneva Convention on Refugees which represents the legal frame-
work for the refugee protection status (Section 3 subsection 1, Asylum Procedure
Act) and the subsidiary protection status (Section 4 subsection 1, Asylum Procedure
Act). If none of these statuses are recognized, the prohibition of removal (Section 60
subsection 5 and 7, Residence Act) is the weakest and shortest status of recognition.
An important aspect in the legal framework of refugee protection is the individual
entitlement of asylum. After entering Germany and claiming asylum, the German
authorities have the responsibility to examine the claim of every asylum seeker in-
dividually. As a consequence, the number of asylum claims cannot be limited by
refugee quotas.
The asylum procedure follows a deﬁned structure of several steps. At ﬁrst, the
Nevertheless, it is often not feasible to detect which country is responsible for the asylum seeker.
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asylum seekers are placed in reception centers which are distributed over the Ger-
man states following a ﬁxed quota system (Königsberger Schlüssel).6 In reception
centers, the applicant has to stay for at least three months and is interviewed by the
Federal Oﬃce of Migration and Refugees regarding her reason for asylum. After-
wards, the asylum seekers are distributed over the municipalities in the responsible
state and wait until the decision is made. In 2008, the average duration of the asy-
lum procedure was 17,5 months and after two years, 77% of the asylum applications
were settled (BAMF, 2009). During the asylum procedure, the asylum seekers' la-
bor market access is restricted. However, the Federal Employment Agency has the
opportunity to permit employment after one year of residency. These regulations
were even further liberalized in recent years.7
After the examination of the asylum claim, the applicant can receive several
protection statuses which diﬀer in their legal consequences. Political asylum and
refugee protection status lead to permanent residence permit after three years if the
status is not revoked in a reassessment (after three years). Working is permitted for
both groups instantly. Refugees with a subsidiary protection status or asylum seek-
ers who are prohibited of removal can receive a permanent residence permit after
seven years if several reassessments (every one or two years) are positive and if they
fulﬁll certain requirements like economic self-suﬃciency and a clean criminal record.
Working needs to be permitted by the Federal Employment Agency. Regarding
social welfare or unemployment beneﬁts, all refugees are treated like the native pop-
ulation. The residential location is restricted during the asylum procedure (to split
the ﬁnancial burden across states and municipalities). If the refugee is oﬃcially rec-
ognized, the residency requirement ends and she can choose her residential location
independently.
So far, we described the numbers of asylum claims, but not all claims are rec-
ognized and a sizable share of applicants who get rejected has to leave the country
thereafter. The recognition rate varies over the years between 5% in 2003 and 37.7%
in 2008. Not recognized applicants are not necessarily rejected due to missing asy-
lum reasons. Up to 50% of the decisions are formal decisions. These asylum seekers
were not eligible to apply in Germany and sent back to the third country which they
6The quota are determined by the size and the economic power (measured in ﬁscal revenues) of the German states
and adjusted annually.
7The asylum seeker has to wait three months before he or she can get a work permit with lower rank which means
that the job center have to approve that no German or EU-immigrant is available for that job. After 15 months,
the labor market access becomes unrestricted. The current regulations are in place since 2014, beforehand
working was only permitted after four years (BAMF, 2014).
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traveled through before entering Germany.8 The recognition rate not only varies be-
tween years but also among countries of origin. 78.4% of all applications from Iraq,
the largest group in 2008, were recognized, whereas only 9.5% of the applications
from the second largest sending country Turkey (BAMF, 2009). Other countries
with relative high recognition rates are Iran, Syria, Russia and Afghanistan.
2.3 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
2.3.1 Microcensus
The ﬁrst data set that we use is the German Microcensus (MZ), a repeated cross-
sectional survey of a 1% random sample of the German population. It covers detailed
information about individual socio-demographic characteristics, including informa-
tion on employment and personal income. As the Microcensus is the oﬃcial census
in Germany, the advantage of the data is the sample size and that it is highly
representative.
For the identiﬁcation of refugees and the comparison groups, we make use of a
supplementary questionnaire which was asked in 2008.9 Unfortunately, the supple-
mentary questionnaire is only asked to a subsample covering 0.1 % of the population.
It asks for the main reason for migration including a category on political or hu-
manitarian reasons/asylum. We deﬁne all individuals who answered that their main
reasons for migration were political or humanitarian reasons/asylum as refugees.
Ideally, one would prefer to have information on the legal status at time of arrival,
but no such information is available. On one side, it might be possible that im-
migrants adjust their beliefs retrospectively and select themselves into categories
regarding their economic success in Germany. This might be especially important if
the migration decision was based on a combination of motives and the individual has
to decide which category applies best. One the other side, the personal perception
about the migration motives are the more relevant and interesting parameter reveal-
8The European Union introduced a system which determines which country is responsible for the asylum claim,
the Dublin convention. The fundamental idea of the system is that every asylum seeker has to claim asylum in
the country he or she ﬁrst enters (Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for
asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities - Dublin Convention, 1997).
9The European Statistical Oﬃce (Eurostat) adds every year a diﬀerent list of questions to the annual questionnaire.
In 2008, the subject was immigration and the labor market.
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ing the incentive structure of the assimilation process the immigrants is exposed to.
If the incentive structure depends on the possibility to return to the home country,
the personal perception of the immigrant is the relevant determinant in which we
are interested.
A key challenge for the analysis is the deﬁnition of a reasonable comparison
group. To test our hypotheses, we need a group of immigrants who came to Ger-
many for economic reasons and from a comparable set of countries. For our main
analysis, the comparison group consists of immigrants who deﬁne themselves as eco-
nomic (main reason for migration is employment) or family (main reason is family
reuniﬁcation) immigrants.10 As we will show in the robustness section, our results
are robust to various other deﬁnitions and do not depend on the composition of the
comparison group.
We restrict our sample to ﬁrst-generation immigrants, i.e. immigrants born
outside of Germany. To make our sample more homogeneous, we further restrict
the analysis to immigrants arriving in Germany between 1990 and 2008 and were
between 25 and 60 years old in 2008. In addition, we narrow our sample to all
immigrants who arrived in Germany with age 25 or above. Thus, we hope to reduce
potential bias by individuals who had not ﬁnished their schooling career. Ethnic
Germans who represent a sizable group of immigrants especially in the 1990s and
immigrants from the traditional EU-15 member states (e.g., Italy or Greece) are
excluded, too. Both groups represent immigrants whose access to Germany and
legal status is very diﬀerent to immigrants from third countries.
Our main outcome variables of interest are employment, economic self-suﬃciency
and log personal income. Employment is an indicator equal to one if the immigrant
pursues any income-generating activity in the week before the interview and zero
otherwise. Personal income is measured as net personal income per month. We
deﬁne economic self-suﬃciency, i.e. whether an immigrant receives social assistance
payments. The main control variables are the number of years since migration,
age, gender and education. We distinguish between low-skilled (no high school or
vocational degree), medium-skilled (a higher school degree or a vocational degree)
and high-skilled immigrants (a college degree). For the region of origin-ﬁxed eﬀects,
we distinguish between immigrants from countries that recently joined the European
Union (the so-called EU-12, e.g., Poland or the Czech Republic), immigrants from
Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia (except Slovenia) and the Former Soviet Union (except the
Baltic States). We lump together other immigrants into broad regions of origin
10In the robustness checks, we will use diﬀerent deﬁnitions for the comparison groups to relax our assumptions.
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(Asia, Africa, the Middle East and North or South America).
2.3.2 IAB SOEP Migration Sample
The second data source is the IAB SOEP Migration Sample (IAB SOEP), a new
survey which started in 2013. It includes 2.700 households, each containing at least
one person who had either since 1994 immigrated to Germany or whose parents had
done so (Brücker et al., 2014). As the survey is developed for migration related re-
search, it covers a wide range of questions regarding the integration and assimilation
process which are not included in the Microcensus. To make both data sets com-
parable, we deﬁne the refugee and the comparison group respectively and restrict
the sample according to the Microcensus. Besides the main outcome variables of
the Microcensus, biographical information on previous employment histories allow
to reconstruct the duration until an immigrant found her ﬁrst job in Germany. We
use this information as an additional outcome. The IAB SOEP Migration Sample
further gives us the opportunity to analyze diﬀerences in assimilation channels. To
identify the assimilation channels, we use information on language acquisition, re-
turn intentions, human capital transferability, access to social networks and the type
of employment.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
A priori, we hypothesized that refugees are less selected than economic migrants and
a more representative sample of the population. Thus, we would expect refugees to
be more equally distributed over all age groups when they arrive in Germany. Figure
2.2 shows us the kernel densities of the age distribution and the year of arrival of
both groups. Indeed, we can observe that refugees' arrival age is distributed more
equally as, for example, a sizable share of the refugees immigrated to Germany aged
40 or above. As expected, the year of arrival of refugees is more erratic and less
equally distributed than the comparison group. Most refugees arrived between 1995
and 2000.
Table A.1 and A.2 give an overview of the two data sets. In both samples, the
group of refugees is older and has spent more years in Germany. An important
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diﬀerence between the two groups is the sex ratio. Unlike the expectation that
refugees present a more representative sample of the population, refugees have a
higher share of men than the comparison group. One explanation might be that
the long journey before applying for asylum in Germany is less discouraging for
men. Another explanation could be that men are more often politically active and
persecuted or escape for the military service (as e.g., in Eritrea).
Figure 2.2: Descriptive Evidence
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the kernel density estimates of age at arrival and year of arrival for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison
group of immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1990 and 2013 with an age at arrival of 20 or above and are 25-60 years old.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013)
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups also exist regarding the educa-
tional levels. Refugees have a higher share of low-skilled individuals, whereas im-
migrants in the comparison group are more often medium skilled. Regarding high-
skilled individuals, the data sets show an ambiguous picture. Whereas the share
of high-skilled refugees in the Microcensus is approximately eight percentage points
larger than their counterparts' share (26% vs. 18%), the IAB Migration Sample
displays a higher share of high-skilled in the comparison group (18% vs. 22%).11
The diﬀerences between the data sets are quite substantial and illustrate two im-
portant things. First, the importance to rely on several data sources to receive valid
11A comparison of immigrants from the same arriving cohorts in both samples (to account for the survey years)
show the same results. Thus, immigrants arriving after 2008 (the year of the Microcensus) and only surveyed
in the IAB Migration Sample cannot explain the diverging results.
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ﬁndings, especially if the samples are small. And second, although our estimations
control for the education level, both samples might also diﬀer in terms of unobserved
characteristics of refugees and the comparison group.
The composition of source countries across the two groups is very diﬀerent.
Refugees in both data sets are mainly from the Balkan states, the Middle East
and former Soviet states, whereas the comparison group predominantly consists of
immigrants from Eastern Europe, Turkey and the former Soviet states. Yet, there is
variation in all region of origin groups which allows us to identify the refugee eﬀect
within the regions of origin.
Regarding the labor market outcomes of both groups, refugees have lower em-
ployment rates than the comparison group. In both data sets, about 60% of the
refugees are employed. In the comparison group, 66% or 71% of the immigrants are
employed. Refugees spend more time in Germany until they start their ﬁrst job.
On average, they are employed after 2.5 years in Germany, which is one year more
than immigrants in the comparison group. In line with the lower employment rate,
the welfare dependency of refugees is signiﬁcantly higher in both data sets. Yet,
the diﬀerence is noticeably larger in the IAB SOEP Migration Sample (7 vs. 20
percentage points).
The log personal income is calculated for individuals who are currently employed.
Yet, the deﬁnition of the personal income is surveyed diﬀerently across the data sets.
The income measure in the Microcensus includes the net personal income including
social transfer and other sources of non-labor income. The IAB Migration Sample
allows to disentangle the personal income into labor income and other sources of
income. As we want to compare the labor market integration of refugees, we are
mostly interested in labor income as outcome for the analysis. In both data sets, we
observe that the average net personal income is very similar (MZ) or slightly smaller
for refugees (IAB SOEP).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The basic idea is to compare the labor market proﬁles of refugees and the comparison
group. We estimate diﬀerences in labor market outcomes using following linear
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regression models:
Yio = α + βRefugeeio + γ1f(Y SMio) + µ1Ageio + µ2Age
2
io (2.1)
+δ′Xio + θo + λs + εio
where i describes individuals of region of origin o in state s. The parameter of
interest β measures the average diﬀerence between the refugee and the comparison
group. To identify assimilation eﬀects in labor market outcomes, we include the
number of years in Germany (Years since migration, YSM) in the regression.12 To
control for the eﬀects of labor market experience, the regression contains age eﬀects
as linear and squared variables. The vector X is a set of additional control variables
including the sex and the education of the immigrants. To investigate distinct as-
similation proﬁles across the groups, we estimate assimilation proﬁles by interacting
the refugee indicator with the number of years since migration. Thus, we allow
both groups to have distinct assimilation proﬁles. The corresponding models have
the following form:
Yio = α + βRefugeeio + γ1f(Y SMio) + piRefugeeio ∗ f(Y SMio) (2.2)
+µ1Ageio + µ2Age
2
io + δ
′Xio + θo + λs + εio
where pi measures the relative change in the assimilation proﬁle of refugees com-
pared to the comparison group. We apply speciﬁcation tests to determine the best
ﬁt between the assimilation proﬁles and the economic outcomes. Table A.12 shows
diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the functional form including the Akaike information crite-
rion. The best speciﬁcation to model the relationship between years since migration
and employment seems to be a second order polynomial whereas a third order poly-
nomial captures the relationship between years since migration and personal income
most eﬃciently. In the robustness section, we provide further evidence on the func-
tional form assumption and estimate non-parametric assimilation proﬁles.
There are several threats to our identiﬁcation strategy using cross-sectional data.
As ﬁrst described by Borjas (1985), changing cohort quality can bias our estimates
if, for instance, the quality of immigrants (and therefore their labor market per-
12In section 2.6, we will show that the results are robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the number of years in
Germany.
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formance) improves over time. As a consequence, we would underestimate the as-
similation proﬁles of the immigrants.13 Although we cannot entirely rule out that
possibility, there are several arguments why we think that changing cohort qual-
ity is not a major concern. In the ﬁrst place, we analyze the assimilation process
of refugees relative to a comparison group. If both groups would follow the same
global trend in immigrant quality, the estimates would be unaﬀected. In the second
place, we check for shifts in the educational composition during the sampling period
(Figure A.1). If unobserved characteristics which aﬀect productivity are correlated
with educational outcomes, we should observe shifts in formal education. However,
the average level of education shows no evidence of a shift over time. In the third
place, previous evidence suggests that most changes in the cohort quality are across
countries of origin and not within countries (Chiswick, 1986). Controlling for region
of origin diﬀerences should capture changes in the composition of immigration ﬂows.
Another possible threat to identiﬁcation in cross-sectional data could be selec-
tive outmigration in one of the groups (Lubotsky, 2007). Again, the regions of
origin-ﬁxed eﬀects reduce the potential bias as outmigration rates diﬀer predom-
inantly across source countries (Dustmann and Görlach, 2014). Apart from this,
previous studies have shown that economic immigrants have higher rates of return
than refugees (Dustmann and Görlach, 2014). If the least successful economic im-
migrants leave (as evidence from Constant and Massey for Germany suggests)14, the
estimated labor market proﬁles of economic immigrants would be steeper (than the
true proﬁles) and our estimates of the assimilation of refugees a lower bound of the
true eﬀect. As a further test of the robustness of our results, we estimate our regres-
sion models using diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the comparison groups. Family immigrants
might be a good comparison testing for outmigration because they tend to be less
aﬀected by selective outmigration as economic immigrants (Bijwaard, 2010).
13If the cohort quality would decline, we would have the opposite eﬀect and overestimate the assimilation rate.
14 Constant and Massey (2002) study the return migration of German guest workers and provide evidence that
return migration is negatively correlated with employment.
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2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Employment
Table 2.1: Estimation Results for Employment
Microcensus (MZ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Refugee -0.114*** -0.111*** -0.079* -0.358** -0.270*
[0.041] [0.041] [0.045] [0.159] [0.155]
Refugee*Years in Germany 0.040 0.035
[0.034] [0.033]
Refugee*Years in Germany² -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002]
Years in Germany 0.004 0.011 -0.001 0.006
[0.015] [0.016] [0.018] [0.018]
Years in Germany² 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 652 652 652 652 652
R Squared 0.122 0.164 0.188 0.166 0.189
IAB SOEP Migration Sample (IAB SOEP)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Refugee -0.169*** -0.175*** -0.110*** -0.578*** -0.505**
[0.036] [0.036] [0.041] [0.221] [0.210]
Refugee*Years in Germany 0.070** 0.072**
[0.034] [0.033]
Refugee*Years in Germany² -0.003** -0.003**
[0.001] [0.001]
Years in Germany 0.022** 0.029*** 0.013 0.019
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Years in Germany² -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057
R Squared 0.088 0.122 0.152 0.126 0.156
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2008 (MZ) or 2013 (IAB SOEP), aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable Employment is
one if the individual is employed and zero otherwise. Columns (1) to (5) are based on the Microcensus (MZ), (6) to (10) on the IAB
SOEP Migration Sample. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics (Gender (indicator), Age (linear and squared),
State (Fixed eﬀects)). They also include eight region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle
East, Asia, Africa, America/Oceania and Russia/other former Soviet Union states. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high
school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with
college degree. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2008) and IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
In order to investigate the labor market performance of refugees, we start with
an analysis of the employment rate across the two groups. Table 2.1 reports the
regression results for the probability of being employed. The estimated coeﬃcients
of the ﬁrst ﬁve columns in Table 2.1 are based on the Microcensus, the following
ﬁve columns on the IAB SOEP Migration Sample. Columns (1) and (6) show the
coeﬃcients for a baseline model only including covariates for gender, age and state
ﬁxed eﬀects. The following columns add controls for education and years since
migration (columns (2) and (6)), and region of origin-ﬁxed eﬀects (Columns (3)
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and (8)). Throughout the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations in both data sets, refugees have
a signiﬁcant lower employment rate than the comparison group. The gap varies
between 11 and 17.5 percentage points. Including the region of origin-ﬁxed eﬀects
reduces the employment gap to 8 and 11 percentage points, which is a reduction of
about 24% (MZ) or 37% (IAB SOEP). The massive reduction in the employment
gap indicates that a large part of the refugee gap is due to diﬀerences in home
country (or home region) characteristics rather than refugee speciﬁc. This leads
us to the question how the employment gap evolves over time in Germany and if
we observe diﬀerent assimilation pattern across the groups. The speciﬁcations in
columns (4), (5), (9) and (10) allow for both groups to have separate assimilation
proﬁles. We observe the same pattern in both data sets: Refugees start with a large
employment gap and reduce the gap consistently with every further year in Germany.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the assimilation pattern based on the estimated coeﬃcients of
the IAB SOEP Migration Sample. The employment rate of the comparison group
increases linearly with every additional year in Germany. The employment rate of
refugees rises at a higher rate in the ﬁrst years. After approximately 13 years, the
employment rate of refugees has almost caught up to the employment rate of the
comparison group and approximately 93% of the initial gap is closed.15 Afterwards
the gap increases again. The main diﬀerence between the groups is thus the pace of
assimilation into the labor market.
The IAB SOEP Migration Sample allows us to compare the average duration
until an individual is employed for the ﬁrst time after immigration to Germany. If
our ﬁndings regarding the assimilation patterns are not just the result of changing
cohort quality within the group of refugees, we should observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences
across the groups. Table A.3 reports the regression results for the duration until
an immigrant ﬁnds her ﬁrst employment. In all speciﬁcations, refugees need signif-
icantly more time to ﬁnd their ﬁrst job in Germany. On average, it takes almost
ten months or in other words 20% more time until they are employed for the ﬁrst
time. If we restrict the ﬁrst job to only full-time employment (columns (3) to (4)),
the gap increases to one and a half year which is approximately 50% more time as
an immigrant in the comparison group. The estimation results are conditional on
having worked in Germany at least once. Considering the lower overall employment
15 The strong decline at the end of the proﬁle is in parts the result of the functional form of the assimilation process.
We address this issue in section 2.6.
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Figure 2.3: Assimilation Proﬁles for Employment
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the estimated assimilation proﬁles of refugees and the comparison group based on the estimates of Table 2.1
by year since migration.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013), own calculations.
rate of refugees, the coeﬃcients are likely to be a lower bound estimate of the total
eﬀect.
A large part of the public discussion about refugees and low-skilled immigra-
tion in general focuses on increased public spending via social transfers. Table A.4
presents the results of welfare dependency. The dependent variable is deﬁned as
one if an individual receives unemployment beneﬁts or social assistance and zero
otherwise. Indeed, we observe that refugees do have a higher share of individuals
who receive public transfers. The coeﬃcients of the Microcensus are smaller, but
both samples provide evidence for a higher welfare dependency of refugees. The
results reﬂect the reverse assimilation pattern as observed in Table 2.1. Relative
to the comparison group, the welfare dependency of refugees is much higher after
arriving in Germany and decreases over time. Yet, the share of refugees receiving
transfers does not entirely converge to the rate of the comparison group.
Table A.5 provides us with further evidence on the catch-up process of refugees
and tries to detect if the slower labor market integration of refugees is voluntary
or the result of searching for a job unsuccessfully. For the sample of unemployed
immigrants, we have information whether they plan to be employed in the future.
Columns (1) to (4) show the marginal eﬀects of an ordered probit model for a
discrete variable from one (Deﬁnitely not) to four (Deﬁnitely), columns (5) to
(8) the results for an indicator variable which is one if the immigrant plans to be
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employed and zero otherwise.16 Unemployed refugees have a higher expectation to
be employed in the future than the comparison group. The coeﬃcient in column (8)
becomes even larger including the region of origin-ﬁxed eﬀects which indicates the
intention of refugees to be employed.
Hitherto, our analysis reveals that refugees and economic immigrants diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly in their integration into employment; these diﬀerences can be summarized
into two main ﬁndings. Firstly, refugees have signiﬁcantly lower employment rate
and a signiﬁcantly higher welfare dependency than the comparison group in the
ﬁrst years after arriving in Germany. Secondly, the annual growth in employment
is greater than the growth rates of the comparison group. In other words, the labor
market assimilation proﬁles of refugees are steeper and close large parts of the ini-
tial gap. After about 13 years in Germany, the employment rate of both groups has
almost converged. Evidence on future employment aspirations suggests that both
groups do not diﬀer in their willingness to work, but rather that refugees need more
time ﬁnding a job.
2.5.2 Earnings
So far, we have analyzed the extensive margin of employment between refugees and
the comparison group, but not the earnings of both groups. Earnings represent a
proxy for the productivity of individuals and, if refugees have higher investments in
human capital, it should translate into a greater growth in earnings. For the analysis,
we use the monthly personal income and restrict the sample to individuals who are
currently employed. Again, we should bear in mind that the measures for income
are deﬁned diﬀerently across the data sets and are not fully comparable. Thus, we
will focus on the results of the IAB SOEP Migration Sample.17 Table 2.2 presents
regression results for log net personal income. The raw diﬀerences in labor income
between the groups are large, refugees earn 26% less than the comparison group
in the baseline model (Column (1)). Including further covariates and the region of
origin ﬁxed-eﬀects, the gap substantially reduces to 16%, a decline of about 40%.
Figure 2.4 displays the assimilation proﬁles of both groups. The interpretation of
the assimilation pattern is not straightforward. Given that almost no refugee in our
16The binary variable is one if the individual answers the question with 3 (probable) or 4 (deﬁnitely) and zero
otherwise.
17The results of the Micocensus are presented in Table A.6 in the Appendix.
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Table 2.2: Estimation Results for Income (IAB SOEP)
Log Personal Log Personal Log Personal Log Personal Log Personal
Income Income Income Income Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Refugee -0.256*** -0.233*** -0.157** 1.038 0.877
[0.064] [0.070] [0.077] [0.666] [0.614]
Refugee*Years in Germany -0.407** -0.339*
[0.199] [0.180]
Refugee*Years in Germany² 0.035** 0.030*
[0.018] [0.016]
Refugee*Years in Germany³ -0.001* -0.001*
[0.000] [0.000]
Years in Germany -0.064 -0.043 -0.024 -0.009
[0.047] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046]
Years in Germany² 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.001
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Years in Germany³ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 704 704 704 704 704
R Squared 0.229 0.275 0.300 0.280 0.304
Log Hourly Log Hourly Log Hourly Log Hourly Log Hourly
Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Refugee -0.097* -0.132** -0.115* 1.786** 1.681**
[0.053] [0.056] [0.063] [0.744] [0.663]
Refugee*Years in Germany -0.520*** -0.485***
[0.196] [0.175]
Refugee*Years in Germany² 0.041** 0.039***
[0.016] [0.015]
Refugee*Years in Germany³ -0.001** -0.001**
[0.000] [0.000]
Years in Germany 0.017 0.027 0.052 0.059*
[0.036] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034]
Years in Germany² 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Years in Germany³ -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 704 704 704 704 704
R Squared 0.071 0.084 0.107 0.099 0.119
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2013, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The sample is restricted to individuals who are currently employed.
The dependent variable in columns (1) to (5) is Net Personal Income (in logs) only including earned income. In columns (7) to (10),
the dependent variable is log net hourly wage which is the quotient of income and the working hours. All speciﬁcations include the
same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State). We also include eight region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU
entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, America and Oceania and Russia and other former Soviet Union
republics. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high
school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Figure 2.4: Assimilation Proﬁles for Income
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the estimated assimilation proﬁles of refugees and the comparison group for log net monthly income based
on the estimates of Table 2.2 column (5) by year since migration.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013), own calculations.
sample is employed in the ﬁrst ﬁve years since migration, the assimilation proﬁles
are displayed for refugees who reside for more than six years in Germany.18 The
proﬁle of the comparison group increases with a relative constant growth rate. For
the group of refugees, the proﬁle is steeper and we observe a sizable catch-up process
of refugees. After 18 years, the income gap reduces to less than 2% which translates
into an average annual catch-up rate of 2%. After 18 years, the gap increases again.
However, the increasing gap at the posterior part of the proﬁle should be interpreted
carefully. Firstly, the number of employed individuals in both groups with more
than 20 years since migration is low. Hence, this part of the proﬁle is imprecisely
estimated. Secondly, the assimilation proﬁle of refugees based on the Microcensus
does not have a negative shape at the posterior part.
Compared to the catch-up rate of refugees in the USA (Cortes, 2004), the annual
earnings growth of refugees is slightly smaller in Germany. Yet, the large diﬀerence
between the two countries is in the initial earnings gap. Whereas refugees in the
United States earn on average 17% less within the ﬁve years, the gap in Germany is
about 30%. Thus, despite a similar relative earnings' growth, refugees in Germany
do not entirely close the gap or even oﬀset the gap like in the USA.
An increase in labor income can have two reasons. It could either be due to
18In the ﬁrst ﬁve years, the sample includes twelve observations which belong to the group of refugees. Only one
observation among them is employed.
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increased working hours or due to higher productivity and therefore higher hourly
wages. To disentangle the relative growth of earnings into a part induced by in-
creased working hours and a part induced by hourly wage growth, we calculate the
rough net hourly wages.19 The overall gap in hourly wages between refugees and
the comparison group is 12%, roughly a reduction of 25% compared to the monthly
personal income. Figure 2.5 describes the assimilation proﬁles of the log hourly
wage. Compared to the monthly earnings, the assimilation proﬁle for the compar-
ison group is much steeper. The hourly wage increases by 30% within 15 years.
The assimilation of refugees has a similar pattern as in Figure 2.4. The hourly wage
decreases at ﬁrst and starts to grow after about nine years. After 18 years, the gap is
almost closed. The annual growth rate of refugees relative to the comparison groups
is 2.1%. Given that the wage growth of the comparison group is also 2%, the total
growth rate of refugees is 4.1% per year. The sharp decline in the ﬁrst years might
have the following explanation. In Table A.3, we ﬁnd that refugees with higher
education ﬁnd their ﬁrst job much faster. The negative growth in hourly earning
might just be the result of less productive refugees ﬁnding employment. To test for
this possibility, we estimate the assimilation proﬁles for the full sample deﬁning the
labor income for unemployed individuals as zero. If increased employment of less
productive refugees induces the negative growth rate in the ﬁrst years, we should not
observe a negative assimilation proﬁle for the unconditional sample (Figure A.2).
Indeed, the unconditional income gap decreases with every additional year since mi-
gration. This is a clear indication that increased employment of refugees with lower
productivity leads to negative growth rate.
2.5.3 Type of Employment and Potential Mechanisms
We have investigated that refugees assimilate to the labor market outcomes of eco-
nomic immigrants in terms of employment and earnings, but the assimilation takes
much more time. What are the reasons for the slow assimilation? Table 2.3 sum-
marizes regression coeﬃcients for various employment determinants to give a more
detailed picture of the types of job in which refugees work. Overall, refugees work
more likely in unstable and unskilled jobs. They have a signiﬁcantly higher proba-
bility to be employed temporarily and to work in jobs which are unskilled or do not
19To calculate the net hourly wage, we divide the monthly earnings by the actual working hours. To include
self-employed individuals, we decided to use actual working hours instead of contractual working hours.
31
Figure 2.5: Assimilation Proﬁles for Hourly Wage
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the estimated assimilation proﬁles of refugees and the comparison group for log net hourly wage based on
the estimates of Table 2.2 column (10) by year since migration.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013), own calculations.
match their qualiﬁcations. In terms of magnitude, the eﬀects are large and relevant
given that about 50% of all refugees work in an unskilled position and only 20%
work in jobs which match their qualiﬁcations. In general, one can say that these job
characteristics are associated with lower earnings and less job security. Hence, the
lower hourly wages of refugees are likely to be the result of a higher probability to
work in low quality jobs.
But what are the channels driving the large initial employment gap, the lower
job quality and the catch-up process in the following years? To shed light on the
mechanisms behind the observed assimilation pattern, we test whether refugee sta-
tus has an eﬀect on diﬀerent channels of assimilation: Human capital investments,
language skills as a special type of country-speciﬁc human capital and informal
networks. Thus, we try to disentangle the mechanisms that hamper refugees' ini-
tial labor market integration and to identify areas of immigration policy which can
improve the labor market performance of refugees.
One theoretical argument for a larger earnings' growth of refugees is that refugees
invest more in human capital due to the missing opportunity to return home. Due
to the longer time horizon in the host country, returns to human capital investments
become larger and the human capital then translates into higher productivity and
wages. The IAB SOEP data provides us with a good measure of the propensity to
return home. Individuals were asked if they want to stay in Germany permanently or
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results for Type of Employment
Permanent Self-Employed Unskilled Job matches
Contract Position Qualiﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugee -0.120*** -0.093* 0.020 0.049 0.140*** 0.064 -0.144*** -0.105*
[0.045] [0.052] [0.030] [0.033] [0.052] [0.061] [0.053] [0.061]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 656 656 668 668 605 605 532 532
R Squared 0.092 0.097 0.054 0.077 0.136 0.154 0.094 0.110
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2013, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable permanent contract (in columns (1)-(2)) is
one if the individual possesses a permanent contract and zero otherwise. The dependent variable self-employed (in columns (3)-(4)) is
one if the individual is self-employed and zero otherwise. The dependent variable unskilled position (in columns (5)-(6)) is one if the
individual works in position which does not require vocational or academic training and zero otherwise. The dependent variable job
matches qualiﬁcation (in columns (7)-(8)) is one if the individual works in the occupation she is trained for and zero otherwise. All
speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany, Region of Origin).
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
if they plan to return home. Table 2.4 reports the regression results for a dependent
variable which is one if the individual plans to stay in Germany permanently and
zero otherwise. Indeed, we observe a strong and signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of refugees
on the propensity to stay permanently. The share of individuals who plan to stay
permanently is about 10 percentage points larger than the share of immigrants in
the comparison group (Columns (1) and (2)). Including the region of origin-ﬁxed
eﬀects, the coeﬃcient does not change much in size or loses signiﬁcance. Thus,
refugees have a higher propensity to stay even compared to the peers from the
same region of origin. However, we do not observe more investments into formal
human capital or citizenship acquisition. Refugees are not more likely to naturalize
(Columns (3) and (4)), do not plan to acquire more additional qualiﬁcations or
degrees in the future (Columns (5) and (6)) nor invest in the recognition of their
foreign qualiﬁcations or degrees (Columns (7) and (8)). One explanation could be
that our proxies of human capital investments are not suﬃcient to measure actual
investments. Or, if we consider that about 80% of the refugees work in jobs which
do not match their qualiﬁcations, further investments in formal qualiﬁcations might
not seem to be worthwhile. As a consequence, this lack of investments might hamper
moving up the occupational ladder in the wider future and explain why we do not
observe that refugees outperform economic immigrants.
The key for a successful integration into the host society are language skills.
According to the theoretical framework, refugees should have signiﬁcantly lower
language skills before immigration to Germany. Table 2.5 reports the estimation
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results for Human Capital
Stay in Germany Naturalization Intentions for Recognition of
permanently Further Qualiﬁcation Foreign Qualiﬁcations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugee 0.132*** 0.107*** 0.034 0.004 -0.007 -0.030 -0.025 -0.009
[0.030] [0.034] [0.034] [0.038] [0.026] [0.031] [0.051] [0.060]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,040 1,040 1,057 1,057 1,051 1,051 503 503
R Squared 0.060 0.083 0.098 0.165 0.118 0.132 0.053 0.059
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2013, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(2) is one if the individual
plans to stay in Germany permanently and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (3)-(4) is one if the individual is
naturalized and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(6) is one if the individual has intentions to get further
qualiﬁcations and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(8) is one if the individual has recognized her occupational
degree and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in
Germany, Region of Origin). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
results for the language ability measured as the self-assessed ability to speak Ger-
man (Columns (1) to (8)). Refugees have signiﬁcantly lower language skills than the
comparison group before immigration to Germany. Yet, if we compare the current
level of language skills, the gap in the average level as well as in the share of low
proﬁcient immigrants has vanished. In terms of language ability, refugees show a
strong convergence and reduce the initial shortcomings. The results for speaking
German are consistent with other dimensions of language ability like reading and
writing (Table A.7). Overall, the results show that refugees oﬀset their initial short-
comings and that acquiring language skills is most likely one channel which explains
the distinct assimilation proﬁles.
Another potential channel which might explain the diﬀerent assimilation dura-
tion is the access to informal networks in the host country. Several studies have
shown that social networks are very important channels to ﬁnd a job and improve
job quality (e.g., Dustmann et al., 2015; for a survey, see Ioannides and Datcher
Loury, 2004). Unfortunately, we have no detailed information on the quantity and
quality of the social network, but we have information in both data sets whether
the individuals have found their ﬁrst jobs via friends or relatives. We use this in-
formation as a rough proxy for access to networks. Informal channels are also very
important for the labor market integration in our samples given that more than 50%
of both groups report to have found their ﬁrst job via friends and relatives (Table
A.2). Columns (1) to (4) show the eﬀect of refugee status on the probability to
ﬁnd a job via informal networks for both data sets. The coeﬃcients are negative in
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Table 2.5: Estimation Results for Language Skills
Before Immigration Current Level
Speaking Speaking badly Speaking Speaking badly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugee 0.530*** 0.489*** 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.022 -0.103 -0.002 -0.020
[0.101] [0.111] [0.031] [0.036] [0.086] [0.100] [0.020] [0.022]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055
Log-Likelihood -1191,49 -1180,39 -1210,76 -1166,18
R Squared 0.055 0.065 0.092 0.111
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2013, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable speaking (in columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6))
is self-assessed language skills regarding speaking German (reported on a scale from 1=Very well to 5=Not at all). The dependent
variable speaking badly (in columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)) is an indicator variable which is one if self-assessed language skills are
reported as 5=Not at all or 4=Poorly and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier
tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany, Region of Origin). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
all speciﬁcations and both data sets indicate that refugees lack the same access to
informal network as economic or family immigrants. As a proxy for the quality of
the network, we use the ethnic composition of the circle of friends. A larger share of
natives might raise the overall quality of the network (given the better average labor
market position of natives) or provide immigrants with additional information. The
dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is an indicator variable which is one if all
or most friends of the individual are foreigners and zero otherwise. In columns (7)
and (8), we estimate an ordered probit model for a discrete dependent variable.20
All coeﬃcients show that refugees have fewer natives within their friends. Given
that (close) contact to natives increase the labor force integration (e.g., Meng and
Gregory, 2005), refugees have a weaker starting position than immigrants in the
comparison group.
Yet, the problem of reverse causality arises. The weaker contact to natives could
be a reason for lower labor market performance, but it could also be the result of it.
Yet, in sum, we ﬁnd evidence that refugees have less access to informal networks and
that the quality of the network is lower. Both ﬁndings indicate that the access to
informal network could be one explanation for the slower labor market integration
of refugees.
20The variable Share of Foreign Friends ranges from one (=all friends are foreigner) to six (=none).
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results for Informal Networks
Informal Job Informal Job Friends mostly Share of
Search (MZ) Search (IAB) Foreigner Foreign Friends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugee -0.189** -0.129 -0.049 -0.053 0.104*** 0.071 -0.274*** -0.234**
[0.077] [0.084] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.043] [0.088] [0.098]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 219 219 973 973 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052
R Squared 0.173 0.239 0.025 0.035 0.060 0.098
Log-Likelihood -1602,18 -1583.73
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1985 and 2008 (MZ) or 2013 (IAB SOEP), aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable in columns
(1)-(4) is one if the individual found her job via friends or relatives and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5)-(6) is
one if the individual reports that all or most of her friends are foreigners and zero otherwise. Columns (7)-(8) report marginal eﬀects
of an ordered probit model. The dependent variable is the share of foreigners within the circle of friends (from 1=all to 6=none). All
speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany, Region of Origin).
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: Micocensus (2008) and IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
2.5.4 Heterogeneity of the Results
So far, the samples of our analysis included both, female and male immigrants.
Yet, the eﬀects might by gender. Table A.8 presents the eﬀects for men and women
separately. It appears that the observed patterns of the full sample are more pro-
nounced for male refugees. The initial gap as well as the catch-up rate are larger.
Female refugees show a more similar labor market assimilation as female immigrants
in the comparison group. This result might not be unexpected as the average labor
market integration of female immigrants is relatively low. Yet, female refugees also
show a clear convergence in personal income and hourly wage.
If refugees have diﬃculties to apply their skills and qualiﬁcations, refugees with
a medium or high level of education should be predominantly aﬀected. Table A.9
shows the estimation results for employment, personal income, and hourly wage by
education group. A higher educational level increases the employment probability
and the income for both immigrant groups. Relative to the comparison group, the
educational level of refugee does not have an impact on employment. However, it has
an eﬀect on both, the income and the hourly wage of refugees. High-skilled refugees
earn signiﬁcantly less than high-skilled immigrants in the comparison group. The
wage penalty (relative to the comparison group) even oﬀsets the wage premium of
being high-skilled. Medium- and low-skilled refugees seem to have a similar labor
market performance as the comparison group. Given that we compare refugees to
immigrants from the same region of origin, lower quality of the educational degrees
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of refugees is not a likely explanation for the ﬁnding. Skill depreciation or miss-
ing certiﬁcates or credentials which could attest qualiﬁcations could however be an
explanation why high-skilled refugees earn so much less.
2.6 Robustness Checks
The idea of the paper is to compare refugees to economic immigrants. Thus,
the deﬁnition of the comparison group is crucial for the identiﬁcation of assimilation
patterns between the groups. Previous ﬁndings could just be the results of a speciﬁc
deﬁnition of the comparison group and not reﬂect a general pattern. To test the
robustness of our results, we set up several diﬀerent comparison groups. Table A.10
presents the regression results of four diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the comparison group.
It ranges from a very broad deﬁnition of economic immigrants including all immi-
grants in Germany to very narrow deﬁnitions only consisting of family or economic
immigrants. Throughout all speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients of the assimilation pro-
cess do not vary much. The assimilation pattern of refugees is observable in every
speciﬁcation and shows the catch-up process of refugees. Thus, we are conﬁdent that
the observed catch-up process is robust and not the result of a selective deﬁnition
of the comparison group.
Alternatively, the assimilation pattern of refugees could be the result of one
speciﬁc origin group within the refugee or the comparison group. Refugees from, for
instance, the Balkan states could be very successful in their economic integration
in Germany and account for large parts of the overall results of refugees. To check
for this possibility, we re-estimate the regression models for employment and net
personal income always excluding one of the largest regions of origin-groups. Table
A.11 displays the results for the restricted samples. Overall, the general patterns
are robust over all speciﬁcations and do not depend on one speciﬁc group of source
countries.
Another potential caveat of our analysis might be the functional form of the
assimilation proﬁle. The estimated proﬁle might not capture the true relationship
between years since migration and economic outcomes. To allow for a more ﬂexi-
ble form of the assimilation process, Table A.12 presents regression coeﬃcients for
employment, welfare dependency and income including three separate indicators of
years since migration. Each indicator captures six years of the assimilation process.
The results indicate that our functional form assumption should be capable to cap-
ture the true assimilation process. The pace of assimilation is the largest in the
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early years in the new host country and decreases over time. As mentioned before,
only one refugee in our sample is employed within the ﬁrst six years. Thus, the
interpretation of the coeﬃcients for net personal income of refugees should focus
on the comparison of the later indicator variables. As a second test, we estimate
the assimilation proﬁles using linear to quadric polynomial speciﬁcations for years
since migration. Table A.13 presents the coeﬃcients for all four speciﬁcations and
Figure A.3 illustrates the diﬀerences in the assimilation pattern for employment,
log personal income and log hourly wage.21 For employment, the Figure A.3 shows
that the second order polynomial is enough to capture the assimilation process. The
assimilation process for income and wage is more complex. Yet, from the third order
polynomials, the patterns converge. Thus, we are conﬁdent that our results are not
the consequence of the selected functional form but represent the relation between
years since migration and the respective economic outcomes most eﬃciently.
2.7 Conclusion
The number of refugees living in the OECD has risen over the last years, but
not much attention has been drawn to their economic integration. In this article,
we attempt to ﬁll the gap and analyze the labor market integration of refugees in
Germany. By comparing the labor market assimilation proﬁles of refugees with
the proﬁles of economic immigrants, we can detect if refugees are a distinct group
within the group of immigrants. Moreover, our empirical approach makes it possible
to disentangle the eﬀect of refugee status from the region of origin-eﬀect by including
region of origin-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our results are twofold: First, refugees start in a weaker economic position
characterized by lower employment and higher welfare dependency. Yet, they catch-
up over time in Germany and after around 13 years, the employment rate of refugees
has almost reached the employment rate of the comparison group. Secondly, the
earnings of refugees are signiﬁcantly lower than the earnings of economic immigrants.
But again, refugees have a greater growth rate and after 17 years, the gap has almost
disappeared. The greater relative growth in earnings is not only due to an increase
in working hours, but also due to higher productivity. The reason for the slower
integration is most likely the lack of country speciﬁc human and social capital.
Refugees have more diﬃculties ﬁnding jobs in which they can apply their skills than
21Unlike the previous ﬁgures, the lines in Figure A.3 show the estimated diﬀerence in outcome by years in Germany
between refugees and the comparison group.
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economic immigrants.
Our results have important policy implications. Refugees should be considered
as one source of immigration which, in the medium and long run, has similar la-
bor market outcomes as economic and family immigrants. Thus, an assessment of
refugees' labor market performance should consider the diﬀerent speed of assimila-
tion. Policies which want to improve the labor market integration of refugees should
focus on measures which speed up the job search and matching process. This is
especially important in order to avoid skill depreciation and reduce ﬁscal costs.
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2.8 Appendix
Figure A.1: Average Education by Year of Immigration
Notes: The ﬁgure displays the average level of education by year of immigration for refugees and the comparison group.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
Figure A.2: Assimilation Proﬁles for Income (unconditional)
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the estimated assimilation proﬁles of refugees and the comparison group for net monthly income based on
estimation for log net personal income unconditional on employment status (unemployed individuals are set to zero) by years since
migration.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013), own calculations.
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Figure A.3: Robustness of the Functional Form
Notes: The ﬁgures show the gap in estimated assimilation proﬁles between refugees and the comparison group for diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations of the functional form. They include speciﬁcations from a linear to a fourth order polynomial relation between years since
migration*Refugee and the respective outcome.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
MZ
Refugees Economic Immigrants Signiﬁcance
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 43.43 7.826 39.62 8.352 ***
Years in Germany 12.16 4.29 9.62 5.20 ***
Male 0.588 0.493 0.479 0.500 **
Naturalized 0.304 0.461 0.278 0.448
Low-skilled 0.387 0.488 0.333 0.472
Medium-skilled 0.353 0.479 0.509 0.500 ***
High-skilled 0.259 0.439 0.158 0.365 ***
Regions of Origin
New EU Member States (EU-12) 0.015 0.120 0.236 0.020 ***
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.284 0.031 0.091 0.288 ***
Turkey 0.058 0.235 0.160 0.367 ***
Middle East 0.264 0.442 0.044 0.206 ***
Africa 0.068 0.253 0.051 0.220
Asia 0.112 0.317 0.071 0.257 *
America and Oceania 0.024 0.155 0.040 0.196
Former Soviet Union 0.171 0.377 0.303 0.460 ***
Employment 0.607 0.489 0.658 0.474
Receive Welfare Transfers 0.264 0.442 0.197 0.398 *
Log Personal Income 7.008 0.678 7.006 0.686
Observations 204 448
IAB SOEP
Refugees Economic Immigrants Signiﬁcance
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 45.07 7.22 39.94 7.72 ***
Years in Germany 14.63 4.44 10.32 5.39 ***
Age at arrival 30.44 7.156 29.61 7.215
Male 0.627 0.485 0.380 0.486 ***
Naturalized 0.289 0.454 0.186 0.389 ***
Years of Education 9.880 1.721 10.40 1.481 ***
Low-skilled 0.394 0.490 0.301 0.459 ***
Medium-skilled 0.426 0.495 0.479 0.500
High-skilled 0.181 0.386 0.220 0.415
Regions of Origin
New EU Member States (EU-12) 0.008 0.089 0.425 0.495 ***
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.325 0.469 0.134 0.341 **
Turkey 0.120 0.326 0.178 0.383 ***
Middle East 0.221 0.416 0.015 0.121 ***
Africa 0.052 0.223 0.040 0.195
Asia 0.068 0.253 0.032 0.177 **
America and Oceania 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.121 *
Former Soviet Union 0.205 0.404 0.162 0.369
Employment 0.594 0.492 0.707 0.456 ***
Receive Welfare Transfers 0.369 0.484 0.153 0.361 ***
Log Personal Labor Income 6.787 0.776 6.871 0.739
Log Hourly Wage 5.708 0.537 5.797 0.470 **
Time till First Job 1.601 2.975 2.682 3.514
Observations 249 808
Notes: The tables report summary statistics for ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1990 and 2013 (2008),
arrived aged 20 or above and who are 25-60 years old. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school degree or vocational
degree; medium-skilled are those with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree. The variable
Employment is one if the individual is employed and zero otherwise. The variable Personal Income (in logs) include net personal
income (MZ) or net labor income (IAB SOEP). The variable Receive Welfare Beneﬁts is one if the individual receives either
unemployment beneﬁts (ALG-I) or social assistance (ALG-II) and zero otherwise. The variable Time till First Job is the log time
spend in Germany until an individual ﬁnds a job (in years). Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus and IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics cont'd
Refugees Economic Immigrants Signiﬁcance
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Permanent Contract 0.710 0.456 0.739 0.440
Self-Employed 0.108 0.312 0.081 0.272
Unskilled Position 0.471 0.501 0.360 0.481 **
Job matches Qualiﬁcation 0.210 0.409 0.396 0.490 ***
Stay in Germany Permanently 0.888 0.317 0.738 0.440 ***
Naturalization 0.289 0.454 0.186 0.389 ***
Recognition of Credentials 0.196 0.399 0.207 0.406
Intentions for Further Qualiﬁcations 0.118 0.323 0.229 0.420 ***
Speaking German (after Immigration) 4.482 1.004 4.035 1.168 ***
Speaking German badly (after Immigration) 0.863 0.344 0.708 0.455 ***
Speaking German (Now) 2.406 0.808 2.377 0.860
Speaking German badly (Now) 0.072 0.259 0.087 0.282
Informal Job Search 0.543 0.499 0.568 0.496
Friends mostly Foreigner 2.751 1.299 2.991 1.254 ***
Share of Foreign Friends 0.502 0.501 0.401 0.490 ***
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1990 and 2013, whose
age at immigration was 20 years or above and who are 25-60 years old. The variable permanent contract is one if the individual posses
a permanent contract and zero otherwise. The variable self-employed is one if the individual is self-employed and zero otherwise. The
variable unskilled position is one if the individual work in position which does not require vocational or academic training and zero
otherwise. The variable job matches qualiﬁcation is one if the individual works in the occupation she is trained for and zero otherwise.
The variable naturalized one if the individual is naturalized and zero otherwise. The recognition of credentials variable is one if the
individual has recognized her occupational degree and zero otherwise. The variable Intentions for further Qualiﬁcations is one if the
individual has intentions to get further qualiﬁcations and zero otherwise. The variables Speaking German (after immigration) and
Speaking German (Now) are self-assessed language skills regarding speaking German (reported on a scale from 1=Very well to 5=Not
at all). The variables Speaking badly (after Immigration or Now) are binary variable which is one if self-assessed language skills are
reported as 5=Not at all or 4=Poorly and zero otherwise. The variables Participation in a German Language Course (in Germany)
are binary variables which are one if the individuals has participated in a language course and zero otherwise. The variable Informal
Job Search is one if the individual found her job via friends or relatives and zero otherwise. The variable Friends mostly Foreigner is
one if the individual reports that all or most of her friends are foreigners and zero otherwise. The variable Share of Foreign Friends
reports the the share of foreigners within the circle of friends (from 1=all to 6=none). Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
Table A.3: Estimation Results for Time Until First Job
Log Years Until First Job
Every Type of Employment Full-Time Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee 0.414*** 0.194** 0.484*** 0.354***
[0.067] [0.079] [0.082] [0.099]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes No Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes
Observations 876 876 671 671
R Squared 0.160 0.209 0.141 0.159
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2013, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable is the log time spend in Germany until
an individual ﬁnds a job (in years). Estimates in columns (1)-(2) include migrants who found a job (both, part-time and full-time).
Columns (3)-(4) show the coeﬃcients only including migrants who found a full-time position. All speciﬁcations include the same
individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Region of Origin). They also include 8 region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects
(new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, America and Oceania and Russia and other former
Soviet Union republics. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those
with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.4: Estimation Results for Welfare Dependency
Welfare Dependency
MZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Refugee 0.088** 0.105** 0.080* 0.739*** 0.732**
[0.041] [0.042] [0.045] [0.282] [0.289]
Refugee*Years in Germany -0.120** -0.129**
[0.053] [0.053]
Refugee*Years in Germany² 0.005** 0.006**
[0.002] [0.002]
Observations 539 539 539 539 539
R Squared 0.082 0.107 0.137 0.117 0.148
IAB SOEP
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Refugee 0.185*** 0.181*** 0.159*** 0.604** 0.539**
[0.033] [0.034] [0.038] [0.236] [0.225]
Refugee*Years in Germany -0.066* -0.064*
[0.036] [0.034]
Refugee*Years in Germany² 0.002* 0.002*
[0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057
R Squared 0.126 0.139 0.158 0.144 0.163
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2008 (MZ) or 2013 (IAB SOEP), arrived aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable is
one if the individual receives either unemployment beneﬁts (ALG-I) or social assistance (ALG-II) and zero otherwise. Estimates in
columns (1) to (5) are based on the Microcensus, columns (6) to (10) on the IAB SOEP Migration Sample. All speciﬁcations include
the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany, Region of Origin). They also include 8
region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, America and Oceania and
Russia and other former Soviet Union republics. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school degree or vocational degree;
medium-skilled are those with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1. Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
Table A.5: Estimation Results for Employment in the Future
Plan for Employment in Future Plan for Employment in Future (Yes/No)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugee 0.114 0.123 0.223 0.371* 0.015 0.014 0.057 0.095
[0.170] [0.175] [0.179] [0.201] [0.057] [0.055] [0.055] [0.062]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Region of Origin No No No Yes No No No Yes
Observations 334 334 334 334 334 334 334 334
Log-Likelihood -357.98 -338.70 -334.80 -322.23
R Squared 0.098 0.174 0.210 0.250
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2013, arrived aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable (in columns (1)-(4)) is whether
they plan to be gainfully employed in the future ( from 1= Deﬁnitely not to 4 = Deﬁnitely). The dependent variable (in Columns
(5) -(8)) is one if they plan to be gainfully employed ( 4 = Deﬁnitely and 3 = Probable) and zero otherwise (2=Improbable and 1=
Deﬁnitely not). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013)
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Table A.6: Estimation Results for Income (MZ)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Income Income Income Income Income Wage Wage Wage Wage
Refugee -0.083 -0.115 -0.099 -0.331 -0.250 0.032 0.029 -0.512 -0.670
[0.068] [0.071] [0.079] [1.188] [1.243] [0.063] [0.063] [1.867] [1.806]
Refugee*Years in Germany -0.024 -0.028 0.173 0.237
[0.363] [0.382] [0.502] [0.491]
Refugee*Years in Germany² 0.004 0.003 -0.018 -0.026
[0.034] [0.036] [0.043] [0.042]
Refugee*Years in Germany³ -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Years in Germany -0.013 -0.006 -0.033 -0.021 -0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018
[0.027] [0.027] [0.063] [0.065] [0.022] [0.024] [0.054] [0.057]
Years in Germany² 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.008] [0.008] [0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.007]
Years in Germany³ -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405 405
R Squared 0.309 0.339 0.352 0.350 0.360 0.106 0.119 0.109 0.122
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2008, arrived aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The sample is restricted to individuals who are currently
employed. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (6) is Net Personal Income (in logs) only including earned income. In columns
(7) to (10), the dependent variable is actual working hours in the last month (in hours). Columns (11) to (14) show the coeﬃcients
for the dependent variable log net hourly wage which is the quotient of income and the working hours. All speciﬁcations include
the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State). We also include 8 region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU
entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, America and Oceania and Russia and other former Soviet Union
republics. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high
school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2008)
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Table A.7: Language Skills
Level of German Language Before Immigration
Speaking Speaking badly Writing Writing badly Reading Reading badly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Refugee 0.530*** 0.489*** 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.504*** 0.465*** 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.510*** 0.484*** 0.122*** 0.130***
[0.101] [0.111] [0.031] [0.036] [0.104] [0.113] [0.030] [0.034] [0.105] [0.112] [0.032] [0.037]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany No No No No No No No No No No No No
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055
Log-Liklihood -1191.49 -1180.39 -1265.75 -1255.23 -1260.15 -1250.96
R Squared 0.055 0.065 0.059 0.067 0.061 0.068
Current Level of German Language
Speaking Speaking badly Writing Writing badly Reading Reading badly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Refugee 0.022 -0.103 -0.002 -0.020 0.096 0.009 0.014 0.002 0.077 -0.014 -0.007 0.007
[0.086] [0.100] [0.020] [0.022] [0.081] [0.093] [0.030] [0.034] [0.084] [0.094] [0.024] [0.026]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055 1,055
Log-Likelihood -1210.76 -1166.18 -1385.86 -1372.86 -1310.63 -1289.26
R Squared 0.092 0.111 0.134 0.140 0.131 0.143
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1985 and 2013, arrived aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variables speaking (in columns (1)-(2)),
writing (in columns (5)-(6)) and reading (in columns (9)-(10)) are self-assessed language skills speaking German (reported on a scale
from 5=Not at all to 1= Very well). These columns report marginal eﬀects of an ordered probit model. The dependent variable
speaking badly (in columns (3)-(4), (7)-(8) and (11)-(12)) is a binary variable which is one if self-assessed language skills are reported
as 5=Not at all or 4=Poorly) and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables
(Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany, Region of Origin). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013)
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Table A.8: Estimation Results by Gender
Men
Employment Log Income Log Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Refugee -0.133** -0.820*** -0.193** 2.936 -0.161*** 2.665
[0.057] [0.265] [0.083] [2.263] [0.062] [1.628]
Refugee*Years in Germany 0.109*** -0.762 -0.657*
[0.041] [0.522] [0.394]
Refugee*Years in Germany² -0.004** 0.056 0.047
[0.002] [0.038] [0.030]
Refugee*Years in Germany³ -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
Observations 463 463 351 351 351 351
R Squared 0.151 0.164 0.253 0.197 0.226 0.192
Women
Employment Log Income Log Wage
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Refugee -0.070 -0.320 -0.176 0.408 -0.037 1.455**
[0.062] [0.305] [0.146] [0.594] [0.124] [0.617]
Refugee*Years in Germany 0.040 -0.335 -0.484*
[0.052] [0.291] [0.260]
Refugee*Years in Germany² -0.001 0.033 0.040
[0.002] [0.028] [0.025]
Refugee*Years in Germany³ -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
Observations 594 594 353 353 353 353
R Squared 0.171 0.172 0.128 0.139 0.115 0.135
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1985 and 2013, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable (in columns (1)-(2) and (7)-(8)) is whether
the individual is employed or not. Columns (1) and (2) include male immigrants, columns (7) and (8) female immigrants. The
dependent variable (in columns (3)-(4) and (9)-(10)) is the log net personal labor income. Columns (3) and (4) include male
immigrants, columns (9) and (10) female immigrants. The dependent variable (in columns (5)-(6) and (11)-(12)) is the log net
hourly wage. Columns (5) and (6) include male immigrants, columns (11) and (12) female immigrants. All speciﬁcations include
the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany). They also include 8 region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, America/Oceania and Russia/other former
Soviet Union states. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those
with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.9: Estimation Results by Education Group
Employment Log Personal Income Log Hourly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Refugee -0.176*** -0.136** -0.073 -0.000 -0.014 0.009
[0.059] [0.062] [0.103] [0.103] [0.063] [0.065]
Refugee *Medium Education 0.056 0.085 -0.094 -0.102 -0.058 -0.072
[0.076] [0.076] [0.137] [0.134] [0.089] [0.088]
Refugee*High Education -0.125 -0.063 -0.590*** -0.556*** -0.542*** -0.528***
[0.096] [0.095] [0.197] [0.194] [0.152] [0.150]
Medium Education 0.154*** 0.089** 0.296*** 0.238*** 0.115*** 0.089**
[0.037] [0.039] [0.064] [0.064] [0.041] [0.043]
High Education 0.198*** 0.130*** 0.573*** 0.536*** 0.392*** 0.375***
[0.043] [0.045] [0.082] [0.083] [0.055] [0.056]
Observations 1,057 1,057 704 704 704 704
R Squared 0.125 0.154 0.304 0.325 0.169 0.181
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1985 and 2013, arrived aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable (in columns (1)-(2)) is whether
the individual is employed or not. The dependent variable (in columns 3)-(4)) is the log net personal labor income. The dependent
variable (in columns (5)-(6)) is the log net hourly wage. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables
(Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany). They also include 8 region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia,
Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, America/Oceania and Russia/other former Soviet Union states. Low-skilled individuals are those
without a high school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled
are those with college degree. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.10: Diﬀerent Deﬁnitions of the Comparison Group
Employment
All immigrants Third Country Family Economic
Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugee -0.103*** -0.477** -0.100*** -0.468** -0.080* -0.386* -0.193*** -0.799***
[0.037] [0.209] [0.039] [0.211] [0.044] [0.217] [0.051] [0.238]
Refugee 0.061* 0.062* 0.053 0.110***
*Years in Germany [0.032] [0.033] [0.034] [0.037]
Refugee* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.004***
Years in Germany² [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Refugee*
Years in Germany³
Observations 2,004 2,004 1,384 1,384 835 835 565 565
R Squared 0.123 0.127 0.144 0.148 0.156 0.126 0.167 0.187
Log Labor Income
All immigrants Third Country Family Economic
Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Refugee -0.210*** 0.995* -0.201*** 1.001* -0.177** 0.887 -0.242** 0.593
[0.072] [0.581] [0.073] [0.591] [0.087] [0.606] [0.097] [0.491]
Refugee* -0.358** -0.365** -0.313* -0.350**
Years in Germany [0.170] [0.171] [0.175] [0.157]
Refugee* 0.030** 0.031** 0.026* 0.035**
Years in Germany² [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014]
Refugee* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001**
Years in Germany³ [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,428 1,428 958 958 520 520 410 410
R Squared 0.295 0.298 0.295 0.300 0.303 0.306 0.334 0.353
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1985 and 2013, arrived aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable (in columns (1)-(8)) is whether the
individual is employed or not. In Columns (9) to (16), the dependent variable is log net labor income. Columns (1)-(2) and (9)-(10)
include all immigrants in the data set, columns (3)-(4) and (11)-(12) all third country immigrants (excluding ethnic Germans). The
comparison group in columns (5)-(6) and (13)-(14) consists of family migrants, columns (7)-(8) and (15)-(16) of immigrants whose
reason for immigration was employment. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age,
State, Years in Germany). They also include 8 region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle
East, Asia, Africa, America/Oceania and Russia/other former Soviet Union states. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high
school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with
college degree.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.11: Excluding Diﬀerent Regions of Origin
Employment
Total Sample Without EU-12 Without Balkan Without Without former
States Middle East Soviet States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Refugee -0.110*** -0.505** -0.120*** -0.652*** -0.123** -0.469* -0.101** -0.476* -0.097** -0.369
[0.041] [0.210] [0.042] [0.200] [0.050] [0.256] [0.042] [0.251] [0.048] [0.238]
Refugee*Years in Germany 0.072** 0.087*** 0.060 0.069* 0.059
[0.033] [0.033] [0.039] [0.038] [0.037]
Refugee*Years in Germany² -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 -0.003* -0.003*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1,057 1,057 712 712 868 868 990 990 875 875
R Squared 0.152 0.156 0.168 0.175 0.146 0.149 0.140 0.144 0.181 0.185
Log Labor Income
Total Sample Without EU-12 Without Balkan Without Without former
States Middle East Soviet States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Refugee -0.157** 0.877 -0.150* 1.840 -0.209** 0.849 -0.155* 0.383 -0.008 0.719
[0.077] [0.614] [0.084] [1.733] [0.104] [0.589] [0.080] [0.378] [0.074] [0.504]
Refugee*Years in Germany -0.339* -0.534 -0.361* -0.212 -0.308**
[0.180] [0.385] [0.186] [0.132] [0.145]
Refugee*Years in Germany² 0.030* 0.043 0.033** 0.019 0.031**
[0.016] [0.028] [0.017] [0.012] [0.013]
Refugee*Years in Germany³ -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001***
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 704 704 441 441 595 595 685 685 587 587
R Squared 0.300 0.304 0.323 0.327 0.291 0.297 0.311 0.314 0.341 0.350
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2013, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable in the upper part of the table is employemt.
The dependent variable in the lower part is log net personal labor income (conditional on being employed). The columns (1)-(2) show
the results of the main speciﬁcation. Columns (3) and (4) exclude all immigrants from the EU-12 (Eastern European member states
of the EU), (5) und (6) all immigrants from the Balkan states, (7) and (8) all immigrants from the Middle East and (9) and (10) all
immigrants from former Soviet states. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age,
State, Years in Germany). They also include 8 region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle
East, Asia, Africa, America/Oceania and Russia/other former Soviet Union states. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high
school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with
college degree.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
Table A.12: Functional Form of Assimilation Process
Employment Welfare Net Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Refugee -0.548*** -0.425*** 0.504*** 0.438*** 0.027 0.004
[0.116] [0.110] [0.159] [0.156] [0.079] [0.078]
Refugee*Years in Germany (6-12) 0.399*** 0.341*** -0.295* -0.286* -0.417** -0.277
[0.138] [0.129] [0.174] [0.168] [0.203] [0.202]
Refugee*Years in Germany (12-18) 0.405*** 0.352*** -0.303* -0.259 -0.213* -0.110
[0.126] [0.115] [0.166] [0.160] [0.118] [0.128]
Refugee*Years in Germany (18-23) 0.296** 0.223* -0.341** -0.274 -0.142 -0.088
[0.135] [0.126] [0.172] [0.167] [0.150] [0.152]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 714 714
R Squared 0.106 0.139 0.079 0.103 0.272 0.296
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2008, aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable (in columns (1)-(2)) is whether the
individual is employed. The dependent variable (in Columns (3) -(4)) is one if the individual receives either unemployment beneﬁts
(ALG-I) or social assistance (ALG-II) and zero otherwise. In Columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is log net labor income.
The variables Years in Germany are indicator variables being one if the individual has lived in Germany for the respective duration
and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in
Germany). They also include 8 region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia,
Africa, America/Oceania and Russia/other former Soviet Union states. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school
degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college
degree.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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Table A.13: Functional Form of Assimilation Process II
Employment Net Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Refugee -0.071 -0.488** -0.677* -0.316 -0.259 -0.629 0.877 0.003
[0.113] [0.211] [0.386] [0.668] [0.254] [0.578] [0.614] [0.755]
Refugee*Years in Germany -0.004 0.066** 0.133 -0.047 0.008 0.064 -0.339* 0.047
[0.007] [0.033] [0.105] [0.275] [0.016] [0.087] [0.180] [0.427]
Refugee*Years in Germany² -0.003** -0.009 0.018 -0.002 0.030* -0.022
[0.001] [0.009] [0.038] [0.003] [0.016] [0.065]
Refugee*Years in Germany³ 0.000 -0.001 -0.001* 0.002
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.004]
Refugee*Years in Germany4 0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000]
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,057 1,057 1,057 1,057 704 704 704 704
R Squared 0.134 0.139 0.140 0.141 0.299 0.300 0.304 0.306
AIC 1267.11 1265.06 1267.35 1270.48 1372.93 1376.21 1375.67 1377.26
Notes: The table reports regression results for ﬁrst-generation refugees and a comparison group of immigrants who arrived in Germany
between 1990 and 2008, arrived aged 20 or above and are 25-60 years old. The dependent variable (in columns (1)-(4)) is whether
the individual is employed. In Columns (5) and (8), the dependent variable is log net labor income. All speciﬁcations include the
same individual characteristics as earlier tables (Gender, Age, State, Years in Germany). They also include 8 region of origin ﬁxed
eﬀects (new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, America/Oceania and Russia/other former Soviet
Union states. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with high
school degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree.Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and *p<0.1.
Source: IAB SOEP Migration Sample (2013).
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3 Returns to Citizenship? Evidence from
Germany's Recent Immigration Reforms
3.1 Introduction
Over recent decades, many developed countries have accumulated sizable im-
migrant populations1. In 2013, the share of foreign-born was 12% in France, 17%
in Sweden and almost 28% in Switzerland. These numbers are comparable to the
share of foreign-born in traditional immigrant countries like Australia, Canada or
the United States (OECD, 2015; Hanson, 2009). At the same time, immigrants
often seem to perform poorly in the labor market. They have higher unemployment
rates and earn substantially less than natives (e.g., Algan et al., 2010; OECD, 2015);
in Europe, they often fall short along cultural or political integration as well (Algan
et al., 2012).
This lack of social and economic integration poses substantial challenges for
destination countries. A disadvantaged economic position reduces the ﬁscal bene-
ﬁt of immigration to the destination country. In aging societies such as Germany,
Italy or Japan, lack of assimilation may undermine eﬀorts to sustain the current
standard of living. Economic exclusion might also threaten the social cohesion of
host countries producing social unrest and hostility among the native population.
While immigrant performance seems to be more successful in traditional immigra-
1The paper is joint work with Christina Gathmann. We thank Christine Binzel, George Borjas, Christian Dust-
mann, Zeno Enders, Ben Elsner, Andreas Hauﬂer, Giovanni Facchini, Eckhard Janeba, Astrid Kunze, Panu
Poutvaara, Judith Saurer, Albert Solé-Olle´, Massimiliano Tani, Silke Uebelmesser and participants at the Uni-
versity of Mannheim, University of Heidelberg, CESIfo Conference on Public Sector Economics, IZA Research
Seminar, the Workshop on Experiments and Quasi-Experiments, the Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Eu-
ropean Economic Association Meeting, Society of Labor Economists Meeting, European Association for Labor
Economists Meeting, the Verein für Socialpolitik and the TEMPO Conference in Dublin for valuable comments.
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tion countries, the speed of assimilation as well as its underlying mechanisms are
still hotly debated (see, e.g., Abramitzky et al., 2012; Borjas, 2013; or Card, 2005 for
recent contributions). As such, the current situation raises a number of very impor-
tant questions how immigrants may be better integrated into host societies. Which
public policies are eﬀective in promoting the economic integration of immigrants?
Or, does successful integration hinge on the right selection of immigrants by the
host country instead? Answers to these questions are crucial for the economic and
social well-being of immigrants and destination countries alike.
In this article, we investigate what role citizenship plays for the assimilation
of immigrants. In particular, does a more liberal access to citizenship speed up
the economic integration of immigrants in the host country? And if so, what are
the underlying mechanisms? Economic theory suggests a number of reasons why
citizenship could improve labor market success compared to a permanent resident
status. First, citizenship is required for a number of civil servant or public sector
jobs. In some countries like Germany, these restrictions apply to a much wider range
of occupations: prior to 2012, non-EU citizens had only restricted access to regulated
professions like lawyers, notaries, pharmacists or physicians. To the extent that these
jobs oﬀer better pay or working conditions than jobs open to the average immigrant,
naturalization improves the labor market prospects of immigrants. A second reason
is that citizenship provides full geographic mobility within the European Union.
By becoming a citizen in one of the EU member states, an individual therefore
obtains not only the right to live and work in one, but all EU labor markets.2
Employers might therefore hesitate to hire a non-EU citizen for a job with extensive
traveling or assignments abroad due to additional visa costs and reduced ﬂexibility,
for example. Furthermore, employers in the private sector might be less willing
to invest in a foreign employee who, from their point of view, is less committed to
remain in the host country (e.g., Lalonde and Topel, 1997). Through naturalization,
the immigrant could therefore provide a signal of long-term commitment to the
destination country - and thus reduce potential barriers to career mobility.
Finally, access to citizenship also increases an immigrant's incentive to invest in
the language or other speciﬁc skills of the host country. With better destination-
speciﬁc skills immigrants are more productive on the job or can take advantage of
entirely new job opportunities (Chiswick and Miller, 1995; Dustmann and Glitz,
2011 provide a comprehensive survey). Hence, changes in incentives on both the de-
2In contrast, an immigrant with permanent resident status has to prove economic self-suﬃciency (and possibly
fulﬁll additional criteria) if she wants to settle in another EU member state.
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mand and supply side of the labor market suggest that access to citizenship could be
an important policy instrument to improve the economic integration of immigrants.
Yet, there are also reasons to believe that a simple comparison of naturalized
and non-naturalized immigrants is likely to overstate the true beneﬁts of citizen-
ship. Because naturalized migrants are not selected randomly from the immigrant
population, it is diﬃcult to separate the return to citizenship from the selection into
naturalization. Migrants applying for citizenship might well be those with the high-
est motivation to integrate and the best prerequisites to perform well in the host
country. Previous studies from Canada and the United States, for instance, suggest
indeed that selection into citizenship is positive with respect to observable skills (see
Chiswick and Miller, 2008; Mazzolari, 2009; and Yang, 1994 for the United States;
and De Voretz and Pivnenko, 2006 for Canada). A second diﬃculty is that eligibility
to citizenship is closely tied to the number of years an immigrant has lived in the
host country. As a result, it is challenging to disentangle the returns to citizenship
from assimilation in the host country more broadly.
To overcome these empirical challenges, we exploit the unique setting in Ger-
many. Today, more than ten million foreign-born live in Germany, about 13% of
Germany's population. Yet, Germany is an exemplary case for the assimilation and
integration problems of immigrants with substantial lower employment and earn-
ings even among second-generation immigrants (e.g., Algan et al., 2010 for recent
evidence). Most important for our purpose, Germany has substantially liberalized
its access to citizenship over the past decades. Traditionally, Germany had a very
restrictive citizenship law which was closely tied to ancestry and ethnic origin. In
1991 however, the federal government introduced for the ﬁrst time explicit criteria
how immigrants could obtain German citizenship. And since 2000, immigrants can
naturalize after eight years of residence in Germany.
For the empirical analysis, we use the fact that eligibility for citizenship varied
across arrival cohorts and birth years. Speciﬁcally, the 1991 reform deﬁned age-
dependent resident requirements for naturalization. Eligible adults (aged 23 and
above) faced a 15-year resident requirement before they could apply for citizenship.
Eligible adolescents (ages 16-22) in turn could apply for citizenship after only eight
years in Germany. Hence, immigrants (say, born in 1969) who arrived in Germany
in 1985, for example, became eligible for citizenship in 1993. Immigrants (born
before 1969) who came to Germany in the same year had to wait until 2000 in order
to be eligible, or seven years after the younger cohort. The second immigration
reform in 2000 reduced resident requirements for all immigrants to eight years. We
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then explore how immigrants who arrived in Germany as children or young teens
perform in the German labor market as adults. More speciﬁcally, we compare young
immigrants from the same arrival cohort who get eligible for citizenship in diﬀerent
years while controlling ﬂexibly for year of birth, general assimilation and time eﬀects.
Our results suggest that the propensity to naturalize is quite low in Germany
even after the liberalization of citizenship. Naturalization is more common among
immigrants from outside the EU member countries and more recent immigrants
arriving after the fall of the Berlin wall. Furthermore, selection into citizenship is
intermediate in terms of education for immigrant men and negative for immigrant
women. Accounting for selection into citizenship is important in our case. Once
we control for selection and other confounding factors, there are few, if any eﬀects
of eligibility for immigrant men. In line with negative selection into citizenship for
women, adjusting for selection actually increases the returns to citizenship eligibility.
Evaluated at the mean number of eligible years, the option to naturalize increases
female earnings by 0.122 log points. We also implement an instrumental variable
approach using eligibility as an instrument for actual naturalization.
We next investigate potential channels for the substantial wage returns of im-
migrant women. Access to citizenship changes the job characteristics for women,
but not for men. About 50% of the observed wage gains are the result of occupa-
tional upgrading and working in better-paying industries. After eligibility, women
also have more stable jobs: they are less likely to have temporary contracts, less
likely to be self-employed, have longer tenure and work for larger ﬁrms. Further-
more, eligible women adjust their labor supply at the intensive margin by working
3.2 hours per week longer. Given that part-time work carries sizable wage penalties
in most countries including Germany, longer working hours are a second reason for
the observed wage growth. Finally, women also improve their German writing skills
after eligibility, while men do not. In contrast, the wage returns for women cannot
be explained by a higher propensity to work in the public sector. These channels
suggest that there are few returns to citizenship within a given job; rather, citi-
zenship seems to open new opportunities in more productive and stable jobs with
better pay. As women took advantage of these new opportunities more than men,
the option to naturalize improves the relative economic position of women in the
immigrant population. Overall, the results suggest that a more liberal access to cit-
izenship can be a promising policy to improve immigrant assimilation in countries
with traditionally restrictive immigration policies.
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Our article contributes to three strands of the literature. First, we contribute
to the literature on naturalization decisions. Most evidence seems to suggest that
there is positive selection into citizenship (Mazzolari, 2009 for the US; Bevelander
and Veenman, 2008 for the Netherlands; Constant et al., 2009 for Germany). We ﬁnd
mixed results for Germany. Men are intermediately selected as the medium-skilled
are more likely to naturalize than the low- and high-skilled. Women, in contrast,
are negatively selected with respect to education. Furthermore, our analysis is
closely related to the literature on citizenship and labor market outcomes in the
United States or Canada (e.g., Chiswick, 1978; Bratsberg et al., 2002; De Voretz and
Pivnenko, 2006) and some European countries (see Bevelander and Veenman, 2008
for the Netherlands; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2011; and Scott, 2008 for Sweden;
Fouge`re and Saﬁ, 2009 for France; Steinhardt, 2012 for Germany). Most studies
rely on cross-sectional data comparing naturalized citizens with other immigrants.
Recently, a few studies employ panel data to study the relationship between actual
naturalization and labor market performance (Bratsberg et al., 2002; Bratsberg and
Raaum, 2011; Steinhardt, 2012). We contribute to this literature in three ways: ﬁrst,
we study the eﬀect of legal access to citizenship rather than the individual decision
to naturalize. Second, we use arguably exogenous variation in eligibility rules from
national immigration reforms for identiﬁcation. Our study therefore does not face
the kind of selection problems of earlier, especially cross-sectional studies. Finally,
we provide evidence on the beneﬁts of citizenship in a country where naturalization
is the exception rather than the norm. Returns to citizenship might diﬀer from those
in traditional immigration countries or countries with a long immigration history,
such as the US or the UK. Taste-based discrimination, for example, might be more
widespread in a country where the native population is more homogeneous and
shares common values or a common religion. Returns to citizenship would then be
higher if naturalization eliminates taste-based discrimination in the host country;
yet, returns might be lower if discrimination is based on foreign-sounding names or
appearance rather than citizenship status alone.3 Two related studies by Avitabile
et al. (2013) and Sajons (2015) also analyze the eﬀect of citizenship on integration
outcomes in Germany. However, they focus on social and economic integration
3Evidence from the European Social Survey suggests that naturalized immigrants feel much less discriminated
against in Germany than non-naturalized immigrants (OECD, 2011, Figure 8.1). At the same time, a recent
ﬁeld experiment for apprenticeships in Germany suggest that there is some discrimination against immigrants
based on foreign-sounding names or foreign accents which are largely independent of citizenship status (Kaas
and Manger, 2012). As such, it is a-priori unclear whether discrimination increases or reduces the returns to
citizenship compared to traditional immigration countries.
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outcomes of immigrant parents whose children became eligible for citizenship by
birth. In contrast, we analyze how the labor market performance of adults changes
when they themselves can naturalize.
Finally, our study also contributes to the literature on immigrant assimilation.
Most of the literature compares labor market outcomes between natives and immi-
grants documenting substantial wage gaps upon arrival. While the literature agrees
there is some catch-up with time in the host country, extent and speed of immi-
grant assimilation is still hotly debated (see e.g., Abramitzky et al., 2012; Borjas,
1985, 1995; Card, 2005; Clark and Lindley, 2009; Duleep and Dowhan, 2002; Hu,
2000; Lalonde and Topel, 1997; Lubotsky, 2007; see Dustmann and Glitz, 2011
for a survey). For Germany, most studies do not ﬁnd much evidence for assimila-
tion relative to natives (Pischke, 1993; Dustmann, 1993; Licht and Steiner, 1994;
Schmidt, 1997; Bauer et al., 2005; results in Fertig and Schuster, 2007 are mixed).
We focus instead on the assimilation between subsequent immigrant cohorts which
share many characteristics and hence are more comparable with each other than
with the native population (see also Lalonde and Topel, 1997). More importantly,
we can identify how much citizenship (i.e. a change in immigration status) speeds
up economic assimilation and provide novel evidence on its underlying channels:
through movements up the occupational ladder, more stable employment, improve-
ments in language skills or economic self-suﬃciency. Our results thus have direct
implications for policy-makers wishing to promote immigrant assimilation in their
respective countries.
This article proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the recent immigra-
tion reforms in Germany. Section 3 introduces our data sources, while Section 4
explains our empirical strategy to identify the returns to citizenship. Section 5 dis-
cusses the results on naturalization decisions and the returns to citizenship. Section
6 presents a number of informal validity checks to test the robustness of our results.
Section 7 discusses the policy implications of our ﬁndings and concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
3.2.1 A Reluctant Immigration Country
More than ten million - or about 13% of the population - in Germany is foreign-
born. After World War II, most immigrants, especially from Turkey, Yugoslavia or
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Italy came to Germany as guest workers. From the late 1950s until the guest worker
program was abolished in 1973, the German government actively recruited foreign,
mostly low-skilled labor through a series of bilateral agreements, in order to meet the
growing demand of Germany's booming manufacturing sector. Originally, the guest
worker program was intended as a short- to medium-run policy. Initially, guest
workers obtained work and residence permits for one year. The regulations after
that depended on the country of origin. For Turkish guest workers, for instance,
the work permit was tied to a particular employer and occupation for the ﬁrst
years. After three years, the guest worker could apply for other jobs within the
same occupation. Full job mobility was granted only after four years of gainful
employment in Germany. Until 2005, work permits became permanent after six
years of residence or after four years if a person had worked in a job subject to social
security contributions.4 Since 2005, immigrants obtain permanent work permits
when they worked in Germany for 4 years or lived there for 5 years. While spouses
and children could settle in Germany, they could not take up gainful employment
or vocational training until 1979. After 1979, they had to wait for up to three years
before obtaining a work permit. Immigrants who came to Germany under the age of
18 could obtain a permanent work permit if they had a secondary school degree of
a minimum of 9 years or started some vocational training. Importantly, temporary
work permits are subject to the proof of precedence in their ﬁrst two years which
requires that no German or EU employee is available for the job.
Despite the temporary nature of the guest worker program, many guest workers
actually stayed and settled down in Germany. Since the late 1980s and especially
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, new waves of immigrants arrived in Germany from
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, around one mil-
lion foreigners (about 1% of its population) arrived in Germany each year.5 These
immigration rates are comparable to those in the United States during the age of
mass migration.
4Regulations for guest workers from North Africa, Yugoslavia and many other countries in Africa were a bit more
restrictive than for Turkish guest workers. Guest workers from the European Union (resp. its predecssor) did
not require a work permit and hence, were not restricted to work for a speciﬁc employer, for example.
5Many of these were ethnic Germans (i.e. immigrants with some German ancestry), mostly from Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, who had access to citizenship within three years of arrival in Germany. Aggregate
statistics suggest that migration ﬂows of ethnic Germans started in 1985 with less than 50,000 per year and
peaked between 1988 and 1991 at around 300,000 per year. Since 1992, the inﬂow of ethnic Germans is
restricted to 220,000 per year. Stricter application requirements (esp. German language requirements) and
less ﬁnancial assistance further reduced the number of applicants in the late 1990s to around 100,000 per year
(Bundesministerium des Innern, 2008). Below, we drop ethnic Germans from our sample as they are not aﬀected
by the immigration reforms we study.
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Despite substantial inﬂows of foreign-born, Germany had no explicit natural-
ization policy at that time. Prior to 1991, German citizenship was closely tied to
ancestry (jus sanguinis) as laid down in the law of 1913. Explicit criteria how a
foreign-born immigrant without German ancestry would qualify for naturalization
did not exist. The oﬃcial doctrine was that foreigners were only temporary residents
in Germany - even though many foreigners had lived in the country for many years.
The Federal Naturalization Guidelines of 1977 summarize the oﬃcial view at the
time quite well: The Federal Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration;
it does not strive to increase the number of German citizens by way of naturaliza-
tion [. . . ]. The granting of German citizenship can only be considered if a public
interest in the naturalization exists; the personal desires and economic interests of
the applicant cannot be decisive. (Hailbronner and Renner, 1992, pp. 865-6).
3.2.2 A New Approach to Citizenship
The passage of the Alien Act (Ausländergesetz (AuslG)) by the federal parlia-
ment on April 26, 1990 (and the Federal Council on May 5, 1990) marked a turning
point in Germany's approach to immigration and citizenship. The reform which
came into eﬀect on January 1, 1991 deﬁned, for the ﬁrst time, explicit rules and
criteria for naturalization.6 Most importantly for our purpose, the new law imposed
an age-dependent resident requirement. Immigrants who were 16-22 years-old (when
they ﬁrst satisfy the resident requirement) became eligible after eight years; we call
these eligible adolescents. Immigrants aged 23 and older (when they ﬁrst satisfy
the resident requirement and have not yet been eligible under the reduced resident
requirement) became eligible for citizenship only after ﬁfteen years of residence in
Germany; we call this group eligible adults.7 Note that these resident requirements
are still quite restrictive in comparison to other countries. Immigrants in Canada,
for example, may naturalize after three years and after ﬁve years in the United
6The reform was preceded by more than a decade of intense political discussion that oscillated between the desire
to restrict immigration and encourage return migration on the one hand; and the recognition that the foreign
population had to be better integrated into German society on the other hand. Several reform attempts were
made during the 1980s, mostly from left-wing parties, but defeated by the political opposition or inﬂuential
social groups. The reform in 1991 was pushed on the political agenda by a ruling of the Federal Constitutional
Court in 1989 on whether immigrants should be entitled to vote in local elections. The Court ruled those local
voting rights unconstitutional but advocated a liberalization of Germany's naturalization policy (see Howard,
2008 for a more detailed discussion).
7See  85 AuslG (Alien Act) for adolescent immigrants and  86 AuslG (Alien Act) for adult immigrants. If
the applicant stayed abroad for no more than 6 months, the period of absence still counted toward the res-
ident requirement. Temporary stays abroad (between 6 months and 1 year) may still count for the resident
requirement.
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States and many European countries (like the UK or Sweden).
Applicants for German citizenship had to fulﬁll several other criteria: ﬁrst, they
had to renounce their previous citizenship upon naturalization as the new law did
not allow dual citizenship. Few exemptions to this rule existed at that time. The
most important exception covered citizens of the European Union who could keep
their original citizenship (unless their country of origin prohibits dual citizenship).8
Second, the applicant must not be convicted of a criminal oﬀense.9 Eligible adults
(23 years or older) also had to demonstrate economic self-suﬃciency, i.e. they should
be able to support themselves and their dependents without welfare beneﬁts or un-
employment assistance. Eligible adolescents (aged 16-22) had to have completed a
minimum of six years of schooling in Germany, of which at least four years had to
be general education. Note that these job or educational requirements are similar
or even somewhat lower than the conditions for obtaining a permanent work or
residence permit. As such, they are unlikely to have much inﬂuence on the deci-
sion whether to naturalize or keep a permanent residence and work permit instead.
Finally, an applicant needed to declare her loyalty to the democratic principles of
the German constitution. Spouses and dependent children of the applicant could be
included in the application for naturalization even if they did not fulﬁll the criteria
individually.10
The diﬀerent resident requirements for adults and adolescents remained in place
until the second important reform came into eﬀect on January 1, 2000. The Citi-
zenship Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG)) reduced the resident requirement
to eight years irrespective of the immigrant's age.11 The other requirements of the
8Children of bi-national marriages, for example, did not have to give up their dual citizenship until they turned 18.
Exceptions were also granted if the country of origin prohibits the renunciation of citizenship or delayed it for
reasons outside the power of the applicant; if the applicant was an acknowledged refugee or if the renunciation
imposed special hardships on older applicants. In practice, few exceptions to the general rule were granted in
the 1990s.
9Applicants with minor convictions, such as a suspended prison sentence up to 6 months (which would be abated
at the end of the probation period), a ﬁne not exceeding 180 days of income (calculated according to the
net personal income of the individual), or corrective methods imposed by juvenile courts, were still eligible.
Convictions exceeding these limits were considered on a case-by-case basis by the authorities.
10Similar criteria apply in other countries. Overall, they seem to play a secondary for the naturalization process.
A survey of eligible immigrants by the Federal Oﬃce of Migration and Refugees showed that most migrants had
good knowledge about the naturalization criteria. Of those, 72% reported that they fulﬁlled all requirements
while 23% reported to meet most, though not all of the criteria (BAMF, 2012). Most of these additional criteria
have to be fulﬁlled to obtain a work permit. As such, it is unlikely that many applications for naturalization
would be denied because of these other criteria. If anything, this would bias our estimates downward as we
would deﬁne an immigrant as eligible (based on the resident requirement) even though she is not (based on one
of the other eligibility criteria).
11The law was adopted with a large majority in the lower house on May 7, 1999 and the upper house on May
21, 1999. The provisions are laid down in  10 Abs. 1 StAG (Abs. 2 for spouses and dependent children of
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1991 reform stayed the same: applicants could not have a criminal record, had to
demonstrate economic self-suﬃciency and their loyalty to democratic principles. In
addition, the new law also required applicants to demonstrate adequate German
language skills prior to naturalization. As before, the law of 2000 did not recognize
dual citizenship in general though exemptions became more common.12 The 2000
reform further introduced elements of citizenship by birthplace into German law. A
child born to foreign parents after January 1, 2000 was eligible for citizenship if one
parent had been a legal resident in Germany for 8 years and had a permanent resi-
dence permit for at least three years. Since our analysis focuses on ﬁrst-generation
immigrants, our sample is not directly aﬀected by the jus soli provisions of the 2000
reform.13
The liberalization of citizenship law after 1991 and again after 2000 is reﬂected in
the number of naturalizations in Germany as shown in Figure 3.1. Prior to the ﬁrst
reform, less than 20.000 persons became naturalized on average each year. After the
immigration reform in 1991, naturalizations increase to 60-70.000 per year during
the 1990s. After the second reform in 2000, the number of naturalizations jumps
to over 180.000 and then gradually declines, but remains above 100.000 per year.
Relative to the stock of immigrants, the propensity to naturalize was below 0.4%
prior to 1991 and increased to 2 percent annually after 1991. Yet, the propensity
to naturalize in Germany remains low in international comparison: by 2007, only
about 35-40% of ﬁrst-generation immigrants with more than ten years of residency
had naturalized; the share is about 60% in the United Kingdom and over 80% in
Canada (OECD, 2011). To investigate the consequences of liberalizing Germany's
citizenship law in the labor market, we next discuss our data sources.
eligible immigrants) which forms the legal basis for over 80% of all naturalizations in Germany (BAMF, 2008).
Additional provisions are laid down in  8 (naturalizations based on a discretionary decision of the authorities
because of public interest) and  9 (naturalization for spouses of German citizens who face a reduced resident
requirement of 3 years).
12It became easier for older applicants and refugees to keep their previous citizenship. Applicants could also keep
their nationality if it was legally impossible to renounce it or if it imposed a special hardship like excessive costs
or serious economic disadvantages (e.g., problems with inheritances or property in their country of origin).
13See Avitabile et al. (2013) for an analysis of the jus soli provisions of the 2000 reform. There might be an indirect
eﬀect on ﬁrst-generation immigrants, however. Before the 2000 reform, second or third generation immigrants
could only become naturalized if their parents applied for citizenship. After the 2000 reform, young children
had access to German citizenship independently of their parents' decision (subject to the resident requirements
outlined above). Hence, the reform of 2000 might have actually decreased the inter-generational beneﬁts of
citizenship for foreign parents with young children. We return to this issue in the robustness analysis below.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Naturalizations in Germany
Notes: The ﬁgure reports the number of naturalizations in Germany (excluding naturalized ethnic Germans); before 1993, the numbers
refer to discretionary naturalizations (applications for naturalization based on criteria other than ancestry); after 1993, the numbers
refer to naturalizations following the 1991 reform and other discretionary naturalizations. We exclude all naturalizations through a
legal claim (based on German ancestry prior to 1990) prior to 1993 and naturalizations based on German ancestry after 1993.
Source: Authors' calculations based on data of the Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
3.3 Data Sources
3.3.1 Microcensus
Our main data to study the consequences of naturalization in the labor market
is the Microcensus, an annual survey of 1% of the German population. It covers
detailed questions about individual socio-demographic characteristics, employment,
personal income and household composition. Most importantly for our purpose,
the Microcensus has large samples of foreigners (about 50,000 per year) and precise
information on their year of arrival. The sample is restricted to ﬁrst-generation
immigrants, i.e. immigrants born outside of Germany. We also drop ethnic Germans
who had faster access to citizenship and therefore are not aﬀected by the 1991 and
2000 reforms. Ethnic Germans have some German ancestry and therefore have
access to German citizenship within three years of arrival.14
We focus in our analysis on immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976
14We then deﬁne ethnic Germans as individuals born outside Germany with a German passport who naturalized
within three years of arrival in Germany (which is legally impossible for regular immigrants) and whose previ-
ous nationality was Czech, Hungarian, Kazakh, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovakian or Ukrainian as ethnic
Germans (see Birkner, 2007: Algan et al., 2010 follow the same approach).
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and 2000 - and hence become eligible between 1991 and 2008. To make the sample
more homogenous, we restrict the sample to immigrants who were between 16 and 30
years-old when they ﬁrst become eligible for citizenship. It is only since 2005 that
the Microcensus elicits information whether an immigrant has obtained German
citizenship and the year in which naturalization took place.15 We therefore use data
for the 2005-2010 period for our empirical analysis. This later period allows us to
study the decision to naturalize as well as the returns to actual naturalization using
an instrumental variable approach. There is a second reason why the focus on these
later years is useful. All immigrants in our sample came to Germany as children
or young teens - the average age of arrival is 12 years. Many immigrants in our
sample are therefore still in full-time education or vocational training at their time
of arrival and even when they ﬁrst become eligible for citizenship.16 By focusing on
later years, we can investigate how eligibility as a teen or young adult aﬀects their
labor market careers as adults. The drawback of using this later time period is that
most immigrants have become eligible for German citizenship prior to 2005. We
return to this issue in the next section when we introduce our empirical strategy.
Our main outcome variables of interest are log personal income and employment.
Personal income per month combines labor earnings, income from self-employment,
rental income, public and private pensions as well as public transfers (like welfare
or unemployment beneﬁts, child beneﬁt or housing subsidies) but is net of taxes
and other contributions. To study assimilation in labor income (rather than other
sources of personal income), we restrict our sample to those employed (including
students and others with some income-generating activity) at the time of the sur-
vey. We deﬂate personal income with the national consumer price index to 2005
prices. Employment is an indicator equal to one if the immigrant pursues any
income-generating activity in the week before the interview and zero otherwise. We
also analyze economic self-suﬃciency, i.e. whether an immigrant receives social as-
sistance payments or unemployment beneﬁts. The variable is coded as one if an
individual receives welfare beneﬁts, either unemployment beneﬁts (Arbeitslosen-
geld I) or social assistance (Arbeitslosengeld II); and zero otherwise. We further
analyze working hours per week, job tenure (measured in years) and indicators for
the type of job held: whether an individual works on a temporary or permanent
contract, whether she is self-employed, employed in the public sector or in a white-
15In contrast, no such detailed information is available in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) or the social
security data from the IAB, two other popular data sources.
16In Germany, compulsory schooling is between 9 and 10 years. Children typically enter at age 6 which implies
that students can leave school around age 15 or 16.
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collar job. A white-collar job is deﬁned as working as a clerk or oﬃcer, judge or civil
servant. The variable is zero if someone is employed as a worker or home worker.
Here, we exclude trainees and family workers. Finally, we also analyze the size of
the ﬁrm which is measured from 1 (1 employee) to 13 (50 employees and more).
The main control variables are birth year, year of arrival, the number of years
in Germany and education. We distinguish between low-skilled (no high school
or vocational degree), medium-skilled (a higher school degree or a vocational de-
gree) and high-skilled immigrants (with a college degree). We further estimate all
speciﬁcations separately for men and women. To study heterogeneity in decisions
to naturalize and returns to citizenship, we classify immigrants into ten regions of
origin: the traditional EU-15 member states (e.g., Italy or Portugal), immigrants
from countries that recently joined the European Union (the EU-12, e.g., Poland
or the Czech Republic), immigrants from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia (except Slovenia)
and the Former Soviet Union (except the Baltic states). We lump together other
immigrants into broad regions of origin (Asia, Africa, the Middle East and North or
South America). In addition, we analyze whether the returns to citizenship diﬀer
for immigrants from high- and low-income countries using data on GDP per capita
in the country of origin in 2005 from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2011).
Table B.1 shows summary statistics of our sample of ﬁrst-generation immigrants in
the Microcensus. Further details on the deﬁnition of each variable is contained in
the data appendix.
3.3.2 Socio-Economic Panel
To study additional outcomes and run several robustness checks, we use the
Socio-Economic Panel from 1984 to 2009 (SOEP, 2010). The SOEP is an an-
nual panel interviewing more than 20,000 individuals about their labor supply,
income and demographic characteristics. The number of immigrants is however
much smaller than in the Microcensus.17 Our basic sample again consists of all
ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and
are between 16-30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship. Because the
SOEP does not ask questions about naturalization, we deﬁne naturalization based
on observed changes in the citizenship recorded. The variable is equal to zero as
long as an immigrant reports a foreign nationality and one in all years when a Ger-
17Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007) provide a comprehensive description of the data set. The distribution of
immigrants is diﬀerent from the Microcensus because the SOEP oversampled immigrants in 1984 and 1994/5.
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man citizenship is recorded. We perform several consistency checks to ensure that
individuals do not change their citizenship more than once.
Our main dependent variables are self-reported language skills in writing or
speaking German which range from 0 = not at all to 4 = very well. For the ro-
bustness checks, we further analyze log of monthly gross labor earnings (deﬂated
with the national consumer price index) and labor force participation which is equal
to one if an immigrant works in any type of employment; the indicator is zero if
she is unemployed or out of the labor force. Our main control variables are again
year of arrival, year of birth and the number of years spent in Germany. In the
SOEP, we distinguish between low-skilled (with no high school or vocational de-
gree), medium-skilled (with high school or vocational degree), high-skilled (holding
a tertiary degree) and those currently enrolled in school. We further classify im-
migrants into ten broad regions of origin which are deﬁned as in the Microcensus.
Table B.2 shows summary statistics for our sample of ﬁrst-generation immigrants in
the SOEP.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Variation in Eligibility induced by the Immigration
Reforms
To estimate the labor market returns to citizenship, one cannot simply compare
naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants because the decision to naturalize is
endogenous. In addition, eligibility for citizenship is often closely tied to the number
of years spent in the host country which makes it diﬃcult to separate the returns
to citizenship from general assimilation eﬀects. We now discuss how the step-wise
liberalization of Germany's citizenship law discussed in Section 3.2.2 can identify
the returns to citizenship net of selection and general assimilation eﬀects.
The key insight here is that the two reforms create variation in the eligibility for
citizenship depending on an immigrant's arrival year and year of birth (as well as
calendar year).18 Take two immigrants who arrived in Germany in the same year,
18We abstract in our analysis from other eligibility criteria discussed in Section 2 either because we do not have
any information (e.g., about the criminal record) or because it is unclear how the criteria is applied (e.g.,
economic self-suﬃciency). As a consequence, we are likely to misclassify a few immigrants who satisfy the
resident requirements but are not eligible according to some other criteria. This misclassiﬁcation will result in
a downward bias of eligibility on naturalization propensities (as some individuals, which we classify as eligible,
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say 1985. The ﬁrst immigrant is born in 1971 and therefore becomes eligible for
citizenship in 1993 under the eight-year resident requirement. The second immigrant
is born in 1970 would not be eligible for citizenship in 1993 (after eight years) because
she is then 23 years-old and therefore does not qualify under the reduced resident
requirement. Instead, she would become eligible in 2000 - after ﬁfteen years in
Germany. The same argument holds for immigrants arriving in Germany in 1983
and 1984. For all arrival cohorts, the younger immigrant is eligible seven years earlier
than the older immigrant - though both are of similar age and arrived in Germany
in the same year. A similar logic applies to earlier arrival cohorts (arriving between
1977 and 1982): adolescents (born between 1969 and 1975) can naturalize right after
the reform in 1991. Adults (born 1968 or before) in contrast can only naturalize
between 1992 and 1997 or one and six years later than the adolescents in the same
arrival cohort. For all immigrants arriving in 1985 or later, young immigrants are
again eligible after eight years while adult immigrants get eligible in 2000 when the
resident requirement was reduced to eight years for all immigrants.19
One might consider using this variation to implement a regression discontinuity
design (RDD) in which the forcing variable is the age when an immigrant satisﬁes
the eight-year resident requirement: individuals between 16 and 22 years of age
would be the treatment group, while immigrants between 23 and 30 years of age
would be the control group. However, the conditions for a RDD are not satisﬁed in
our setting. The main reason is that eligibility is inevitable as both the treatment
and control group get access to citizenship; it is only the timing of treatment that
varies across arrival and birth cohorts. In addition, eligibility for citizenship is
likely to have persistent eﬀects on labor market outcomes. Therefore, both sides
of the threshold will eventually beneﬁt from citizenship in our sample period.20 As
a result and depending on the shape of the returns to citizenship, there need not
be any discontinuity in outcome variables around the age threshold (see Lee and
Lemieux, 2010 for a discussion of age-dependent eligibility rules in RDD settings).
Finally, eligibility in our data varies at an annual level (based on year of arrival and
year of birth) for which there is little uncertainty ex-ante about being left and right
of the threshold (as would be the case if eligibility hinges on a speciﬁc birth date, for
cannot naturalize in practice).
19Immigrants arriving between 1992 and 2000 all get eligible with eight years of residency after the 2000 reform. We
include arrival cohorts between 1992 and 2000 mostly to identify general assimilation and year of birth eﬀects.
20Even if we used data closer to the 1991 reform (for which we have no information about actual naturalization),
the fact that adult immigrants eventually become eligible is likely to generate anticipation eﬀects (and hence,
changes in labor market behavior). These anticipation eﬀects would again smooth potential discontinuities at
the threshold.
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instance). Such ex-ante uncertainty is however, crucial to get quasi-random variation
close to the threshold which ensures local identiﬁcation of the RDD estimator.
We therefore pursue a diﬀerent approach here: we rely on the diﬀerential timing
of eligibility which creates variation in how long an immigrant has been eligible for
citizenship. To identify labor market returns to citizenship eligibility, we use the
number of years an immigrant has been eligible for citizenship as our treatment
variable. In the ﬁrst step, we deﬁne the year an immigrant ﬁrst satisﬁes the resi-
dent requirement. The variable is calculated as follows: (a) the year in which an
immigrant has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and is then between 16 and 22
years old in 1991-1999; (b) the year in which an immigrant has lived in Germany for
at least ﬁfteen years and is 23-30 years old in the 1991-1999 period (given that she
has not qualiﬁed for citizenship under (a)); (c) the year in which a 16-30 years-old
immigrant has lived in Germany for at least eight years in the 2000-2010 period.
Finally, (d) some immigrants who have lived in Germany for at least eight years
only become eligible in the year they turn sixteen.
In a second step, we calculate the years since an immigrant has been eligible for
citizenship as the diﬀerence between the current year and the year of ﬁrst eligibility.
The eligibility variable is zero before an immigrant becomes eligible for citizenship
and equal to the number of years since an immigrant has become eligible thereafter.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the variation in years since eligibility we exploit for identi-
ﬁcation for two immigrants arriving in 1985. The younger immigrant who qualiﬁes
under the reduced resident requirement has been eligible for 12 years when we ﬁrst
observe him in the Microcensus in 2005. The slightly older immigrant who qualiﬁes
under the regular 15 years-rule has only been eligible for 5 years in 2005. Table B.3
shows for each cohort of arrival from 1976 to 2000 the year in which immigrants ﬁrst
get eligible for citizenship (in column (1) for eligible adolescents and in column (5)
for eligible adults). Columns (4) and (8) show how long adolescents and adults have
been eligible for citizenship in 2005, the ﬁrst year in our main data. The last column
illustrates that immigrants of the same arrival cohort and the same calendar year
diﬀer substantially in the years they become eligible for citizenship depending on
their year of birth. These diﬀerences in eligibility are also reﬂected in our data. The
bottom of Table B.3 shows that immigrants who qualify under the reduced resident
requirement get eligible two years earlier (1999 versus 2001) and have been eligible
for naturalization longer (8.1 versus 5.3 years in 2005) than adults. The comparison
also shows that eligible adolescents are born on average ﬁve years later (1979 versus
1974) and have spent about half a year less in Germany (8.9 versus 9.5 years) when
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they get eligible for citizenship. We next discuss our estimation strategy to study
naturalization decisions and the returns to citizenship in the labor market.
Figure 3.2: Variation in Eligibility Rules
Notes: The ﬁgure demonstrates the variation in eligibility rules which was created by the two policy reforms. The example shows
two immigrants who arrive in the same year and with a similar age, but face diﬀerent eligibility regimes.
3.4.2 Eligibility and the Decision to Naturalize
We start out with analyzing naturalization decisions. In our data, adolescents
who qualify under the reduced resident requirement have higher naturalization rates
and naturalized earlier than adults. Whereas only 30% of adults have naturalized,
46% of adolescents have done so during our sample period (2005-2010). To in-
vestigate how eligibility aﬀects the decision to naturalize more systematically, we
estimate variants of the following model:
Natiabt = βEligabt + λD(Y OBb) + µD(ACohorta) + γ1Y SMat (3.1)
+γ2Y SM
2
at + δ
′Xit + θt + pist + εiabt
where the dependent variable Natiabt is equal to one if individual i (born in b
and arrived in Germany in a) is naturalized in year t and zero otherwise. Our key
independent variable here is Eligabt which is equal to one if an individual (born in b
and arrived in Germany in a) is eligible in year t and zero otherwise. The eligibility
indicator is derived from the eligibility rules discussed in the previous section and
varies by year of birth, year of arrival and time. Our main parameter of interest isβ
which measures how eligibility for naturalization aﬀects the decision to naturalize.
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We include cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects D(ACohorta) to adjust for changes in
the quality of immigrants arriving in Germany over time. We further include year
of birth ﬁxed eﬀects D(Y OBb) to control for diﬀerences in naturalization decisions
across birth cohorts and year ﬁxed eﬀects θt to adjust for aggregate changes in the
propensity to naturalize over time. We add a second-order polynomial of years since
migration (Y SMat, Y SM2at) to account for time in the host country. Additional
controls Xit are immigrant's education and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects to allow
naturalization propensities to diﬀer across education groups and source countries.
To capture diﬀerences in the numbers of naturalizations across regions and changes
therein over time, we further include state ﬁxed eﬀects and state-speciﬁc linear
trends pist.21 Finally, we cluster the standard errors by age x arrival year to adjust
for the level of aggregation in the eligibility variable.
3.4.3 Eligibility and Labor Market Performance
To identify how eligibility aﬀects the labor market performance of immigrants,
we estimate variants of the following model:
Yiabt = β˜Y rsEligabt + λ˜D(Y OBb) + µ˜D(ACohorta) + γ˜1Y SMat (3.2)
+γ˜2Y SM
2
at + δ˜
′Xit + θ˜t + p˜ist+ε˜iabt
where Y iabt is a labor market outcome of immigrant i from birth cohort b who
arrived in Germany in year a in survey year t. Here, the main variable of interest is
years since eligibility (Y rsEligabt) which captures persistent eﬀects of eligibility in
the labor market. As in the last section, we control for year of arrival, birth cohort
and year ﬁxed eﬀects.22 Note that we cannot include two-way interactions between
these variables as, conditional on birth and arrival cohort, years of eligibility changes
only with the reduction of the resident requirement in 2000 (and not every calendar
year, for example).23
We also want to distinguish returns to citizenship eligibility from economic as-
21Since we are primarily interested in the eﬀects of naturalization on the labor market performance of immigrants,
we choose this rather reduced form approach instead of including detailed controls for the source countries (as
in Chiswick and Miller, 2008, for example). Clearly, there might be other factors determining the decision to
naturalize, for example, the political or economic circumstances in the country of origin.
22We get almost identical results if we include age ﬁxed eﬀects rather than birth year ﬁxed eﬀects in addition to
year ﬁxed eﬀects which is not surprising because our data covers ﬁve years (2005-2010).
23A regression of years of eligibility on all other control variables in equation (2) gives an R2 of 0.93 for both
men and women. Hence, we only absorb a lot of the variation in our eligibility variable though our ﬂexible
speciﬁcation with both individual arrival cohort and birth year ﬁxed eﬀects.
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similation that occurs with time in the host country more generally. To avoid perfect
multicollinearity between arrival year, calendar year and years since migration, most
studies in the assimilation literature estimate the above model for immigrant and
natives jointly and restrict the year eﬀects to be the same for natives and immi-
grants. As we are interested in the returns to citizenship, we pursue a diﬀerent
approach here. We control for a second-order polynomial of years since migration
(Y SMat, Y SM
2
at) but allow for a full set of cohort of arrival and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
We show in Section 3.5.3 that results remain unchanged if we allow for an even more
ﬂexible speciﬁcation of years since migration. All other controls are the same as for
the analysis of naturalization decisions above.
The parameter of interest β˜ in equation (2) measures whether an additional year
of eligibility increases employment or wages. Conditional on year of arrival, year of
birth, year ﬁxed eﬀects and other controls, the parameter is identiﬁed from the
interaction between year of arrival, year of birth and calendar year. As discussed in
Section 3.4.1, the variation comes from diﬀerences in eligibility rules for adolescent
and adult immigrants who arrive in Germany in the same year. The identifying
assumption is that labor market outcomes have the same non-parametric year of
birth pattern for subsequent arrival cohorts conditional on our control variables.
This assumption would be violated, for example, if younger birth cohorts earn more
than older birth cohorts among recent immigrants, while the opposite pattern is
observed for those same birth cohorts among earlier arrival cohorts.
We show in Section 3.5.3 below that allowing for even more ﬂexible interactions
between birth and arrival cohorts does not aﬀect our results. Similarly, we ﬁnd few
changes if we sequentially restrict the set of birth cohorts used in the estimation for
which imposing a common age eﬀect seems less restrictive. Another concern for our
identiﬁcation strategy is that age of arrival eﬀects might bias our estimates. Immi-
grants who arrived at younger ages, for instance, invest more in host-speciﬁc human
capital like language skills and might therefore perform better in the labor market
even independently of citizenship. Including controls for age of arrival however, we
ﬁnd little evidence that age of arrival eﬀects bias our results.
A third issue is that equation (2) only allows for a growth eﬀect on wages but not
a level eﬀect immediately after naturalization. The main reason is that we cannot
identify a level eﬀect during the 2005-2010 period because our control group of adult
immigrants has qualiﬁed for citizenship by then as well. Hence, both treatment and
control group would have experienced the same upward shift in wage levels in the
2005-2010 period. Yet, existing studies of naturalization (e.g., Bratsberg et al., 2002)
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do not ﬁnd any level eﬀects after naturalization; our robustness checks also suggest
that level eﬀects are not important. We address these concerns after presenting
our main results (in Section 3.5.3). A ﬁnal issue in assimilation studies like ours
is related to selective in- or outmigration of immigrants. If return migrants, for
instance, are negatively selected from the pool of immigrants in the host country,
return migration overestimates general assimilation eﬀects. Return migration would
not aﬀect our eligibility variable however, as long as selection into return migration is
similar for eligible adolescents and adults. We discuss selective in- and out-migration
in the robustness analysis (in Section 3.6.1). These additional tests suggest that all
four threats to identiﬁcation do not appear to be a major concern for our study.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 The Decision to Naturalize in Germany
To study naturalization decisions, we convert the Microcensus into a pseudo-
panel for the 1985-2010 period. We create an indicator equal to one if an immigrant
has naturalized in any year between 1985 and 2010 from the reported year of natu-
ralization. We calculate eligibility for naturalization in any year between 1991 and
2009 from information on year of birth and year of arrival in Germany (see the last
section for details). Finally, we assign education based on the information recorded
in 2005-2010; here, education refers to the highest educational degree attained rather
than the education level in a particular year.
Table 3.1 shows that eligibility after the 1991 and 2000 reforms has a surpris-
ingly modest eﬀect on the decision to naturalize: the likelihood of naturalization
after eligibility increases by between 3 and 4 percentage points.24 The second speci-
ﬁcation adds individual ﬁxed eﬀects, while the third speciﬁcation uses lagged (rather
than current) eligibility status to allow for some delay in the naturalization process.
Overall, we ﬁnd very similar results across all three speciﬁcations. We also estimated
a probit model; the marginal eﬀects (not reported) are again similar to the linear
probability estimates in Table 3.1.
The table further shows some interesting selection patterns into Germany cit-
24Note that we cannot compare our estimates directly to the naturalization rates reported by the OECD (discussed
in Section 3.2.2) because there naturalizations are scaled by the number of immigrants with more than 10 years
of residency in Germany. Here, we study 16-30 years-old immigrants where some are eligible and others are not
(yet) eligible for citizenship.
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Table 3.1: The Decision to Naturalize after the 1991 and 2000 Reforms
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Baseline Individual Lagged Baseline Individual Lagged
FE Elig. FE Elig.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eligible for Naturalization 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.027***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
Years in Germany 0.010*** 0.040*** 0.065*** 0.013*** 0.051*** 0.061***
[0.001] [0.007] [0.003] [0.001] [0.005] [0.006]
Years in Germany2 -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Medium-skilled 0.005** -0.003
[0.002] [0.002]
High-skilled -0.007 -0.019***
[0.004] [0.005]
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 38,009 38,009 38,009 37,346 37,346 37,346
R Squared 0.084 0.114 0.141 0.078 0.114 0.133
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.109 0.109 0.109
Notes: The table reports results from a linear probability model where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a
migrant has naturalized in a given year and zero otherwise. The sample includes all ﬁrst-generation immigrants who are not ethnic
Germans, arrived in Germany between 1976 to 2000, are 16-30 years old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period,
and report valid information on income, naturalization and years lived in Germany. The eligibility indicator is equal to one if an
individual is a) 16-22 years old and has lived in Germany for at least 8 years; b) 23-30 years old and has lived in Germany for at
least 15 years in 1991-1999; or c) 23-30 years old and has lived in Germany for at least 8 years after 2000. The left-hand side reports
results for male immigrants, the right-hand side for female immigrants. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include individual ﬁxed eﬀects;
columns (3) and (6) lag eligibility by one year to allow for delay in the naturalization process. All speciﬁcations include year of
arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten
region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU member countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia,
Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). The omitted region of
origin are the EU-15 member states; the omitted education category is low-skilled (no high school or vocational degree). Standard
errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus Pseudopanel (1985-2010).
izenship. Most interestingly, we ﬁnd evidence for intermediate and even negative
selection in terms of educational attainment. Medium-skilled men are slightly more
likely to naturalize than the low-skilled reference group. For immigrant women, we
actually ﬁnd that high-skilled women are about 1.9 percentage points less likely to
naturalize than low-skilled women. The evidence on selection is very diﬀerent from
studies in other countries which typically report positive selection into citizenship
(see Chiswick and Miller, 2008 and Yang, 1994 for the US; or Fougère and Saﬁ,
2008 for France). Yet, it ﬁts well into the public perception that Germany has had
diﬃculties in attracting high-skilled immigrants. One interpretation of this pattern
would be that medium-skilled men (or low- and medium skilled women) are more
likely to naturalize because they also beneﬁt more from naturalization in the labor
market; our evidence below does however not support such an interpretation (see
Table 3.8). We also ﬁnd no inﬂuence of the birth cohort on the decision to naturalize
(not reported). This result also diﬀers from traditional immigration countries where
older immigrants are more likely to naturalize even conditional on years since immi-
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gration (Chiswick and Miller, 2008 for the United States; De Voretz and Pivnenko,
2006 for Canada).
Taken together, the evidence in this section supports the idea that eligibility
rules inﬂuence naturalization decisions. At the same time, take up of citizenship
is low compared to traditional immigration countries which suggests either a lack
of information or substantial costs of German citizenship for eligible immigrants.
The most important reason for the low take-up rates seems to be that Germany has
been reluctant to accept dual citizenship. Immigrants who plan to return to their
home country some day might face disadvantages. In Turkey, for example, foreign
citizens face restrictions for buying or inheriting property. The need to renounce
their source country's citizenship seems to make German citizenship relatively less
attractive and lowers naturalization rates among immigrants.
3.5.2 Naturalization, Eligibility and Labor Market
Performance
We now turn to our main question whether naturalization and the option to
naturalize have permanent eﬀects on wages and employment. As a benchmark of
comparison, we start with OLS estimates where the key independent variable is
years since actual naturalization (rather than years since eligibility) and all other
variables are deﬁned as in equation (2). Our main focus is however, on the reduced-
form speciﬁcation and the instrumental variable estimates. The reduced-form iden-
tiﬁes whether legal access to citizenship improves labor market outcomes among
immigrants. Knowing whether a more liberal access to citizenship aﬀects labor
market outcomes is interesting in its own right as it represents the option value of
naturalization for immigrants. Furthermore, the intent-to-treat eﬀect is the primary
parameter of interest for policy makers who aim to improve the economic integration
of immigrants in the host country. In addition, we also implement an instrumental
variable approach where we use eligibility for citizenship as an instrument for actual
naturalization to estimate the returns to citizenship.
The OLS results in Table 3.2 suggest that an additional year as a German
citizen is associated with higher employment rates (by about 0.2 percentage points)
for both men and women but not associated with higher earnings. In contrast to
most of the earlier studies on assimilation in Germany, we ﬁnd strong evidence for
general assimilation eﬀects. Immigrant men and women who have lived in Germany
longer have both higher employment and higher earnings than more recent arrivals.
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If immigrants select into German citizenship based on unobservable characteristics,
the correlation between actual naturalization and labor market outcomes may be
misleading. If the selection pattern into naturalization for education extends to
unobservable skills, returns to citizenship for women, for instance, should be larger
than the OLS estimates suggest.
Table 3.2: OLS Estimates of Naturalization and Labor Market Outcomes
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Employment Log Personal Income Employment Log Personal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years since Naturalized 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.002*** 0.002 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years in Germany -0.004 0.067*** 0.051*** -0.004 0.054*** 0.046***
[0.006] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.013] [0.012]
Years in Germany2 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Medium-skilled 0.074*** 0.169*** 0.142*** 0.081*** 0.267*** 0.147***
[0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.017] [0.017]
High-skilled 0.127*** 0.493*** 0.485*** 0.197*** 0.691*** 0.478***
[0.012] [0.021] [0.021] [0.014] [0.028] [0.028]
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and Sector FE - No Yes - No Yes
Observations 16,468 12,916 12,916 14,875 9,884 9,884
R Squared 0.044 0.404 0.477 0.060 0.172 0.260
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.717 7.12 7.12 0.529 6.55 6.55
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between naturalization and whether a person is gainfully employed
(columns (1) and (4)) and log monthly personal income adjusted to 2005 prices (in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6)). The sample includes
all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible
for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to
German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrant became eligible for
naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms. All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects,
current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional
EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and
other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). Columns (3) and (6) add broad occupation and sector dummies. The
omitted education category is low-skilled (without high school or vocational degree). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age
x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
To identify returns to citizenship net of selection eﬀects, Table 3.3 shows the
intent-to-treat eﬀect of citizenship eligibility on labor market performance. Gen-
erally, we ﬁnd no eﬀect of eligibility for men: both employment and earnings are
not higher after eligibility (columns (1)-(3)). For women, we also do not ﬁnd any
response in employment rates (column (4)). Yet, we ﬁnd sizable wage eﬀects for
women: wages increase by about 0.15 log points per year. Consistent with negative
selection in terms of unobservables, the reduced-form returns for women are larger
than the OLS estimates. These returns imply that the option to naturalize car-
ries substantial beneﬁts: at the mean years of eligibility in our sample (7.9 years),
earnings for women are 0.12 log points higher than prior eligibility. To put these
numbers in perspective, we calculate how the return to eligibility for women com-
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pares to wage growth due to general assimilation. Women's earnings increase by
about 0.34 log points over their ﬁrst twenty years in Germany. Access to citizenship
then adds another 38% to the wage growth associated with economic assimilation.25
Finally, we explore how much of the earnings increase is due to sorting across broad
occupations and sectors (see column (6) in Table 3.3). Conditional on broad occu-
pations and sectors, wage growth among eligible women falls to 0.08 log points and
loses statistical signiﬁcance. Hence, occupational upgrading and sorting into better-
paying industries accounts for almost 50% of the observed wage gains for women.
One might also wonder whether a linear speciﬁcation of years since eligibility is the
appropriate speciﬁcation. In Figure 3.3, we plot the coeﬃcients from re-estimating
equation (3.2) where we now include separate indicators for 1-5 years eligible, 6-10
years eligible and more than 10 years eligible for citizenship. The results show that
returns for men are always below those for women. In addition, returns exhibit some
concavity but are positive for all groups of eligible immigrant women.
Table 3.3: Eligibility for Citizenship, Employment and Wage Growth
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Employment Log Personal Income Employment Log Personal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years since Eligible 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.015*** 0.008
for Naturalization [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005]
Years in Germany -0.005 0.069*** 0.053*** -0.003 0.044*** 0.040***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.013] [0.013]
Years in Germany2 0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Medium-skilled 0.076*** 0.171*** 0.143*** 0.083*** 0.267*** 0.147***
[0.007] [0.011] [0.010] [0.009] [0.017] [0.017]
High-skilled 0.129*** 0.494*** 0.486*** 0.200*** 0.693*** 0.479***
[0.012] [0.021] [0.021] [0.014] [0.028] [0.028]
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation and Sector FE - No Yes - No Yes
Observations 16,468 12,916 12,916 14,875 9,884 9,884
R Squared 0.043 0.404 0.477 0.059 0.172 0.260
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.717 7.12 7.12 0.529 6.55 6.55
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates of the returns to citizenship eligibility for male and female immigrants in Germany.
The dependent variables are whether a person is gainfully employed (columns (1) and (4)) and log monthly personal income adjusted
to 2005 prices (in columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6)). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000
and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic
Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since
eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrants became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms.
All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc
linear trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia,
Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship).
Columns (3) and (6) add broad occupation and sector dummies. The omitted education category is low-skilled (without high school
or vocational degree). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
25For wage growth due to assimilation, take the coeﬃcients from column (5) in Table 3.3: 20*0.044-400*0.001=0.48.
In turn, eligibility after 8 years in Germany increases wages after 20 years by: 12*0.015 = 0.18. Hence, the wage
growth from access to citizenship adds 37.5% (0.18/(0.18+0.48)=0.375) to the wage growth from assimilation.
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Figure 3.3: Nonlinear Returns to Eligibility for Citizenship
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the coeﬃcient from estimating equation (2) where the key independent variables are binary indicators for 1-5
Years Eligible, 6-10 Years Eligible and More than 10 Years Eligible. The omitted category is not yet eligible. See notes to Table 3.3
for the speciﬁcation and description of other control variables.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
Rather than estimating the return to eligibility, we can also implement an instru-
mental variable approach using eligibility as an instrument for actual naturalization.
Based on the year of naturalization, we deﬁne the number of years since an immi-
grant became a German citizen. Table 3.4 shows that an extra year of eligibility
increases the years since naturalization by between 0.06 and 0.09 years for men and
0.15 years for women. The ﬁrst-stage is relatively weak especially for immigrant
men (see the F-statistic and partial R2 at the bottom of column (2) and (3) in Table
3.4) which is in line with the naturalization propensities reported in Table 3.1. The
second-stage results again reveal no employment gains or wage returns to citizenship
for men.
While there is no change in female employment, naturalization increases wages
for women by 0.103 log points. Compared to returns to education in the low- or
medium-skilled population, citizenship is about worth as much as an additional 1.5
years of education for immigrant women. While these returns are indeed substantial,
it is important to keep in mind that immigrants in Germany have traditionally had
much worse labor market outcomes than natives. One explanation for the large gains
is then that naturalization not only removes explicit entry barriers to certain jobs and
careers - but also reduces implicit taste-based discrimination in hiring and promotion
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decisions, for example. This interpretation also ﬁts well into the survey evidence
that naturalized immigrants in Germany feel much less discriminated against than
immigrants without a German passport (see footnote 3). These ﬁndings suggest
that citizenship could be a powerful tool to improve assimilation in countries with
little tradition of naturalizations like Germany.
Table 3.4: Instrumental Variable Estimates of the Returns to Citizenship
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage
Years Years Employment Log Personal Years Years Employment Log Personal
Naturalized Naturalized Income Naturalized Naturalized Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years since Eligible 0.061* 0.087** 0.155*** 0.146***
for Naturalization [0.035] [0.039] [0.035] [0.052]
Years since Naturalized
-0.080 -0.023 -0.014 0.103**
[0.108] [0.046] [0.019] [0.050]
Years in Germany 0.374* 0.475* 0.105 0.136*** -0.485*** -1.070*** -0.014 0.151**
[0.213] [0.257] [0.066] [0.035] [0.182] [0.275] [0.020] [0.064]
Years in Germany2 0.007*** 0.008*** -0.000 -0.002*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.000 -0.002***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.003] [0.004] [0.000] [0.001]
Medium-skilled 0.973*** 0.844*** 0.160 0.191*** 1.171*** 1.020*** 0.102*** 0.166***
[0.093] [0.109] [0.108] [0.040] [0.096] [0.140] [0.025] [0.057]
High-skilled 1.068*** 1.025*** 0.222* 0.516*** 1.379*** 1.651*** 0.222*** 0.531***
[0.241] [0.265] [0.129] [0.052] [0.241] [0.281] [0.030] [0.093]
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 16,468 12.672 16,468 12,672 14,875 9,884 14,875 9,884
R Squared 0.346 0.363 0.340 0.376
F-Test 3.00 4.84 20.06 7.84
Partial R² First Stage 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 0.001
Notes: The table reports instrumental variable estimates of the returns to citizenship for male (left-hand side) and female immigrants
(right-hand side) in Germany. The dependent variable in the ﬁrst stage (in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5)) is the years since an immigrant
is naturalized. The second stages (columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)) reports whether the acquisition of citizenship aﬀects employment
or log monthly personal income respectively. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000
and were between the ages of 16 and 30 when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e.
immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes
the number of years since an immigrants became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 German immigration reforms. All
speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear
trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). The
omitted education category is low-skilled, i.e. those without high school or vocational degree. The F-statistic and Partial R2 from
the respective ﬁrst stages are reported at the bottom of the table. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year.
Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
We further investigate whether naturalization is related to economic self-suﬃciency.
The dependent variable here is an indicator equal to one if an immigrant receives
unemployment beneﬁts or social assistance in the current year and zero otherwise.26
Note that immigrants can claim both beneﬁts irrespective of their citizenship status
26To receive unemployment beneﬁts, a person had to be employed and have paid UI contributions for at least 12
months over the preceding three years. Unemployment beneﬁts were means tested and 60% (67%) of the last net
wage for a recipient without (with) children. Welfare beneﬁts are available for everybody but are means-tested.
In 2010, welfare beneﬁts were about 260 Euros per month and adult in the household. Beneﬁts for partners in
the same household are somewhat lower, while beneﬁts for children under age 25 living in the household depend
on their age; additional transfers cover housing allowances and running costs.
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as long as they hold a valid work permit. While an immigrant has to demonstrate
economic self-suﬃciency to obtain a temporary work permit, this is no longer re-
quired once an immigrant has a permanent work permit (after at least ﬁve years in
the country). The OLS estimates in the top panel of Table 3.5 suggest that natural-
ized immigrants are actually less likely to receive welfare beneﬁts. The reduced-form
and IV estimates in the middle and bottom panel of Table 3.5 ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of eligibility or actual naturalization on beneﬁt receipt. We further check
whether immigrants who receive some social transfer are more likely to draw welfare
beneﬁts. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 3.5 shows no signiﬁcant eﬀects for men or
women.27
Table 3.5: Citizenship and Social Assistance
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Any Social Unempl. Beneﬁts Any Social Unempl. Beneﬁts
Assistance or Welfare Beneﬁts Assistance or Welfare Beneﬁts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates
Years since Naturalized -0.002*** 0.002 -0.002*** 0.002
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002]
Observations 16,458 2,516 14,870 1,765
R Squared 0.086 0.150 0.063 0.145
Reduced Form Estimates Reduced Form Estimates
Years since Eligible 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.004
for Naturalization [0.002] [0.007] [0.002] [0.007]
Observations 16,458 2,516 14,870 1,765
R Squared 0.085 0.150 0.062 0.145
Instrumental Variable Estimates Instrumental Variable Estimates
Years since Naturalized 0.030 - 0.004 -
[0.038] [0.013]
Observations 16,458 14,870
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.144 0.238 0.115 0.158
Notes: The table reports OLS (top panel), reduced form (middle panel) and instrumental variable estimates (bottom panel) of
the returns to citizenship eligibility for male and female immigrants in Germany. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3)
is an indicator equal to one if a person receives unemployment beneﬁts (Arbeitlosengeld I) or social assistance (Arbeitslosengeld
II). In columns (2) and (4), the dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if an immigrant receives unemployment assistance
and zero if she receives welfare beneﬁts. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and
who were between the ages of 16 and 30 when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans,
i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible
denotes the number of years since an immigrants became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms. The
instrumental variable estimates use years since eligible as an instrument for the years since actual naturalization. All speciﬁcations
include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order polynomial
of years in Germany, education), current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region
of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North
and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship) and education controls. Standard errors
in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
27We do not report IV estimates for the type of beneﬁt received because there is no strong ﬁrst stage in the small
sample of beneﬁt recipients.
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In sum, we ﬁnd that women enjoy substantial returns to citizenship in the labor
market; at the same time, we ﬁnd no evidence that the acquisition of citizenship
imposes a burden for the welfare system. An open question is why women enjoy
large wage returns from naturalization, while men do not. One potential explanation
could be measurement error. Immigrant men, especially those arriving as guest
workers, were more likely to move back and forth between their country of origin and
the destination country which would introduce measurement error in our eligibility
variable (which relies on information about the reported year of arrival in Germany).
Assuming additive measurement error, the coeﬃcients on eligibility in Table 3.3 and
3.4 would be biased toward zero. Yet, if the absence of returns to citizenship was
only the consequence of measurement error, we should ﬁnd positive OLS estimates
as OLS does not rely on the mismeasured eligibility variable (and selection into
citizenship does not seem to be negative for men). The OLS estimates in Table
3.2 are however, economically and statistically close to zero. So, measurement error
does not seem to be the primary explanation for the sizable diﬀerences in returns
to citizenship between men and women. We discuss alternative channels for the
observed gender diﬀerences in Section 3.5.5.
3.5.3 Speciﬁcation Tests
We now show that potential threats to our identiﬁcation strategy do not aﬀect
our results. Recall that our estimation approach allows for a full set of year of arrival,
year of birth and calendar year eﬀects, but imposes a second-order polynomial for
general assimilation eﬀects to avoid multicollinearity between calendar year, year of
arrival and years since migration. Given that adolescent immigrants not only get
eligible faster conditional on year of arrival but also have lived in Germany for a
slightly shorter period, we would have a downward bias in our estimates if we did not
adequately control for assimilation eﬀects. To test this, we allow for diﬀerent degrees
of polynomials in years since migration starting from a linear speciﬁcation up to a
fourth-order polynomial in years since migration. The dependent variable is again
log personal income and all other control variables are the same as in equation (2).
The ﬁrst four columns of Table B.4 show the results for men in the top panel and
for women in the bottom panel. The estimates do not change across speciﬁcations;
the AIC criterion reported at the bottom of each panel suggests no substantive
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improvements beyond the second-order polynomial for men or women. Hence, the
quadratic speciﬁcation for general assimilation eﬀects does not aﬀect our results.
A second concern with our estimation strategy is that adolescent immigrants
(the treatment group) arrived in Germany at a younger age compared to adult im-
migrants (the control group) conditional on year of arrival. Research in psychology
shows that immigrants who arrive at younger ages are more likely to learn the host
country's language (e.g., Birdsong, 2006; Johnson and Newport, 1989; Newport,
2002) and subsequently perform better in the host country's labor market than
those immigrating at later ages. If age of arrival eﬀects matter conditional on our
control variables, the estimated returns to citizenship would be upward biased be-
cause adolescent immigrants arrived in Germany at a younger age. We can assess
this concern by following a similar strategy than Bleakley and Chin (2004): we
generate a variable equal to one if an immigrant arrived prior to age 11 and zero
if she arrived in Germany at a later age. As an additional test, we also include
5-year dummies for age of arrival in addition to all other control variables. Both
sets of controls for age of arrival eﬀects have no impact on wage returns for men
which remain close to zero and insigniﬁcant (see columns (5) and (6), top panel).
For women, the coeﬃcient on years since eligible actually increases somewhat (see
columns (5) and (6), bottom panel). Yet, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the two coeﬃcients are the same as in the baseline. Overall then, age of arrival
eﬀects cannot explain our results.
Our identifying assumption would also be violated if age eﬀects vary systemati-
cally across arrival cohorts, for example, because young immigrants are more favor-
ably selected than older immigrants in later arrival cohorts than in earlier arrivals.
Given that we cannot include a full set of birth cohort x arrival cohort interactions,
we provide two alternative tests for our identifying assumption. First, we include
individual birth cohort eﬀects for immigrants arriving prior to 1990 and a separate
set of birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects for cohorts arriving in Germany after the fall of the
wall. Hence, the eﬀect of eligibility is identiﬁed as long as birth cohort eﬀects are
similar within the 1976-1989 arrival cohorts and again within the arrival cohorts
1990-2000. The results shown in columns (7) of Table B.4 show that estimates are
somewhat lower, but remain sizable and signiﬁcant for women and close to zero for
men.
Our second strategy to limit concerns about diﬀerential birth year eﬀects across
arrival cohorts is to restrict the set of birth years included in the estimation. The
last four columns in Table B.4 subsequently restrict the estimation window of birth
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cohorts in each arrival cohort: columns (8) again shows the baseline from Table 3.3
(sample of 16-30 years-old when ﬁrst eligible). Columns (9) restricts the sample
to immigrants who are between 19 and 27 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible.
Column (10) further restricts the sample to immigrants who are between 21 and 25
years-old when they get eligible, while column (11) only includes immigrants aged 22
or 23 when they ﬁrst get eligible. Across all speciﬁcations, immigrants under 23 get
eligible under the reduced resident requirement while immigrants 23 and older get
eligible later. The estimates for women remain positive and get larger for the most
narrow age window where the sample gets rather small. Estimates for men remain
around zero and insigniﬁcant. Both sets of speciﬁcations suggest that diﬀerential
trends in birth cohorts across arrival cohorts cannot explain our results.
A ﬁnal speciﬁcation issue is that our main empirical model (in equation (2))
identiﬁes persistent eﬀects on wage growth (a slope eﬀect). Citizenship will aﬀect
wage growth if access to citizenship increases the returns to experience or tenure,
for example; or, if immigrants invest more in human capital after naturalization.
Our empirical model does however not identify any eﬀect of citizenship on levels
of employment or earnings. The reason is that by 2005, the ﬁrst year of our data
from the Microcensus, the control group of adult immigrants has become eligible
for German citizenship as well. To test whether employment or earnings change
immediately with naturalization (a level eﬀect), we use the much smaller SOEP
data. We capture the level eﬀect by a dummy variable whether an individual is
naturalized or eligible in the current year. As before, we identify the slope eﬀect by
including a measure of years since eligibility for citizenship. Table B.5 shows small
level and slope eﬀects for men that are never statistically signiﬁcant - just like in the
larger Microcensus. For women, access to citizenship has no slope or level eﬀect on
employment. The slope eﬀects for wages are positive as in the Microcensus but do
not reach statistical signiﬁcance at conventional levels, likely due to small sample
sizes.
3.5.4 Potential Mechanisms
3.5.4.1 Job Characteristics
As discussed in the introduction, citizenship provides access to certain restricted
jobs, for example, in the public sector. In addition, naturalized immigrants might
have better chances of moving up the job ladder, for example by switching from
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a blue collar to a white collar job; or, by leaving low-paid self-employment. The
results in Section 3.5.2 above showed that almost 50 percent of women's earnings
gain from citizenship is associated with occupational upgrading and movements
across industries. As immigrant women are much more likely to work in the low-
paying service sector than immigrant men, part of the wage gains for women could
be attributed to the fact that women move to more stable and better-paying jobs
after naturalization, while men do not.
Table 3.6: Citizenship and Job Characteristics - Men
Male Immigrants
Public White Firm Self- Temporary Job Working
Sector Collar Size Employed Contract Tenure hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reduced Form Estimates
Years since Eligible 0.003* 0.001 0.017 -0.001 -0.001 0.010 -0.097
for Naturalization [0.002] [0.003] [0.026] [0.002] [0.003] [0.034] [0.066]
Observations 10,919 11,032 12,916 12,916 12,132 12,400 12,916
R Squared 0.031 0.201 0.059 0.049 0.256 0.393 0.055
Instrumental Variable Estimates
Years since Naturalized 0.037 0.031 0.141 -0.003 -0.006 0.007 -0.868
[0.032] [0.027] [0.320] [0.019] [0.030] [0.348] [0.764]
Observations 10,919 11,032 12,916 12,916 12,132 12,400 12,916
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.050 0.389 10.45 0.103 0.212 6.191 38.173
Notes: The table reports reduced form (top panel) and instrumental variable estimates (bottom panel) of the returns to citizenship
for male and female immigrants in Germany. The dependent variables are whether a person is employed in the public sector (columns
(1) and (8)); whether a person works in a white collar job (columns (2) and (9)); the size of the individual's plant (columns (3) and
(10)); whether a person is self-employed (columns (4) and (11)); whether a person has a temporary employment contract (columns
(5) and (12)); the number years in the current job (columns (6) and (13)); and the number of hours worked per week (columns (7)
and (14)). Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrants became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or
2000 immigration reforms. The instrumental variable estimates use years since eligible as an instrument for the years since actual
naturalization. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30
years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry
who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics
as earlier tables: individual year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order polynomial of years in Germany, education,
current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends and ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new
EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet
Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 explores in more detail whether men and women select
into diﬀerent types of jobs after having access to citizenship. In line with the absence
of any wage returns for men in Table 3.3 and 3.4, Table 3.6 shows that the job
characteristics of men do not change much after eligibility (top panel) or actual
naturalization (bottom panel). The only exception is that men are slightly more
likely to work in a public sector job when they do no longer face any restrictions on
government jobs. Yet, the stronger presence in public sector jobs is not associated
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with any wage gains for men. The IV estimates for men in the bottom panel need
to interpreted with caution: while eligibility has a positive eﬀect on naturalization
in all ﬁrst stages (which are reported in Table B.6), the corresponding F-statistic
(shown in the bottom row of Table B.6) reveal that the instrument is weak for men.
Table 3.7: Citizenship and Job Characteristics - Women
Female Immigrants
Public White Firm Self- Temporary Job Working
Sector Collar Size Employed Contract Tenure hours
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Reduced Form Estimates
Years since Eligible 0.001 0.011*** 0.053* -0.003* -0.006* 0.151*** 0.445***
for Naturalization [0.003] [0.003] [0.029] [0.002] [0.003] [0.029] [0.101]
Observations 8,390 8,801 9,884 9,884 9,684 9,424 9,884
R Squared 0.038 0.283 0.034 0.04 0.202 0.249 0.099
Instrumental Variable Estimates
Years since Naturalized 0.007 0.077** 0.302 -0.019 -0.045 0.827*** 3.174**
[0.017] [0.039] [0.214] [0.013] [0.030] [0.308] [1.296]
Observations 8,390 8,801 9,884 9,884 9,684 9,424 9,884
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.112 0.652 9.89 0.059 0.236 4.746 28.294
Notes: The table reports reduced form (top panel) and instrumental variable estimates (bottom panel) of the returns to citizenship
for male and female immigrants in Germany. The dependent variables are whether a person is employed in the public sector (columns
(1) and (8)); whether a person works in a white collar job (columns (2) and (9)); the size of the individual's plant (columns (3) and
(10)); whether a person is self-employed (columns (4) and (11)); whether a person has a temporary employment contract (columns
(5) and (12)); the number years in the current job (columns (6) and (13)); and the number of hours worked per week (columns (7)
and (14)). Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrants became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or
2000 immigration reforms. The instrumental variable estimates use years since eligible as an instrument for the years since actual
naturalization. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30
years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry
who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics
as earlier tables: individual year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order polynomial of years in Germany, education,
current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear trends and ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new
EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet
Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
The situation is very diﬀerent for immigrant women (Table 3.7). The ﬁrst-stage
estimates of the IV results in Table B.6 show that eligibility is strongly correlated
with naturalization. More importantly, women's job characteristics change dra-
matically after they become eligible or actually naturalize in Germany. Immigrant
women are more likely to work in a white-collar job and for larger ﬁrms. They are
somewhat less likely to be self-employed and to have a temporary work contract
though the IV estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. Most importantly, women
have more stable jobs as naturalization increases their job tenure by 8.3 months or
17%. Women also work longer hours as naturalization increases working time by
about 3.2 hours per week or about 11%. As part-time work carries a substantial
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wage penalty in Germany, longer working hours are another reason why women earn
more after naturalizing.
3.5.4.2 Investments in Language Skills
Improvements in the command of the host country's language is another poten-
tial source of wage growth among immigrants. Since citizenship grants immigrants
a long-time perspective in the destination country, it should increase incentives to
invest in the local language. We should then see an eﬀect in our data as long as
faster eligibility for citizenship speeds up language acquisition. These investments
might even occur prior to actual eligibility. Because eligibility is based on arrival
year, birth year and calendar year along, prior investments will not bias our reduced
form estimates as long as in- and outmigration rates are uncorrelated with the years
of eligibility conditional on our control variables. We discuss diﬀerential migration
in section 3.6.1 below.
While language skills are not observed in the Microcensus, we can analyze them
using the SOEP. The dependent variables are now how well immigrants are able
to speak or write in German. The self-reported score ranges from 0 to 4 where
higher values imply better language skills. The control variables are the same as in
equation (2). Table B.7 shows no language improvements for men. In line with the
substantial earnings gains for women, we ﬁnd that German writing skills improve for
women with eligibility. Evaluated at the mean years of eligibility in the sample, the
improvement is about 11 percent. Other control variables have the expected eﬀect:
more educated immigrants have better (self-reported) language skills as do immi-
grants who have lived in Germany for a longer period of time. While writing skills
respond to the better job opportunities that immigrants obtain with citizenship,
these improvements are modest compared to the large changes with time in the host
country. We interpret these results as evidence that language skills, in particular
speaking the language mostly improves with time in Germany rather than through
access to citizenship alone.
Overall, our evidence suggests that the large wage gains of women are accom-
panied by substantial improvements in their labor market position and adjustments
on the labor supply side. The question remains why women beneﬁt much more from
the liberalization of citizenship than men. We propose three potential explanations.
A ﬁrst reason is related to the traditional employment diﬀerences of immigrant men
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and women. Women have had much lower labor force attachment with fewer work-
ing hours. Given that part-time work carries substantial wage penalties in Germany
as in many other countries, more full-time jobs will improve the labor market posi-
tion of women. A second reason is related to the fact that immigrant women have
been working in less stable jobs with lower pay than men. Almost 50% of the wage
gains for immigrant women come from occupational and sectoral upgrading. These
wage gains are not the result of higher returns to eligibility in white-collar jobs, for
example (not reported); rather, white-collar jobs pay higher wages on average and
immigrant women are more likely to be employed in white-collar jobs after eligibility
while men are not. Hence, access to citizenship allows immigrants to sort into more
productive and better jobs - and women had a lot more room for improvements than
men. In addition, German language skills are likely to be more important in the
service sector where immigrant women are employed than in the manufacturing jobs
of immigrant men. As such, improvements in language skills might have been more
valuable for women than men. A ﬁnal reason is related to the legal status prior
to eligibility. Most immigrant men have had stable employment careers since en-
try; most of them therefore had permanent residence and work permits in Germany
by the time they get eligible for citizenship. Immigrant women in contrast, might
have obtained a permanent permit either through their employed husbands; or after
having worked without disruption in the same job for at least three years. As a
consequence, fewer women might have had their own permanent work permit prior
to citizenship. Citizenship then provides a stronger signal of long-term commitment
to current and future employers, for example, than for men.
3.5.5 Heterogeneity of Returns
So far, we have estimated the average return to citizenship in the labor market.
Beneﬁts of naturalization and hence incentives to naturalize might however diﬀer
across immigrants. Most importantly, the potential beneﬁts should be strongest for
immigrants from outside the European Union because they face restrictions on job
and occupational mobility unless they have a permanent work permit.
Table 3.8 indeed conﬁrms that immigrants from outside the EU have much
higher propensities to naturalize: the pattern is very strong for women. It is weaker
for men where only immigrants from the former Soviet Union and those with no (or
unknown) nationality have statistically signiﬁcant higher propensities to naturalize
than immigrants from EU member countries (EU-15 plus the new EU-12). Does the
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propensity to naturalize also diﬀer between guest workers and their families (who
came to Germany prior to 1990) and more recent immigrants (arriving after the fall
of the Berlin Wall in 1990)? There is indeed some heterogeneity. Eligibility has a
modest eﬀect on naturalization for guest workers (only 1.3 percentage points for men
and 2.2. percentage points for women). Among more recent immigrants, eligibility
increases the likelihood of naturalization by 5 percentage points for both men and
women. We ﬁnd no selection with respect to education for guest workers. For more
recent immigrants, selection is intermediate for men and negative for women.
Table 3.8: Heterogeneity in the Propensity to Naturalize
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
by Region Guest Workers Recent Immigrants by Region Guest Workers Recent Immigrants
of Origin (1976-1989) (1990-2000) of Origin (1976-1989) (1990-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eligible for Naturalization -0.014 0.013* 0.047*** -0.059 0.022*** 0.049***
[0.041] [0.007] [0.013] [0.035] [0.008] [0.013]
Eligible*new EU12 -0.032 0.058
[0.047] [0.041]
Eligible*Ex-Yugoslavia 0.040 0.065
[0.045] [0.040]
Eligible*Turkey 0.016 0.077**
[0.042] [0.035]
Eligible*Middle East 0.069 0.167***
[0.045] [0.040]
Eligible*Africa 0.075 0.096**
[0.047] [0.042]
Eligible*Asia 0.062 0.174***
[0.049] [0.047]
Eligible*(North and South America) 0.043 0.068
[0.098] [0.062]
Eligible*(Russia and Former SU) 0.153*** 0.110**
[0.055] [0.050]
Eligible*(Other or No Passport) 0.171** 0.051
[0.076] [0.062]
Years in Germany 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.019***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Years in Germany2 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Medium-skilled 0.005** 0.001 0.011*** -0.003 0.000 -0.006
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
High-skilled -0.007* 0.006 -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.007 -0.034***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.007]
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,124 19,873 18,251 37,426 18,195 19,231
R Squared 0.089 0.059 0.100 0.081 0.050 0.090
Notes: The table reports results from a linear probability model where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a
migrant has naturalized in a given year and zero otherwise. The sample includes all ﬁrst-generation immigrants who are not ethnic
Germans, arrived in Germany between 1976 to 2000, are 16-30 years old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period,
and report valid information on income, naturalization and years lived in Germany. The eligibility indicator is equal to one if an
individual is a) 16-22 years old and has lived in Germany for at least 8 years; b) 23-30 years old and has lived in Germany for at
least 15 years in 1991-1999; or c) 23-30 years old and has lived in Germany for at least 8 years after 2000. The left-hand side reports
results for male immigrants, the right-hand side for female immigrants. Columns (1) and (4) interact the eligibility variable with the
ten region of origins. Columns (2) and (5) show results for immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 1989. Columns
(3) and (6) show results for immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1990 and 2000. All speciﬁcations include year of arrival
and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region
of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU member countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa,
North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). The omitted region of origin
are the EU-15 member states; the omitted education category is low-skilled (no high school or vocational degree). Standard errors in
brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
Given that the propensity to naturalize varies a lot with the country of ori-
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gin, we might expect that some immigrants also beneﬁt more from citizenship than
others. Table 3.9 explores how wage returns to eligibility vary across immigrant
groups. Male immigrants from Africa, Russia and the Former Soviet Union have
large positive wage returns of 1.2-1.4% per year. All other immigrant groups, in-
cluding immigrants from EU member states, have no statistically signiﬁcant returns
to eligibility. Women exhibit a diﬀerent pattern: here, it is mostly immigrants from
ex-Yugoslavia as well as Russia and the Former Soviet Union who have positive
returns ranging from 1.2-1.6% per year.
To analyze this heterogeneity more systematically, we next explore whether im-
migrants from poorer countries - which are typically outside the EU - have higher
returns to citizenship eligibility.28 We merge information on the GDP per capita
in the source country in 2005 from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2011)
and interact the eligibility indicator with the GDP per capita in the immigrant's
source country.29 Immigrants from richer countries have higher earnings (though
the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant); but men from poorer countries have
slightly higher returns after they become eligible for citizenship than men from richer
source countries (see column (2) of Table 3.9). Going from a country like Turkey
to Afghanistan, for instance, eligibility increases annual wage returns for men from
0.12% to 0.19%; in contrast, we ﬁnd no diﬀerential eﬀect for women from poorer
countries.30 Alternatively, returns could vary across education groups. We ﬁnd no
heterogeneity in returns across education groups for women (see column (7)) but
actually lower returns for medium-skilled men (see column (3)). Hence, the fact
that medium-skilled men are more likely to naturalize (see Table 3.1) cannot be
explained by higher returns to citizenship.
Finally, the returns to eligibility might vary across cohorts of arrival. More recent
immigrants to Germany are more likely to come from Eastern Europe, especially ex-
Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, than traditional guest workers. We ﬁnd
striking diﬀerences in returns. As shown in Table 3.10, guest workers - both men
and women - have no returns to citizenship eligibility. For recent immigrants, wage
returns are positive for women. One question that emerges from Table 3.9 and 3.10
28We also tested whether citizenship aﬀects female employment especially for women from countries with low female
labor force participation rates; however, we do not ﬁnd any evidence for any convergence in employment after
citizenship.
29The number of observations for this speciﬁcation is lower because we can merge GDP data only with immigrants
for which we observe the actual country of origin (e.g., Turkey), not only the region of origin (e.g., Asia).
30In 2005, Turkey's GDP per capita was 7,091 Euros, while Afghanistan had a GDP per capita of 619 Euros.
Taking the main eﬀect and interaction eﬀect of column (2) in Table 3.9, the return for a Turkish men is
0.002-0.0001*7.091= 0.0012. A male immigrant from Afghanistan in turn gets 0.002-0.001*0.619= 0.0019.
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Table 3.9: Heterogeneity of Returns to Eligibility among Immigrants in Germany
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reduced Form Estimates Reduced Form Estimates
Years since Eligible for -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.020*** 0.016***
Naturalization [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Years Eligible*new EU12 -0.000 0.008
[0.004] [0.005]
Years Eligible*Ex-Yugoslavia 0.005 0.012**
[0.004] [0.006]
Years Eligible*Turkey 0.000 0.006
[0.003] [0.005]
Years Eligible*Middle East -0.002 0.014
[0.005] [0.009]
Years Eligible*Africa 0.014*** -0.008
[0.005] [0.009]
Years Eligible*Asia 0.002 0.006
[0.005] [0.008]
Years Eligible*(North/South -0.014 0.009
America) [0.009] [0.009]
Years Eligible*(Russia and 0.012** 0.016**
Former SU) [0.005] [0.007]
Years Eligible*(Other or 0.001 0.017
No Passport) [0.010] [0.014]
GDP Source Country 0.002 0.002
[0.003] [0.003]
Years Eligible*GDP Source -0.000** -0.000
Country [0.000] [0.000]
Years Eligible*Medium-skilled -0.005** -0.004
[0.002] [0.003]
Years Eligible*High-skilled -0.006 0.005
[0.004] [0.005]
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 12,916 8,540 12,916 9,867 6,619 9,867
R Squared 0.405 0.405 0.404 0.173 0.168 0.172
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates of the returns to citizenship eligibility in Germany. The dependent variable is
log monthly personal income (adjusted to 2005 prices). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976
and 2000 and who were between the ages of 16 and 30 when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic
Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since
eligible denote the number of years since an immigrants became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms.
All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order polynomial of years in Germany, education,
current year and state of current residence ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South
America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship) and education controls. Standard errors in brackets
are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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is why guest workers naturalize at all if there are no labor market beneﬁts associated
with naturalization. The likely explanation is that citizenship also has other beneﬁts
outside the labor market: it is much easier to bring family members to Germany, for
instance, if the immigrant is naturalized than if he has a permanent work permit.
Table 3.10: Returns to Eligibility for Diﬀerent Immigration Waves to Germany
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Y: Log Personal Income Guest Workers Recent Immigrants Guest Workers Recent Immigrants
(arrived 1976-1989) (arrived 1990-2000) (arrived 1976-1989) (arrived 1990-2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reduced Form Estimates Reduced Form Estimates
Years since Eligible for -0.006 -0.002 0.000 0.043***
Naturalization [0.004] [0.013] [0.004] [0.012]
Years in Germany 0.117*** 0.045 0.040 0.016
[0.025] [0.032] [0.032] [0.037]
Years in Germany2 -0.002*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Medium-skilled 0.153*** 0.178*** 0.286*** 0.261***
[0.013] [0.018] [0.029] [0.023]
High-skilled 0.472*** 0.516*** 0.692*** 0.704***
[0.031] [0.030] [0.046] [0.036]
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,988 6,031 3,962 4,977
R Squared 0.305 0.430 0.155 0.181
Mean of Dependent Variable 7.13 6.80 6.54 6.33
Notes: The table shows reduced-form estimates where the dependent variable is log monthly personal income (adjusted to 2005
prices). The sample is restricted to ﬁrst-generation immigrants (excluding ethnic Germans) who were between 16 and 30 years-old
when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrants became
eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms respectively. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation shows results for older
guestworkers who arrived in Germany between 1976-1989 for men (column (1)) and women (column (3)). The second speciﬁcation
reports results for more recent immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1990-2000 for men (column (2)) and women (column (4)).
All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc
linear trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (EU-15, EU12, Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Africa, Asia,
North and South America, Former Soviet Union and other/no citizenship). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival
year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to previous tables.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
Another question is why we see these large diﬀerences between guest workers
and more recent immigrants. Note that the diﬀerence cannot explained by changes
in cohort quality as we include a full set of cohort of arrival dummies. Coeﬃcients
on these cohort dummies are small and not statistically signiﬁcant for women; for
men, cohort of arrival dummies are sometimes negative for later arrivals - the exact
opposite of the pattern observed here. The patterns are also not merely a reﬂection
of non-linear returns to citizenship. While the returns to citizenship decline with
years of eligibility, they are still positive even for immigrant women who became
eligible in the 1990s. Another possible explanation could be that the economic and
social environment in Germany has turned in favor of immigrants. However, reduced
discrimination or other more favorable attitudes of natives toward immigrants would
only explain our results if immigrants who arrived in Germany recently beneﬁt
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from it while more traditional immigrants do not. In addition, the more favorable
treatment has to be restricted to immigrants eligible for citizenship earlier, but
cannot beneﬁt immigrants who got eligible for German citizenship later. We think
this scenario is unlikely. An alternative explanation is that immigrants arriving in
Germany after 1990 knew that they can obtain citizenship whereas earlier guest
workers came to Germany without that option. As such, incentives to migrate and
invest in destination-speciﬁc skills might have changed after the 1991 and the 2000
reforms. At the same time however, immigrants arriving after 1990, many from
Central and Eastern Europe, are somewhat more educated than traditional guest
workers. Their better human capital endowment could be another reason why they
perform better in the German labor market. Unfortunately, due to the timing of the
reform, we cannot test whether changes in immigrant selection after 1991 are the
results of the 1991 reform, or just the consequence of new migration opportunities
after the removal of the Iron Curtain.
3.6 Additional Robustness Checks
3.6.1 Selective Migration, Return Migration and Sample
Attrition
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, our estimates might be aﬀected by selective in-
or outmigration. The reforms in 1991 and 2000 might have changed the selection
of immigrants to Germany. As we control for cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects, changes
in the selection of immigrants does not aﬀect our results as long as the selection of
immigrants changes in the same direction for immigrants eligible under the reduced
resident requirement and those that are not. In Section 3.5.3 above, we allowed
the quality of immigrants to change diﬀerentially across birth cohorts before and
after the announcement of the 1991 reform. Yet, this alternative speciﬁcation did
not change our results which suggests that immigrant quality and years of eligibility
are uncorrelated conditional on arrival year, region of origin and our other control
variables.
A potentially more severe issue is dropout or return migration. As the immi-
grant sample is relatively young (between 16 and 49 years-old), survivor bias due
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to mortality is of minor concern. A more important issue is selective out-migration.
The literature (see Lubotsky, 2007; or Abramitzky et al., 2012 for recent evidence;
Dustmann and Göhrlach, 2014 for a survey) suggests that return migration is in-
deed substantial: depending on the country studied, between 20% and 50% of an
immigrant cohort leave within 10 years of arrival in the host country. If return
migrants are negatively selected from the pool of immigrants, the average quality
of those remaining in the host country improves over time. Selective out-migration
then results in the well-known upward bias in estimated assimilation rates between
immigrants and natives. Does selective return migration also aﬀect our estimates
of citizenship eligibility? The existing evidence suggests that return migration is
highest in the ﬁrst years and levels oﬀ after about eight years in the host country
(see Figure 3 in Dustmann and Göhrlach, 2014; also Dustmann, 1993; Constant
and Massey, 2002). Yet, our sample of immigrants have spent at least ﬁve years
in Germany but most have been in the country for many more years - the mean is
around eighteen years. Return migration during the 2005-2010 period is therefore
unlikely to be a major issue.
However, return migration prior to our sample period could still produce a se-
lected sample. If there is negative selection in out-migration and adolescent immi-
grants (who get eligible faster conditional on the cohort of arrival) are more likely to
return than adult immigrants, then we would get an upward bias in the estimated
return to citizenship eligibility. If adult immigrants are more likely to leave and
there is negative selection into out-migration, there is a downward bias instead. If
both groups are equally likely to leave Germany conditional on our control vari-
ables, there would be no bias in our estimates. Hence, the sign of the potential bias
depends on whether return migration is positively or negatively with immigrant
age. The existing evidence on the relationship between age and return migration is
however not clear-cut: for immigrants from richer countries, age of arrival seems to
be negatively correlated with return migration, while it is positively correlated for
immigrants from developing countries (Dustmann and Göhrlach, 2014). In principle
then, it is not obvious how return migration before our study period would aﬀect
our estimates.
While we cannot assess return migration in the repeated cross-sections of the
Microcensus, we can test for selective dropout of immigrants in the SOEP panel. We
take the probability of attrition from our sample (either due to mortality, emigration
or other dropout) as the dependent variable and test whether attrition depends on
eligibility or actual naturalization. All regressions include the same set of control
92
variables as before (i.e. year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order
polynomial of years in Germany, education and region of origin). Table B.8 suggests
that attrition from the sample due to out-migration or other reasons is somewhat
less likely for those who eventually naturalize or those currently naturalized. This
result is not surprising because we would expect that naturalized immigrants have
a longer-time horizon in the host country and are therefore less likely to return
home. Yet, only the coeﬃcient for eventual naturalization is statistically signiﬁcant
for men at the 10% level; the other coeﬃcients do not reach statistical signiﬁcance
at conventional levels. Most importantly, we ﬁnd no correlation between sample
attrition and either an indicator for eligibility in the current year or years since
eligible. Based on this evidence, return migration seems unlikely to bias our results.
3.6.2 Alternative Samples and Controls
In this section, we provide additional robustness tests to demonstrate that our
results are not aﬀected by alternative deﬁnitions of the eligibility variable and the
immigrant sample. Our main analysis uses the 1991 reform to code our treatment
variables. Yet, one may argue that the reform was fully implemented only in 1993
when a legal claim to eligibility was introduced. The ﬁrst row in Table B.9 redeﬁnes
our time since eligibility using 1993 as the ﬁrst year of eligibility for citizenship. We
ﬁnd similar results than in the baseline and even a slight decrease in employment
rates for men (by about 0.5%).
Some immigrants in our sample might qualify for citizenship through alterna-
tive channels. The most important fast track to citizenship is through marriage
to a German citizen. Foreign spouses of citizens can apply for naturalization after
three years of residency in Germany.31 Therefore, some of the immigrants in our
sample would be eligible for naturalization much faster than our eligibility variable
indicates. Naturalization through marriage is expected to be more important for
adult immigrants aged 23 and above. Since those immigrants are more likely to be
in the control group, we possibly underestimate the returns to German citizenship.
To check whether this could explain the absence of returns for male immigrants, we
drop all immigrants who report having a German spouse in 2005-2010.32 The results
31The immigrant has to be married for at least two years by the time he or she applies for naturalization; further-
more, the spouse has to have a German citizenship for at least two years. Finally, the couple has to have a
permanent resident permit.
32Note that we only observe their current spouse, not the spouse or partner an immigrant had when they ﬁrst
lived in Germany. Some immigrants we drop from the sample might have naturalized through the provisions
of the 1990 or 2000 reforms but married a German citizen only afterward. And some immigrants might have
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reported in the second row show a very similar pattern than before: no eﬀects of
citizenship for men and positive labor market eﬀects for women.
Another potential issue is that the 2000 reform not only changed the resident
requirement for adult immigrants but also granted citizenship to children born in
Germany to foreign-born parents. Immigrants with dependent children therefore
have a higher incentive to naturalize prior to 2000 because they could include spouses
and dependent children in their application. After 2000, newborn children obtained
German citizenship independently of their parents (except for an eight-year resident
requirement for at least one parent). Hence, the beneﬁts of citizenship might be
smaller after 2000 for parents with very young children. Controlling for the presence
and age structure of children in the household does however not change our results.
Alternatively, immigrant parents might adjust their labor supply after their newborn
child has access to German citizenship after the 2000 reform. Mothers, for example,
might reduce employment in order to give their newborn child a good start in the
host country (Sajons, 2015). To check whether access to citizenship by birthplace for
children born after January 1, 2000 may explain our results, we rerun our analysis
dropping all immigrants with children under ten in the household. The children of
the remaining sample were all born prior to 2000 and hence not directly aﬀected
by the reform.33 The results in the fourth row show that women still have positive
wage eﬀects; again, there are no eﬀects for men.
Our sample could also be aﬀected by changes in the inﬂow of refugees and
asylum seekers. After the opening of the Iron Curtain, large numbers of asylum
seekers and ethnic Germans began to arrive in Germany. Faced with ever-increasing
numbers of refugees, the federal government restricted access to political asylum in
1993.34 Hence, the selection of refugees arriving in Germany might have changed
substantially over time, especially after 1993. Refugees who are granted political
asylum face the same naturalization criteria as all other immigrants in Germany.
naturalized through a German spouse, but got divorced before we observe them in the 2005-2010 sample period.
We think that the number of immigrants we misclassify should be small relative to the number of immigrants
with a German spouse in the 2005-2010 period. We ﬁnd similar results if we use the SOEP where we have
annual information on the immigrant's partner from 1984-2009 (not reported).
33The 2000 reform also included a transitory provision: Parents with children born between 1990 and 1999 could
apply for German citizenship for their child between 2000 and 2001. The parent had to fulﬁll the other require-
ments of the 2000 reform granting citizenship by birthplace (most importantly, an 8-year resident requirement).
In practice, less than 10 percent of parents did apply which suggest that children older than ten in 2010 have
mostly not beneﬁted from the citizenship by birthplace reform. In addition, if we drop immigrants with children
younger than 15, we ﬁnd again very similar results (not reported).
34After 1993, immigrants from source countries that are considered safe, or those arriving from safe third countries
(which included all of Germany's geographic neighbors) could no longer apply for political asylum in Germany.
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In some cases, however, the resident requirement could be reduced to six years. As
such, some refugees might have naturalized earlier than our deﬁnition of eligibility
indicates. Unfortunately, as in most data sources, our data do not record whether
an immigrant arrives in Germany as a refugee or applies for asylum. As a proxy for
refugee status, we therefore rerun our baseline after dropping all immigrants from
ex-Yugoslavia and the Middle East which formed the largest groups of refugees over
our sample period. The ﬁfth row in Table B.9 shows slightly larger eﬀects for female
wages than our main results in Table 3.3. In addition, our sample might still contain
some ethnic Germans who are not directly aﬀected by the immigration reforms. We
therefore restrict our data in the sixth row to the 2007-10 Microcensus; in those
years, immigrants were asked whether they were eligible as ethnic Germans. The
coeﬃcients are almost unchanged.
Finally, changes in the German economy more broadly might inﬂuence our re-
sults. Germany's labor market experienced a substantial inﬂow of migrants after
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the Iron Curtain. In addition, wage
inequality in Germany increased in the late 1990s and 2000s with substantial net
gains for the high-skilled but net losses for the low-skilled. In principle, these changes
might be absorbed by year dummies or state-speciﬁc trends. Our reduced-form es-
timates would however be biased if business cycle eﬀects or secular wage changes
aﬀect adolescent immigrants diﬀerently than adult immigrants. If adolescent immi-
grants perform better during a recession than adult immigrants, for instance, our
estimates would be upward biased. The seventh row drops all East German states
because immigration ﬂows and labor market dynamics diﬀer substantially between
East and West Germany. Alternatively, we include state-level unemployment rates
and GDP growth rates to our speciﬁcation in the eighth row. In both cases, results
are remarkably similar to our main results.
3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
Over the past decades, Germany has moved from a country where citizenship
was closely tied to ancestry to a more liberal understanding of citizenship and nat-
uralization. We investigate whether citizenship improves the economic assimilation
in a country that has traditionally had little experience with naturalization. In
contrast to traditional immigrant countries, we do not ﬁnd positive selection into
German citizenship. Men are intermediately selected in terms of observable skills,
as medium-skilled immigrants are more likely to naturalize than the low-skilled.
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Women, in contrast, are even negatively selected with respect to education, with
high-skilled immigrants being less likely to naturalize than low- and medium-skilled
immigrants.
Using age-dependent resident requirements of Germany's immigration reforms,
we ﬁnd no persistent beneﬁts of citizenship for men, but substantial wage returns
for immigrant women. In contrast to previous evidence from the US, we ﬁnd only
modest eﬀects of citizenship on public sector employment. Rather, access to citizen-
ship allows women adjust their labor market careers along three dimensions: ﬁrst,
they engage in occupational and sectoral upgrading like moving into white-collar
jobs. Second, women have more stable careers, have longer tenure and work for
larger ﬁrms after naturalization. Finally, women work longer hours and improve
their language skills with access to citizenship. Exploring the heterogeneity of re-
turns, we ﬁnd that wage returns are typically larger for immigrants from outside the
European Union and for recent arrivals in Germany.
Our empirical evidence diﬀers from an earlier study for Germany which ﬁnd
wage returns for men, but no gains for women (Steinhardt, 2012). There are several
important diﬀerences to our study: ﬁrst, our sample includes all employment includ-
ing self-employed and temporary jobs not subject to social security contributions;
given that immigrants have much higher rates of self-employment, this diﬀerence
is likely to be important. Since women move out of self-employment and tempo-
rary jobs after eligibility, upgrading into jobs with social security contributions is
one explanation why we see wage returns for women. Second, in the social security
data, an employee's citizenship is reported by the employer which is likely to be
measured with error. As women have less stable careers with frequent changes of
employer, their information on citizenship is less reliable (resulting in a downward
bias in returns for women). Finally, the social security data used in Steinhardt's
analysis does not contain any information on the year of arrival in Germany. Since
time in Germany is positively correlated with naturalization, omitted variable bias
will overestimate the returns to citizenship. As men have spent somewhat more
time in Germany on average, this bias is likely more severe for men than women.
Overall, naturalization appears to be one channel to speed up the economic inte-
gration of immigrants even in countries where access to citizenship has traditionally
been restrictive. The beneﬁts of a more liberal immigration policy seem to mate-
rialize especially if immigrants have the human capital necessary to succeed in the
host country's labor market - a condition more recent immigrants to Germany sat-
isfy. As such, the substantial inﬂow of immigration over the past decade - making
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Germany the second most important immigration country after the United States -
is likely to provide large labor market beneﬁts in the long-run. There are however,
three caveats to this conclusion. First, our results show that a more liberal access to
citizenship does not work automatically for everybody; we ﬁnd few eﬀects for guest
workers. The second caveat is that the take-up of citizenship in Germany among
ﬁrst-generation immigrants is still low compared to more traditional immigration
countries, though higher among more recent immigrants. Given the large labor
market returns of citizenship for women, the low take-up points to informational
issues or substantial costs of obtaining German citizenship. Reducing these costs
(e.g., by allowing dual citizenship, for instance) would beneﬁt both the immigrants
and the host country. Finally, labor market performance is just one of several mar-
gins of assimilation in the host country. It would be interesting to complement our
study with an analysis of social or cultural integration outcomes.
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3.8 Appendix
Table B.1: Summary Statistics of the Microcensus
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Labor Force Participation 0.72 0.45 0.53 0.50
Log Personal Income 6.96 0.76 6.42 0.77
Public Sector Employment 0.05 0.22 0.11 0.32
White Collar Employment 0.39 0.49 0.65 0.48
Firm Size 10.45 3.92 9.89 4.01
Self-Employed 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22
Temporary Work Contract 0.21 0.40 0.23 0.42
Job Tenure 6.32 6.12 4.80 4.74
Working Hours 35.66 14.41 24.21 16.39
Receive Transfers (Unemployment or Welfare) 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.32
Type of Beneﬁts Received (1= Welfare Beneﬁts) 0.24 0.43 0.16 0.37
Year of Arrival 1989 6.66 1990 6.57
Years in Germany 18.65 6.76 17.65 6.63
Naturalized 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49
Years since Naturalized 4.06 6.62 4.11 6.70
Year 1st Eligible 2000 4.93 2000 4.77
Years since Eligible 7.97 5.05 7.29 4.87
Birth Year 1978 6.74 1978 7.3
Low-skilled 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50
Medium-skilled 0.46 0.50 0.41 0.49
High-skilled 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Region of origin
Traditional EU member states (EU 15) 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.30
New EU Member States (EU 12) 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.35
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33
Turkey 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
Middle East 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
Africa 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.19
Asia 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21
North and South America 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16
Former Soviet Union (without EU12) 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.32
Other or No Citizenship 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11
Source Country GDP per capita 9178.93 7428.41 8974.94 7012.90
Observations 18,837 19,688
Notes: The table shows summary statistics for the sample of ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and
2000 and are 16-30 years old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. Ethnic Germans are excluded from the
sample. The means for personal income, public sector and white collar employment are only available for the subsample of working
individuals; GDP per capita in the country of origin (measured in 2005 US dollars) is only available for immigrants for which we know
the country of origin rather than only the region of origin. The variable ﬁrmsize varies from 1 (1 employee) to 13 (50 employees and
more). Low-skilled are those without highschool degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled individuals are those with a highschool
or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with a college degree.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010); Penn World Tables (2011).
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics of the Socio-Economic Panel
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Labor force Participation 0.73 0.44 0.44 0.50
Log Monthly Labor Income 7.37 0.72 6.83 0.78
Speak German 3.13 0.84 2.92 1.07
Write in German 2.58 1.15 2.59 1.29
Year of Arrival 1987 6.47 1988 6.31
Years in Germany 10.00 8.54 9.29 8.33
Naturalized 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50
Years since Naturalized 2.75 5.10 2.52 4.94
Eligible 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49
Years since Eligible 2.87 4.48 2.58 4.25
Birth Year 1974 6.36 1974 5.90
Low-skilled 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.50
Medium-skilled 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.46
High-skilled 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20
In School 0.26 0.44 0.21 0.41
Region of origin
Traditional EU Member Countries (EU 15) 0.10 0.29 0.10 0.30
New EU Member Countries (EU 12) 0.19 0.40 0.20 0.40
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.29
Turkey 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
Middle East 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.11
Africa 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.13
Asia 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14
North and South America 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13
Former Soviet Union (without EU 12) 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
Other or no Citizenship 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.07
Observations 4,559 4.939
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for ﬁrst-generation immigrants who are not ethnic Germans, arrived in Germany between
1976 and 2000 and who are 16-30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. Writing and speaking
German are self-assessed language abilities which vary from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very well). Naturalized is equal to one if a person
is actually naturalized. Eligible is equal to one if an individual is (a) aged 16-22, has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and the
year is 1991 or later; (b) aged 23-30, has lived in Germany for at least 15 years in the period 1991-1999; or (c) aged 23-30, has lived
in Germany for at least 8 years and the year is 2000 or later. Low-skilled individuals are those without a high school or vocational
degree; medium-skilled are those with high school or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college degree. Individuals are in
school if they still attend school over the past four weeks.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2009).
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Table B.3: Variation in Eligibility after the 1991 and 2000 Immigration Reforms
Adolescent Immigrants Adult Immigrants Diﬀerence
Year of Arrival
Treatment: Eligible after Control: Eligible after 15 Years (<2000),
in Year when8 Years (=1991) 8 Years (=2000)
in Germany Year 1st Years in Germany Birth Years Eligible Year 1st Years in Germany Birth Years Eligible ﬁrst Eligible
Eligible when 1st eligible Cohorts (in 2005) Eligible when 1st eligible Cohorts (in 2005) col. (8)-(4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1976 1991 15 1969-75 14 1991 15 1961-68 14 0
1977 1991 14 1969-75 14 1992 15 1962-68 13 1
1978 1991 13 1969-75 14 1993 15 1963-68 12 2
1979 1991 12 1969-75 14 1994 15 1964-68 11 3
1980 1991 11 1969-75 14 1995 15 1965-68 10 4
1981 1991 10 1969-75 14 1996 15 1966-68 9 5
1982 1991 9 1969-75 14 1997 15 1967-68 8 6
1983 1991 8 1969-75 14 1998 15 1968 7 7
1984 1992 8 1970-76 13 1999 15 1969 6 7
1985 1993 8 1971-77 12 2000 15 1970 5 7
1986 1994 8 1972-78 11 2000 14 1970-71 5 6
1987 1995 8 1973-79 10 2000 13 1970-72 5 5
1988 1996 8 1974-80 9 2000 12 1970-73 5 4
1989 1997 8 1975-81 8 2000 11 1970-74 5 3
1990 1998 8 1976-82 7 2000 10 1970-75 5 2
1991 1999 8 1977-83 6 2000 9 1970-76 5 1
1992 2000 8 1978-84 5 2000 8 1970-77 5 0
1993 2001 8 1979-85 4 2001 8 1971-78 4 0
1994 2002 8 1980-86 3 2002 8 1972-79 3 0
1995 2003 8 1981-87 2 2003 8 1973-80 2 0
1996 2004 8 1982-88 1 2004 8 1974-81 1 0
1997 2005 8 1983-89 0 2005 8 1975-82 0 0
1998 2006 8 1984-90 0 2006 8 1976-83 0 0
1999 2007 8 1985-91 0 2007 8 1977-84 0 0
2000 2008 8 1986-92 0 2008 8 1978-85 0 0
Mean 1999 8.9 1979 8.1 2001 9.5 1974 5.3
Notes: The table shows when an immigrant who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 became eligible for citizenship after
Germany's immigration reforms in 1991 and 2000. Adolescent immigrants (on the left-hand side of the table) who are between the ages
of 16 and 22 when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship beneﬁt from a reduced residency requirement of eight years after 1991. Adult
immigrants (on the right-hand side of the table) who are 23 years-old or older when they ﬁrst get eligible had to live in Germany for
at least ﬁfteen years in the 1991-1999 period; since 2000, the resident requirement has been reduced to eight years for all immigrants.
Columns (1) and (5) show the year an immigrant ﬁrst gets eligible for citizenship; the number of years an immigrant has lived in
Germany when she qualiﬁes for citizenship (in columns (2) and (6)). Columns (3) and (7) show the birth cohorts in each category
when we restrict our sample to 16-30 years-olds when ﬁrst eligible. Columns (4) and (8) show how the discontinuity in eligibility
rules after 1991 and 2000 transforms into a discontinuity in years of eligibility, our treatment variable in the empirical analysis.
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Table B.4: Alternative Speciﬁcations
Male Immigrants Log Personal Income (Reduced Form Estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Years since Eligible -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.014
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009]
Years in Germany
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic QuadraticPolynomial
Age of Arrival Controls No No No No Before 11 Dummies No No No No No
Birth Cohort FE *
No No No No No No Yes No No No NoBefore/After 1990
Age Window 1st
16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 19-27 21-25 22-23Eligible Immigrants
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesLinear Trends
Observations 12,946 12,946 12,946 12,946 12,946 12,946 12,946 12,707 6,447 3,913 1,634
R Squared 0.401 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.405 0.405 0.406 0.406 0.285 0.247 0.243
AIC criterion 19045.9 18981.5 18981.4 18982.1
Female Immigrants Log Personal Income (Reduced Form Estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Years since Eligible 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.02** 0.010* 0.015*** 0.003 0.031* 0.040*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.016] [0.021]
Years in Germany
Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic QuadraticPolynomial
Age of Arrival Controls No No No No Before 11 Dummies No No No No No
Birth Cohort FE *
No No No No No No Yes No No No NoBefore/After 1990
Age Window 1st
16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 16-30 19-27 21-25 22-23Eligible Immigrants
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesLinear Trends
Observations 9,884 9,884 9,884 9,884 9,884 9,884 9,884 9,639 4,767 2,584 1,016
R Squared 0.171 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.173 0.176 0.173 0.159 0.170 0.216
AIC criterion 19817.6 19809.8 19809.7 19811.7
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates of the returns to citizenship for male (top panel) and female (bottom panel)
immigrants in Germany. The dependent variable is log monthly personal income (adjusted to 2005 prices). The ﬁrst four speciﬁcations
(columns (1)-(4)) include diﬀerent polynomials in years in Germany. Columns (5) and (6) test for the inﬂuence of age of arrival eﬀects:
(5) adds a dummy for immigrants which were under the age of 11 when they arrived in Germany; (6) include separate dummies for age
of arrival (5-year bands). Columns (7) allows for separate birth year ﬁxed eﬀects for arrival cohorts prior to 1990 and those arriving
after 1990. Columns (8)-(11) change the bandwidth of the age window (when immigrants are ﬁrst eligible for naturalization): (8)
16-30 years-old; (9) 19-27 years-old; (10) 21-25 years-old; and (11) 22-23 years-old. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in
Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period
(in columns (1)-(8), narrower age band in columns (9)-(11)). We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who
had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. All speciﬁcations also include education and ten region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South
America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age
x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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Table B.5: Additional Estimates of the Labor Market Returns to Citizenship
Eligibility
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Employment Log Monthly Earnings Employment Log Monthly Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Reduced Form Estimates Reduced Form Estimates Reduced Form Estimates Reduced Form Estimates
Eligible -0.008 -0.012 -0.026 -0.026 0.006 0.009 -0.052 -0.068
[0.027] [0.028] [0.035] [0.035] [0.025] [0.026] [0.056] [0.062]
Years since Eligible -0.003 0.002 -0.008 -0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.008 0.012
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.013] [0.013]
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,559 4,559 4,559 3,338 3,338 3,338 4,939 4,939 4,939 2,196 2,196 2.196
R Squared 0.229 0.229 0.220 0.621 0.621 0.612 0.176 0.175 0.165 0.388 0.388 0.365
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates of the returns to citizenship. The dependent variables are whether a person is
employed (columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9)) and the log monthly gross earnings (columns (4)-(6) and (10)-(12)). The ﬁrst speciﬁcation
reruns the baseline using years since eligibility. To test for the presence of level eﬀects, the second speciﬁcation includes an indicator
for current eligibility, while the third speciﬁcation includes both variables. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in
Germany between 1976 and 2000 who were between 16-30 years old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship during the 1991-2009
period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular
immigrants. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (individual year of arrival and year of
birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order polynomial of years in Germany and education), current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as
state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12),
ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other
or no citizenship). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2009).
Table B.6: First-Stage Estimates of IV for Job Characteristics
Male Immigrants
Public White Firm Self- Temporary Job Working Social
Sector Collar Size Employed Contract Tenure hours Assistance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
First Stage
Years since Eligible 0.069* 0.115** 0.081** 0.096** 0.082** 0.098** 0.096** 0.061*
[0.042] [0.045] [0.039] [0.038] [0.039] [0.042] [0.038] [0.035]
Observations 10.704 10.819 13.009 13.375 11.918 12.152 13.375 16.145
R Squared 0.354 0.37 0.36 0.362 0.378 0.361 0.362 0.346
F-Statistic First Stage 2.78 6.6 4.29 6.21 4.4 5.54 6.21 3.04
Female Immigrants
Public White Firm Self- Temporary Job Working Social
Sector Collar Size Employed Contract Tenure hours Assistance
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
First Stage
Years since Eligible 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.156*** 0.147*** 0.128*** 0.178*** 0.147*** 0.152***
[0.053] [0.060] [0.052] [0.052] [0.053] [0.053] [0.051] [0.043]
Observations 8.145 8.552 9.929 10.213 9.431 9.168 10.213 14.561
R Squared 0.362 0.3704 0.373 0.372 0.375 0.370 0.372 0.3364
F-Statistic First Stage 7.56 5.44 9.01 8.33 5.74 11.26 8.33 12.67
Notes: The table reports the ﬁrst-stage estimates of the IV estimates shown in the bottom panel in Table 6. The dependent variable
in all columns is the number of years since a ﬁrst-generation immigrant has naturalized. Results are shown for male immigrants in
the top panel (columns (1)-(8)) and female immigrants in the bottom panel (columns (9)-(16)). See Table 6 for details on the sample
and speciﬁcation. All standard errors are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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Table B.7: Eligibility for Citizenship and Language Skills
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Speak Write Speak Write Speak Write Speak Write
German German German German German German German German
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Estimates Reduced Form Estimates OLS Estimates Reduced Form Estimates
Years since Eligible -0.012* -0.007 0.016 -0.004 0.005 -0.006 0.004 0.032**
[0.007] [0.008] [0.015] [0.019] [0.005] [0.007] [0.014] [0.016]
Years in Germany 0.207*** 0.297*** 0.146*** 0.190*** 0.157*** 0.173*** 0.153*** 0.155***
[0.021] [0.027] [0.021] [0.024] [0.017] [0.020] [0.016] [0.019]
Years in Germany2 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Medium-skilled 0.214*** 0.223*** 0.185*** 0.221*** 0.344*** 0.481*** 0.298*** 0.419***
[0.045] [0.059] [0.043] [0.054] [0.058] [0.063] [0.051] [0.056]
High-skilled 0.448*** 0.573*** 0.392*** 0.540*** 0.391*** 0.893*** 0.356*** 0.746***
[0.136] [0.168] [0.103] [0.118] [0.107] [0.116] [0.084] [0.087]
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 3.00 2.58 3.00 2.58 2.59 2.20 2.59 2.20
Observations 1,800 1.795 1,800 1.795 1,858 1,856 1,858 1,856
R Squared 0.426 0.419 0.396 0.408 0.515 0.534 0.515 0.534
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates of the returns to citizenship for male and female immigrants in Germany. The
dependent variables are self-assessed language skills in writing and speaking German respectively (reported on a scale from 0=Not
at all to 4= Very well). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between
16-30 years old when they ﬁrst eligible for citizenship during the 1991-2009 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with
German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes the number of
years since an immigrants became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 and 2000 German immigration reforms. All speciﬁcations
include the same individual characteristics as earlier tables (individual year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order
polynomial of years in Germany, education), current year and state of current residence ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear
trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship).
Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2009).
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Table B.8: Return Migration and Other Selective Dropout of Immigrants
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Exit from Population Exit from Population
(Emigration or Mortality) (Emigration or Mortality)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eventually Naturalized -0.007* -0.004
[0.004] [0.003]
Actually Naturalized -0.009 -0.008
[0.009] [0.005]
Eligible for Naturalization 0.000 0.001
[0.008] [0.005]
Years since Eligible 0.002 0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
Years in Germany -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002 -0.002*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years in Germany2 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Medium-skilled -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
High-skilled 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019
[0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4.362 4,362 4,362 4.362 4.689 4.689 4,689 4,689
R Squared 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability that an immigrant exits from the population (either through mortality or leaving the
sample, e.g., by moving abroad). The key independent variables are whether an immigrant eventually naturalizes while participating
in the SOEP (columns (1) and (4)); whether the immigrant is currently naturalized (columns (2) and (5)); whether the immigrant
is currently eligible for naturalization (columns (3) and (6)); and the years since an immigrant has been eligible for naturalization
(columns (4) and (8)). The sample and all control variables are the same as in Table A6. Standard errors in brackets are clustered
by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2009).
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Table B.9: Alternative Samples and Additional Controls
Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Employment Log Personal Income Employment Log Personal Income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Use Legal Claim to Eligibility since 1993 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.013*
[0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.007]
Drop Immigrants with German Partners 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.020***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Control for Children in Household 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 0.012**
(2000 Reform) [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
Drop Children under Age 10 0.005* -0.005 0.003 0.018***
(2000 Reform) [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006]
Drop Ex-Yugoslavia and Middle East 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.019***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006]
Drop Additional Ethnic Germans -0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.015**
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006]
Drop East German States 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.014***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
Add Economic Conditions -0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.018**
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007]
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Years in Germany Polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates where the dependent variable is employment (columns (1) and (3)) and log personal
income adjusted to 2005 prices (columns (2) and (4)). The key independent variables are the number of years since a person is eligible
for naturalization. The ﬁrst row uses the introduction of a legal claim to eligibility in 1993 to calculate the eligibility variable (rather
than the 1991 reform year). The second row drops immigrants with a German spouse in 2005-10. The third row includes controls
for the number and age structure of children in the household. The fourth row drops immigrants with children under 10 who might
have beneﬁtted from the introduction of birthright citizenship in 2000 for all children born on or after January 1, 2000. The ﬁfth row
excludes all immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia and the Middle East; the sixth row restricts the sample to the 2007-10 Microcensus where
we can directly identify and exclude ethnic Germans. The seventh row drops observations from East German states except Berlin,
while the last row adds labor market controls (a linear and squared term in state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate).
See notes to previous tables for the deﬁnition of the sample. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as before
(year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a second-order polynomial of years in Germany, education), state and year ﬁxed eﬀects,
state-speciﬁc linear time trends and ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year.
Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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4 Access to Citizenship and the Social Integration
of Immigrants
4.1 Introduction
Many developed countries have accumulated sizable immigrant populations over the
past decades1. In Europe, for example, the shares of foreign-born in 2013 is over
12% in France, 17% in Sweden and almost 28% in Switzerland. These numbers are
comparable to the share of foreign-born in traditional immigrant countries such as
Australia, Canada or the United States (OECD, 2015). At the same time, immi-
grants often seem to perform poorly in terms of economic assimilation with higher
unemployment rates and lower earnings than natives (e.g., Algan et al., 2010; OECD,
2006). In Europe, they often seem to fall short along social, cultural and political
integration as well (Algan et al., 2012).
The lack of economic and social integration poses substantial challenges to des-
tination countries. Social exclusion might threaten the social cohesion of societies,
for instance, by fostering unrest and hostility among the native population. Anti-
immigrant attitudes seem to be only in part explained by economic well-being and
the perceived eﬀects of economic competition from immigrants (e.g., Scheve and
Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and Preston, 2004). Instead, natives
appear to be just as much concerned about the cultural and social impact of immi-
gration on the host country. Dustmann and Preston (2004), for example, ﬁnd that
opposition to immigration in the UK is more closely related to racial intolerance
than to fears about ﬁscal costs or labor market competition. Based on data for
several countries, Mayda (2006) ﬁnds that concerns about crime and identity are
important determinants for attitudes toward migration. As such, negative attitudes
and discrimination against immigrants seem to be a combination of the perceived
1The paper is joint work with Christina Gathmann and Ole Monscheuer. We thank participants at the European
Economic Association Meeting, RWI Essen, Verein für Socialpolitik and the Ifo Migration Workshop for valuable
comments.
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economic impact, be it in the labor market or on the welfare state, and the social
and cultural inﬂuence on the host society - where the latter appears more important
among the low-skilled population in the host country (e.g., Card et al., 2012).2
The importance of both socio-cultural and economic concerns in the native pop-
ulation suggests that we need to understand assimilation not only in terms of wages,
employment or formal education; but also shed light on the process of or barriers
to social and cultural assimilation. Understanding these factors facilitating (or hin-
dering) integration along economic but also social dimensions seems crucial for the
economic and social well-being of immigrants and destination countries alike.
In this article, we ask whether access to citizenship could be a policy instrument
to advance immigrants' position in the destination country. In particular, does a
more liberal access to citizenship speed up the social integration of immigrants in
terms of family formation, fertility choices or the type of partner chosen?
To investigate the eﬀect of citizenship empirically, we cannot simply compare
naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants. Because naturalized migrants are not
selected randomly from the immigrant population, it is challenging to separate the
causal return to citizenship from the selection into naturalization. Migrants applying
for citizenship might well be those with the highest motivation and the best pre-
requisites to integrate into the host society. Previous studies from Canada and the
United States, for instance, suggest indeed that selection into citizenship is positive
with respect to observable skills (see e.g., Chiswick and Miller, 2008 for the United
States; and De Voretz and Pivnenko, 2006 for Canada). A second diﬃculty is that
eligibility to citizenship is often closely tied to the number of years an immigrant
has resided in the host country. Time in the host country in turn is often positively
correlated with measures of integration like language skills or intermarriage, for ex-
ample. As a consequence, it is diﬃcult to disentangle the returns to citizenship from
social assimilation in the host country more broadly.
To overcome these empirical challenges, we exploit the unique setting in Ger-
many. Today, almost 10 million foreign-born live in Germany, about 13% of its
population. Yet, Germany is an exemplary case for the assimilation and integra-
tion problems of immigrants. Immigrants have lower general trust and are more
risk averse than natives even in the second generation; they often do not iden-
tify themselves as Germans as well (e.g., Algan et al., 2012 for recent evidence).
2Experimental evidence from a public opinion survey in the Netherlands suggests that concerns about national
identity are an important driver for the opposition against immigrants - and even more important than economic
factors (see Sniderman et al., 2004; Hainmüller and Hopkins, 2014 provide a recent survey of the political science
literature).
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Most important for our purpose, Germany has substantially liberalized its access
to citizenship over the past decades. Traditionally, Germany had a very restrictive
citizenship law which was closely tied to ancestry and ethnic origin. Starting in the
early 1990s, there have been important changes in Germany's immigration policy.
In 1991, the government introduced for the ﬁrst time explicit criteria how immi-
grants can obtain German citizenship. Since 2000, immigrants can naturalize after
eight years of residency in Germany, and children of foreign parents in Germany
now obtain citizenship at birth.
To identify the eﬀects of citizenship, we make use of two institutional pecu-
liarities of Germany's reforms. The 1991 reform deﬁned age-dependent residency
requirements for naturalization. Speciﬁcally, adult immigrants (aged 23 and above)
faced a 15-year residency requirement before they could apply for citizenship. Ado-
lescent immigrants (ages 16-22) in turn could apply for German citizenship after
only 8-year of residence. Hence, young immigrants (born between 1969 and 1975)
who arrived in Germany in 1983, for example, become eligible for citizenship in
1991, right after the reform was passed. Adult immigrants (born before 1969) who
came to Germany in the same year had to wait until 1997 in order to be eligible, or
7 years after the younger cohort. The second immigration reform in 2000 reduced
resident requirements for all immigrants to 8 years. As a consequence, all adult
immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1985 and 1992 became eligible imme-
diately in 2000 but had lived in Germany between 8 and 15 years. We can therefore
compare outcomes of immigrants who are somewhat younger or arrived in Germany
somewhat earlier and, for this reason, are eligible for naturalization several years
earlier than other immigrants. Our analysis thus identiﬁes the returns to eligibility
(option to naturalize) while being able to control for the eﬀects of cohort quality,
age and general assimilation eﬀects.
The focus of our main analysis is on the reduced-form relationship between
eligibility for citizenship and measures of social assimilation. Knowing whether a
more liberal access to citizenship aﬀects immigrants' integration is important in
its own right. Furthermore, the intent-to-treat eﬀect is the primary parameter of
interest for policy makers who aim to improve the integration of immigrants in
the host country; for the immigrants themselves, it represents the option value of
naturalization.
We have four main results. First, we ﬁnd that eligibility reduces the demand
for children. Because not all immigrant women in our sample have completed their
fertility, the declining number of children reﬂects in part a postponement of births.
109
Both the decline in fertility and the rising age at ﬁrst birth indicate that immigrants
converge to the fertility choices of natives. After the mean years of eligibility in
our sample, the immigrant-native gap in fertility closes by 20-25 percent. Second,
eligibility for citizenship reduces the likelihood of marriage for men and women -
both the probability of being currently married and the probability of ever being
married. As eligibility has no eﬀect on marital stability or cohabitation, this ﬁnding
suggests that eligible immigrants postpone marriage to search for a suitable match.
Third, eligible women but not men choose diﬀerent partners (whether married or
cohabitating). Eligible women are less likely to have a German native or a second
generation immigrant from the same origin as a partner. Their partners have been
in Germany for a shorter period and are therefore less likely to qualify for citizenship
on their own. Finally, we investigate the potential channels why access to citizenship
speeds up social integration. We ﬁnd that income explains about 25 percent of the
speed of assimilation. In addition, we ﬁnd that the cultural heritage of immigrants
matters. Immigrants who come from more traditional cultures with higher fertility,
for instance, have higher fertility themselves; but they also reduce their fertility
much more with access to citizenship. Overall, the speed of assimilation in fertility
is about double at the 75th percentile than at the 25th percentile of the source
countries' fertility distribution. These ﬁndings show that immigrants adapt much
faster into the host society if they have the option to naturalize.
This article contributes to three strands of the literature. First, we contribute
to the literature on citizenship. The vast majority focuses on citizenship's impact
in the labor market (e.g., Chiswick, 1978; and Bratsberg et al., 2002 for the US; De
Voretz and Pivnenko, 2006 for Canada; Gathmann and Keller, 2014 for Germany).
However, citizenship may not only aﬀect the labor market performance of immi-
grants but might have an impact on social and cultural integration into the host
country as well (see also OCED, 2011). A few recent studies have analyzed the link
between birthright citizenship for second-generation immigrants and fertility choices
of their parents (Avitabile et al., 2014), educational attainment of second-generation
immigrant children (Felfe and Sauer, 2015) or parents' interactions with host coun-
try culture (Avitabile et al., 2013; Sajons, 2015).3 All of these studies analyze how
birthright citizenship for newborn children aﬀects the social and cultural integration
of their parents. Our paper in turn investigates how fertility, family formation and
matching behavior change when the immigrant herself can naturalize in the host
3A related literature studies the relationship between naturalization and political involvement (Bevelander, 2011;
Hainmüller et al., 2014). Our study focuses on the impact of citizenship on fertility and family formation instead.
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country.
Our study is also related to the sizable literature on immigrant assimilation.
Most of the literature in economics has focused on labor market assimilation and its
determinants (e.g., Borjas, 1985, 1995; Card, 2005; Hu, 2000; Lalonde and Topel,
1997; Lubotsky, 2007; Dustmann and Glitz, 2011 survey the literature).4 Yet, as
noted by Algan et al. (2012), assimilation seems to vary a lot depending on the
dimension considered. Economic assimilation, for instance, might be faster than
integration along social and cultural dimensions; and some immigrant groups might
integrate much faster along some dimensions than others. A small literature an-
alyzes cultural assimilation among immigrants measured, for instance, by national
identity (e.g., Dustmann, 1996) or values and beliefs (Algan et al., 2012; Bisin et al.,
2008). A much larger literature in economics but also sociology compares natives
and immigrants with respect to family formation and fertility behavior (e.g., Ben-
Porath, 1973; Bleakley and Chin, 2010; Adsera and Ferrer, 2014; and Furtado and
Trejo, 2013 survey the literature). The evidence typically shows that there are sub-
stantial diﬀerences between natives and immigrants in fertility, marriage behavior
and the type of partner chosen. With time in the host country, most studies report
a decline in the immigrant-native gap though full convergence may span several gen-
erations. Rather than comparing immigrants to natives, we analyze the assimilation
process for immigrants who get eligible for citizenship at diﬀerent points in time.5
Our main contribution to this literature is however, that we evaluate the eﬀects of
a particular policy, liberalization of citizenship, for the speed of social assimilation
and its determinants. Our results thus have direct implications for policy-makers
wishing to promote immigrant integration in the host countries.
Finally, this paper also contributes to a broader literature examining the impact
of culture on economic and social behavior. Several recent studies employ immi-
grants from diﬀerent source countries to separate the inﬂuence of culture and norms
from other institutional factors in a host country. The basic idea is that immigrants
have been exposed to diﬀerent traditions and values, either in the country of origin
or, for second-generation immigrants, through parents and ethnic neighborhoods,
but face the same institutional and economic incentives in the host country (see
Fernandez, 2011 for a detailed exposition of the epidemiological approach). Most
related are studies that have analyzed female labor supply (Alesina and Giuliano,
4For Germany, most studies do not ﬁnd much evidence for economic assimilation (see, e.g., Pischke, 1993; or
Schmidt, 1997).
5Similarly, Lalonde and Topel (1997) and Blau et al. (2011) also use diﬀerent immigrant cohorts to study the link
between years in the U.S. and economic integration.
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2010; Blau, 1992; Blau et al., 2011; Fernández and Fogli, 2009), fertility (Fernández
and Fogli, 2009), divorce (Furtado et al., 2011) or living arrangements (Giuliano,
2007).6 The paper closest to ours is by Blau et al. (2011) who analyze how cultural
origin aﬀects the speed of labor market assimilation of female immigrants in the US.
The research question we address here, how citizenship aﬀects social assimilation,
has not been studied so far. What inﬂuence does the cultural heritage of immi-
grants have on the integration through citizenship compared to say, human capital
or income?
The article proceeds as follows: The next section discusses the recent immigra-
tion reforms in Germany. Section 3 introduces our data sources and the empirical
strategy to identify the returns to citizenship. Section 4 discusses the empirical re-
sults on social integration, while Section 5 studies potential mechanisms. Section 6
concludes.
4.2 Theoretical Considerations
4.2.1 Fertility Decisions
Economic theory suggests a number of reasons why access to citizenship might aﬀect
fertility behavior of immigrants. One important channel is that citizenship improves
the economic position of immigrants in the host country (see e.g., Bratsberg et
al., 2002 for the US; or Gathmann and Keller, 2014 for Germany). For Germany,
Gathmann and Keller (2014) show that eligible immigrants have higher wages and
more stable jobs than immigrants who are not yet eligible. Higher wages would
generate both an income and substitution eﬀect on fertility (Becker, 1960; see Hotz,
Klerman and Willis, 1997 for a survey). More income should increase the demand
for children while higher female wages increase the opportunity cost of children.
Since Gathmann and Keller (2014) also ﬁnd that immigrant women in Germany
beneﬁt much more than immigrant men, citizenship is likely to reduce total fertility
among immigrant women.7
6The epidemiological approach has fruitfully been used to study outcomes as diverse as economic growth (Algan
and Cahuc, 2008), political participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011), preferences for redistribution (Luttmer
and Singhal; 2011) or national identity (Manning and Roy, 2010).
7Note that women may adjust not only the number of children, but also the quality dimension of their oﬀspring.
While we will focus on the quantity eﬀect, our prediction apply to the quality-constant demand for children;
hence, the prediction regarding the number of children are ambiguous once the quality dimension is taken into
account (see, e.g., Hotz, Klerman and Willis, 1997). Avitabile et al. (2013), for instance, provide evidence that
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Better career opportunities in the formal labor market could aﬀect the timing
of birth as well. In economic models of fertility, couples time fertility to maximize
lifetime income. Two factors then aﬀect the timing of birth: whether skills depreciate
during absence from the labor market and whether credit markets are perfect or
imperfect. With perfect credit markets and no skill depreciation, fertility will be
high at the beginning of the labor market career when female wages are low. If
capital markets are imperfect and skills do not depreciate, fertility will be high when
the husband's income is high as ﬁnancial resources cannot be shifted intertemporally.
If skills deteriorate, it is no longer clear that these predictions hold because there is
an additional cost from human capital loss. Since skill depreciation is likely to be
less important among low-skilled women, they will have more children when capital
markets are imperfect and postpone children when they are not credit constrained.
For high-skilled women, skill depreciation is more important and credit constraints
potentially less. As such, we would expect that high-skilled immigrant women are
most likely to postpone their ﬁrst birth after becoming eligible for citizenship.
4.2.2 Family Formation
Immigrants often come from more conservative societies where the family plays a
very important role and women have more traditional roles in society. These atti-
tudes do not only aﬀect women's labor market performance, but also their family
formation. Immigrants often marry younger and are less likely to cohabitate. Im-
migrants are also less likely to divorce which might be explained by their more con-
servative values or lack of information about the legal situation in the host country.
How would access to citizenship aﬀect immigrants' marriage and divorce decisions
in the host country?
Access to citizenship could improve an immigrant's marriage market position for
diﬀerent reasons: First, the better labor market position of eligible immigrants will
also make them more desirable spouses if one assumes that income and job stability
are attractive traits in the marriage market. Second, a German passport is likely to
be a valued characteristic in the marriage market, especially among recently arrived
immigrants, because foreign spouses of natives may naturalize after only three years
of residence. Finally, citizenship and the implied incentives to invest in country-
fewer children are born if the children obtain citizenship by birth; at the same time, parents also seem to invest
more into these children.
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speciﬁc human capital could lead to less reservations on behalf of natives. In a
marriage market with search frictions, the reservation value for accepting a partner
might then increase for immigrants with access to citizenship. We would therefore
expect that immigrants search for a spouse longer and that the quality of the match
increases (Becker, 1973, 1974; Mortensen, 1988; Burdett and Coles, 1999; Browning,
Chiappori and Weiss, 2014 for a survey).
For immigrants already married at the time of eligibility, the eﬀects of citizen-
ship are more subtle. In principle, both the immigrant and the spouse can get
naturalized when one spouse becomes eligible for citizenship. However, our previous
research (Gathmann and Keller, 2014) shows that immigrant women have higher
monetary beneﬁts from citizenship than immigrant men. Hence, higher relative
earnings of women should aﬀect the relative bargaining power in a couple (as long
as the weights depend on relative earnings of spouses). Apart from this power-shift
within couples, the risk of divorce can be inﬂuenced in diﬀerent ways by citizenship.
In a dynamic search or matching framework, divorce is explained by uncertainty in
terms of learning about the quality of a spouse, variations in match productivity,
or variations in outside options (Burdett and Coles, 1999; Becker et al., 1977). Ac-
cess to citizenship and its positive monetary eﬀects for women come into play in
all these dimensions: The unexpected change in the earning capacity of women has
an impact on the match productivity of marriages. For the US, Weiss and Willis
(1997) ﬁnd that an unexpected increase in the wife's earning capacity increases the
divorce risk. On the other hand, a higher total income of a couple can lead to higher
gains of a marriage and therefore stabilizes a marriage. Finally, by improving the
position on the remarriage market, citizenship improves outside options and could
therefore increase the risk of divorce (Becker et al., 1977; Browning, Chiappori and
Weiss, 2014 for a survey). Overall then, the expected eﬀects of citizenship on the
probability of divorce are ambiguous.
4.2.3 Characteristics of Partner
In principle, there are several reasons why immigrants are more likely to have a part-
ner from the same ethnic origin: the ﬁrst one is that a common ethnic background
(including a common religion, for example) is a complement in the production of
ethnic household goods like food or a child's education, for instance. A second
reason is that immigrants are more likely to meet members of their own group if
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they live in an ethnic enclave or are clustered in certain areas. Finally, there might
also be constraints imposed by the ethnic group or the family on which partner an
immigrant can choose.
The citizenship reforms allow immigrants to obtain a German passport indepen-
dently of marrying someone with a German passport. Therefore, we might expect
that the citizenship reforms actually reduce incentives to marry a native. At the
same time, intermarriage with natives is often viewed as an indicator of social as-
similation. Access to citizenship could then raise intermarriage rates because their
improved position in the labor market brings eligible immigrants in closer contact
with natives; or, because naturalization reduces reservations against immigrants in
the native population.8 However, an eligible immigrant also becomes a more desir-
able spouse, especially among recent immigrants who themselves do not yet satisfy
the resident requirement. That would reduce the likelihood of marrying a native
and increase the likelihood of marrying another immigrant. Overall then, it is not
obvious whether access to citizenship increases or actually decreases intermarriage
rates with German natives.
Citizenship might also aﬀect the assortative matching along other observable
characteristics such as age or education as well. Researchers have typically ob-
served positive assortative matching with respect to education which might arise if
there are important consumption and leisure complementarities among the partners
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). Immigrants in turn often downgrade in the marriage
market by marrying a less skilled partner; or immigrant women accepting a larger
age diﬀerence. As a consequence, we might expect that eligible immigrants now
downgrade less by choosing more educated partners and, for eligible women, a lower
age gap.
4.3 Institutional Background
4.3.1 Immigration Law Prior to 1991
More than 10 million - or about 13% of the population - in Germany are foreign-
born. After World War II, most immigrants, especially from Turkey, Yugoslavia, or
Italy came to Germany as guest workers. From the late 1950s until the program
8Evidence from the European Social Survey however suggests that naturalized immigrants indeed feel much less
discriminated against in Germany than non-naturalized immigrants (OECD, 2011, Figure 8.1).
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was abolished in 1973, the guest worker program actively recruited foreign, mostly
low-skilled labor, to meet the growing demand of Germany's booming manufacturing
sector. Originally, the guest worker program was intended as a short- to medium-run
measure. In practice, however, many guest workers stayed, brought their families
and settled down in Germany.9 Since the late 1980s and especially after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, new waves of immigrants arrived in Germany from Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, around one million foreigners
(about 1% of its population) arrived in Germany each year.10 These immigration
rates are comparable to those in the United States during the era of mass migration.
Despite substantial immigrant ﬂows, Germany had no explicit naturalization
policy at the time. Prior to 1991, German citizenship was closely tied to ancestry
(jus sanguinis) as laid down in the law of 1913. Explicit criteria how a foreign-born
immigrant without German ancestry would qualify for naturalization did not exist.
The oﬃcial doctrine was that foreigners were only temporary residents in Germany
- even though many foreigners had already lived in the country for several decades.
4.3.2 Germany's Citizenship Reforms in 1991 and 2000
The passage of the Alien Act (Ausländergesetz (AuslG)) by the federal parliament
on April 26, 1990 (and the upper house on May 5, 1990) marked a turning point
in Germany's approach to immigration and citizenship. The reform which came
into eﬀect on January 1, 1991 deﬁned, for the ﬁrst time, explicit rules and criteria
for naturalization.11 Most importantly for our purpose, the new law imposed an
9Their legal status was based on a residence and work permit which became permanent after ﬁve years and fully
unrestricted after eight years if a person had worked for at least ﬁve years in a job subject to social security
contributions. Close family members could also obtain a residence permit in order to move to Germany. At the
same time, the German government used ﬁnancial incentives to encourage return migration, especially after the
guest worker program ended in 1973.
10Many of these were ethnic Germans (i.e. immigrants with some German ancestry), mostly from Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, who had access to citizenship within three years after arrival in Germany. Since
1992, the inﬂow of ethnic Germans is restricted to 220,000 per year. Stricter application requirements (esp.
German language requirements) and a reduction in ﬁnancial assistance further reduced the number of applicants
in the late 1990s. While the number of admitted ethnic Germans was 397,000 in 1990, it fell to 222,000 in 1994
and to 105,000 in 1999 (Bundesministerium des Innern, 2008). Below, we drop ethnic Germans from our sample
as they are not aﬀected by the immigration reforms we study.
11The reform was preceded by more than a decade of intense political discussion that oscillated between the desire
to restrict immigration, to encourage return migration and the recognition for social integration of the foreign
population already living in Germany. Several reform attempts were made during the 1980s, mostly from left-
wing parties, but defeated by the political opposition or inﬂuential social groups. The reform in 1991 was pushed
on the political agenda by a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court whether immigrants should be entitled
to vote in local elections for foreigners in 1989. The Court ruled those local voting rights unconstitutional but
116
age-dependent residency requirement. Adolescent immigrants (aged 16-22 in 1991
or later) became eligible after eight years in Germany. In contrast, adults (aged 23
and older in or after 1991 who have not yet been eligible under the reduced residency
requirement) became eligible for citizenship only after ﬁfteen years of residency in
Germany.12 These residency requirements are still quite restrictive in comparison
to other countries. Immigrants in Canada, for example, may naturalize after three
years of permanent residence, while residency requirements in the United States
and many European countries (like the UK, or Sweden) are ﬁve years - and hence
substantially shorter than the rules imposed by the German reform.
Applicants for German citizenship had to fulﬁll several other criteria: ﬁrst, they
had to renounce their previous citizenship upon naturalization as the new law did
explicitly not allow dual citizenship. Few exemptions to this rule existed at that
time. The most important exception applied to EU citizens who could keep their
citizenship if their country of origin allowed dual citizenship as well.13 A second
requirement was that the applicant must not be convicted of a criminal oﬀense.14
Adult immigrants (23 years-old or above when ﬁrst eligible) further had to demon-
strate economic self-suﬃciency, i.e. they should be able to support themselves and
their dependents without welfare beneﬁts or unemployment assistance. Adolescent
immigrants (16-22 years-old when ﬁrst eligible) had to have completed a minimum
of six years of schooling in Germany, of which at least four years had to be general
education. Finally, an applicant had to declare her loyalty to the democratic prin-
ciples of the German constitution. Spouses and dependent children of the applicant
could be included in the application for naturalization even if they did not fulﬁll the
criteria individually.15
advocated a liberalization of Germany's naturalization policy (see Howard (2008) for a more detailed discussion).
12See  85 AuslG (Alien Act) for adolescent immigrants and  86 AuslG (Alien Act) for adult immigrants. If the
applicant stayed abroad for no more than 6 months, the period of absence still counted toward the residency re-
quirement. Temporary stays abroad (between 6 months and 1 year) may still count for the resident requirement.
For permanent stays abroad (longer than 6 months), the applicant could count up to ﬁve years of residency in
Germany toward the resident requirement.
13Children of bi-national marriages, for example, did not have to give up their dual citizenship until they turned 18.
Other exceptions were granted if the country of current citizenship did not allow the renunciation of citizenship
or delayed the renunciation for reasons outside the power of the applicant; if the applicant was an acknowledged
refugee or if the renunciation imposed special hardships on older applicants. In practice, few exceptions to the
general rule were granted in the 1990s.
14Applicants with minor convictions, such as a suspended prison sentence up to 6 months (which would be abated
at the end of the probation period), a ﬁne not exceeding 180 days (calculated according to the net personal
income of the individual), or corrective methods imposed by juvenile courts, were still eligible. Convictions
exceeding these limits were considered on a case-by-case basis by the authorities.
15Similar criteria are found in other countries. Overall, they seem to play a subordinate role for the naturalization
process. A survey of eligible immigrants by the Federal Oﬃce of Migration and Refugees showed that the
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The diﬀerent residency requirements for adult and adolescent immigrants re-
mained in place until the second important reform came into eﬀect on January 1,
2000. The Citizenship Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG)) reduced the res-
idency requirement to eight years irrespective of the immigrant's age.16 The other
requirements of the 1991 reform remained in place: applicants could not have a crim-
inal record, had to demonstrate loyalty to democratic principles as well as economic
self-suﬃciency. In addition, the new law also required applicants to demonstrate
adequate German language skills prior to naturalization. As before, the law of 2000
did not recognize dual citizenship in general though exemptions became more nu-
merous in practice.17 The 2000 reform further introduced elements of citizenship by
birthplace into German law. A child born to foreign parents after January 1, 2000
was eligible for citizenship if one parent had been a legal resident in Germany for
eight years and had a permanent residence permit for at least three years. Since our
analysis focuses on ﬁrst-generation immigrants, our sample is not directly aﬀected
by the jus soli provisions of the 2000 reform.18
The liberalization of the citizenship law after 1991 and again after 2000 is re-
ﬂected in the number of naturalizations in Germany. Prior to the ﬁrst reform, less
than 20.000 persons become naturalized on average each year. After the immi-
gration reform in 1991, naturalizations increase during the 1990s to 60-70.000 per
year. After the second reform in 2000, the number of naturalizations jumps to over
180.000 and then gradually declines, but remains above 100.000 per year. Scaled
majority of migrants had good knowledge about the naturalization criteria. Of those, 72% reported that they
fulﬁlled all requirements completely while 23% reported to meet most, though not all of the criteria (BAMF,
2012). As such, rejection of applications for citizenship based on criteria other than resident requirements should
not be a major concern. If anything, this would bias our estimates downward as we would deﬁne an immigrant
as eligible (based on the resident requirement) even though she is not (based on one of the other eligibility
criteria).
16The law was adopted with a large majority in the lower house on May 7, 1999 and the upper house on May 21,
1999. The provisions are laid down in  10 Abs. 1 StAG (Abs. 2 for spouses and dependent children of eligible
immigrants), which form the basis for over 80% of all naturalizations in Germany (BAMF, 2008). Additional
ways to naturalize are laid down in  8 (naturalizations based on a discretionary decision of the authorities
because of public interest) and  9 (naturalization for spouses of German citizens who face a reduced resident
requirement of 3 years).
17In addition to citizens of the EU member states, it became easier for older applicants and refugees to keep their
previous citizenship. Applicants could also keep their nationality if it was legally impossible to renounce it
or if it imposed a special hardship like excessive costs or serious economic disadvantages (e.g., problems with
inheritances or property in their country of origin).
18See Avitabile et al. (2013; 2014) for an analysis of the jus soli provisions of the 2000 reform. There might be
an indirect eﬀect on ﬁrst-generation immigrants, however. Before the 2000 reform, second- or third-generation
immigrants could only become naturalized if their parents applied for citizenship. After the 2000 reform, young
children had access to German citizenship independently of their parents' decision (subject to the resident
requirements outlined above). Hence, the reform of 2000 might have actually decreased the inter-generational
beneﬁts of citizenship for foreign parents with young children.
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by the immigrant population, the propensity to naturalize is still low in Germany:
by 2007, about 35-40% of the ﬁrst-generation immigrant population with more than
ten years of residency became German citizens; for comparison, the share is about
60% in the United Kingdom and over 80% in Canada (OECD, 2011).
4.4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.4.1 Microcensus
Our main data source to study the eﬀects of citizenship on social integration is the
German Microcensus, an annual survey of 1% of the population in Germany. The
main advantages of the Microcensus are the large samples of foreigners (about 50,000
per year) and detailed information about household composition, socio-demographic
characteristics and year of arrival in Germany. It is only since 2005 that the Micro-
census elicits whether an immigrant has naturalized and the year in which natural-
ization took place.19 This information allows us to study naturalization decisions
and the returns to actual naturalization using an instrumental variable approach;
it also allows us to control for the country of origin (even for immigrants who have
naturalized). Most of our analysis will therefore rely on data from 2005-2010. The
drawback of using this later time period is that many immigrants will have become
eligible for German citizenship prior to 2005. We return to this issue in the next
section when we introduce our empirical approach.
The sample is restricted to ﬁrst-generation immigrants, i.e. immigrants born
outside of Germany. We drop ethnic Germans who have some German ancestry
and therefore can apply for citizenship within three years of arrival. In our sample,
we deﬁne ethnic Germans as individuals born outside Germany with a German
passport who naturalized within three years after arrival (which is legally impossible
for regular immigrants even after the 1991 and 2000 reforms) and whose previous
nationality was Czech, Hungarian, Kazakh, Polish, Romanian, Russian, Slovakian or
Ukrainian as ethnic Germans (see Birkner, 2007; Algan et al., 2010 follow the same
approach). We further restrict the analysis to immigrants arriving between 1976
and 2000 who were 16-30 years-old when they ﬁrst become eligible for citizenship.
As a result, individuals in our data are between 16 and 48 years-old which is the
19Neither the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) nor the social security data from the IAB, two other popular
data sources, contain this detailed information.
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relevant age span for marriage and fertility choices.
Our main outcome variables of interest are fertility choices (whether an im-
migrant woman has any children, the number of children born and the age when
she gave birth to her ﬁrst child; whether she is a single mother); family formation
(whether an immigrant is currently married; has ever been married; is divorced; is
cohabitating without being married); and the characteristics of partners (whether
the partner is a native; an immigrant from the same region or a diﬀerent region
of origin; we also study the partner's duration of residence in Germany as well as
their age and education). The main control variables are year of birth, year of ar-
rival, the number of years in Germany, age, gender and education. We distinguish
between low-skilled (no high school or vocational degree), medium-skilled (a higher
school degree or a vocational degree) and high-skilled immigrants (with a college
degree). To study whether some immigrant groups assimilate faster than others, we
generate ten regions of origin: the traditional EU-15 member states (e.g., Italy or
Portugal), immigrants from countries that recently joined the European Union (the
EU-12, e.g., Poland or the Czech Republic), immigrants from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia
(except Slovenia) and the Former Soviet Union (except the Baltic states). We lump
together other immigrants into broad categories (Asia, Africa, the Middle East and
North or South America).
To investigate the mechanisms underlying social integration, we investigate the
role of economic and cultural forces: we ﬁrst study whether citizenship aﬀects social
integration through improvements in education and personal income.20 To investi-
gate the role of cultural forces, we merge information on fertility rates (World Bank,
2016) and the female labor market participation (ILO, 2003) in the source country
prior to an immigrant's departure to our main data. Table C.1 shows summary
statistics of our sample of ﬁrst-generation immigrants in the Microcensus.
4.4.2 Socio-Economic Panel
For supplementary analyses we rely on the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from
1984-2009, an annual panel interviewing more than 20,000 individuals about their
20Personal income per month combines labor earnings, income from self-employment, rental income, public and
private pensions as well as public transfers (like welfare or unemployment beneﬁts, child beneﬁt or housing
subsidies) but is net of taxes and other contributions. We deﬂate personal income with the national consumer
price index to 2005 prices.
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labor supply, income and demographic characteristics.21 The main advantage of
the SOEP is that we observe immigrants before they get eligible for citizenship.
The disadvantages are that we have small samples and have only noisy information
whether an immigrant actually naturalized. For the analysis, we impose the same
sample restrictions as in the Microcensus: ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived
in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and are between 16 and 30 years-old when they
ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship.
Our main dependent variables are the age at ﬁrst marriage and the marital
status after 8 years in Germany. As in the Microcensus, our main control variables
are year of arrival, year of birth, the number of years spent in Germany, gender,
age and education. In the SOEP, we distinguish between low-skilled (with no high
school or vocational degree), medium-skilled (with high school or vocational degree),
high-skilled (holding a tertiary degree) and those currently enrolled in school. We
further classify immigrants into ten broad region of origins as in the Microcensus.
Table C.2 shows summary statistics for our sample of ﬁrst-generation immigrants
in the SOEP.
4.4.3 Identifying Variation and Estimation Approach
To study the eﬀects of citizenship on social integration, we cannot just compare nat-
uralized and non-naturalized immigrants as the decision to become a German citizen
is endogenous. The step-wise liberalization of resident requirements in the 1991 and
2000 reforms introduces variation in years eligible across immigrants and over time
which we can exploit to analyze the returns to citizenship. The key insight here is
that the two reforms create variation in the eligibility for citizenship depending on
an immigrant's arrival year and year of birth (as well as calendar year).22 Figure
4.1 illustrates the variation for two immigrants who arrived in Germany in 1985.
The young immigrant is born in 1971 and therefore becomes eligible for citizenship
in 1993 under the eight-year resident requirement. The older immigrant is born in
21 Wagner, Frick and Schupp (2007) provide a comprehensive description of the data set. The SOEP oversampled
immigrants in 1984 and 1994/5; as a consequence, the composition of immigrants in the SOEP diﬀers from the
immigrants surveyed in the Microcensus.
22We abstract in our analysis from other eligibility criteria discussed in Section 2 either because we do not have
any information (e.g., about the criminal record) or because it is unclear how the criteria is applied (e.g.,
economic self-suﬃciency). As a consequence, we are likely to misclassify a few immigrants who satisfy the
resident requirements but are not eligible according to some other criteria. This misclassiﬁcation will result in
a downward bias of eligibility on naturalization propensities (as some individuals, which we classify as eligible,
cannot naturalize in practice).
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Figure 4.1: Variation in Eligibility Rules
Notes: The ﬁgure demonstrates the variation in eligibility rules which was created by the two policy reforms. The example shows
two immigrants who arrive in the same year and with a similar age, but face diﬀerent eligibility regimes.
1970 and would therefore not be eligible for citizenship in 1993 (after eight years)
because she is then 23 years-old and therefore does not qualify under the reduced
residency requirement. Instead, she would become eligible in 2000 - after ﬁfteen
years in Germany. The same logic applies to other immigrants: the older immi-
grants gets eligible much later than the younger immigrants even though both are
of similar age and arrived in Germany in the same year.
Figure 4.2 shows for diﬀerent arrival years (on the x-axis) the set of birth cohorts
that are eligible under the reduced residency requirement (shown in red) and those
that are not (shown in blue). The year of ﬁrst eligibility is shown on the y-axis.
For all arrival cohorts between 1977 and 1982, adolescent immigrants (born between
1969 and 1975) can naturalize right after the reform in 1991. Adult immigrants
(born 1968 or before) in contrast can only naturalize between 1992 and 1997 or
one and six years later than the adolescent immigrants. The 2000 reform which
reduced residency requirements to eight years for all immigrants provides additional
identifying variation for arrivals after 1985. Take two immigrants who arrived in
Germany in 1990: the younger immigrant (born 1976-1982) gets eligible after eight
years in 1998, while the older immigrant (born 1970-1975) gets eligible with the
2000 reform. The same argument applies to all immigrants arriving between 1986
and 1992: immigrants who arrive in Germany at age 14 or earlier are eligible after
eight years while immigrants arriving at age 15 or later get eligible in 2000.23 Again,
immigrants of the same arrival cohort get eligible in very diﬀerent years because of
23Immigrants arriving between 1992 and 2000 all get eligible with eight years of residency after the 2000 reform. We
include arrival cohorts between 1992 and 2000 mostly to identify general assimilation and year of birth eﬀects.
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Figure 4.2: Eligibility for Diﬀerent Birth Cohorts an Arrival Year
Notes: The Figure shows the year in which immigrants become eligible by year of arrival and birth cohort. The colors indicate the
reduced requirement (in red) or the regular requirement (in blue).
small age diﬀerences.
We next discuss how we exploit these diﬀerences in access to citizenship for
our analysis. In the ﬁrst step, we deﬁne the year an immigrant ﬁrst satisﬁes the
resident requirement. The variable is calculated as follows: (a) the year in which an
immigrant has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and is then between 16 and 22
years old in 1991-1999; (b) the year in which an immigrant has lived in Germany for
at least ﬁfteen years and is 23-30 years old in the 1991-1999 period (given that she
has not qualiﬁed for citizenship under (a)); (c) the year in which a 16-30 years-old
immigrant has lived in Germany for at least eight years in the 2000-2010 period.
Finally, (d) some immigrants who have lived in Germany for at least eight years only
become eligible in the year they turn sixteen. In a second step, we calculate the
years since an immigrant has been eligible for citizenship as the diﬀerence between
the current year and the year of ﬁrst eligibility. The eligibility variable is zero before
an immigrant becomes eligible for citizenship and equal to the number of years since
an immigrant has become eligible thereafter.
The focus of our main analysis is on the reduced-form relationship and measures
the eﬀect of eligibility for citizenship on social assimilation. Knowing whether a more
liberal access to citizenship aﬀects immigrants' integration is important in its own
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right. Furthermore, the intent-to-treat eﬀect is the primary parameter of interest for
policy makers who aim to improve the integration of immigrants in the host country;
for the immigrants themselves, it represents the option value of naturalization. We
then estimate variants of the following model:
Yiabt = βY rsEligabt + γ1Y SMat + γ2Y SM
2
at + λ1Agebt + λ2Age
2
bt (4.1)
+
1992∑
b=1961
µbY obb +
2000∑
a=1976
αaCoha + θt + δ
′Xit + εiabt
where Y iabt is a social integration outcome of immigrant i from birth cohort
b who arrived in Germany in year a and is observed in calendar year t. The key
independent variable is Y rsEligabt which deﬁnes the number of years since an im-
migrant has been eligible for citizenship. The main parameter of interest is β which
identiﬁes whether legal access to citizenship improves social integration.
Note that our analysis captures social integration outcomes several years after
an immigrant has become eligible for citizenship. Estimation of equation (1) there-
fore identiﬁes persistent diﬀerences of citizenship eligibility on fertility or marriage
behavior. Our analysis would not identify a one-time level eﬀect immediately after
eligibility or naturalization. The reason is that the control group of immigrants
which gets eligible under the 15-year residency requirements also qualiﬁes for cit-
izenship during our sample period. For example, all immigrants arriving prior to
1998 have satisﬁed the residency requirement before we ﬁrst observe them in the
Microcensus in 2005. The control group would have therefore experienced the same
upward (or downward) shift in outcomes than the treated group. Given that many
of the outcomes we study, like getting married or having a child, are long-run deci-
sions, we think that the focus on permanent eﬀects is not a limitation of our study.
We explore in Section 4.3 that focusing on permanent eﬀects provides conservative
estimates. A potential advantage of focusing on persistent eﬀects is that our esti-
mates are less likely to be aﬀected by other transitory shocks around the reform
years.
Our speciﬁcation in equation (1) includes cohort of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects D(Coha)
to adjust for changes in the quality of immigrants arriving in Germany over time. We
further include year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects D(Y OBb) to control for diﬀerences in social
integration across birth cohorts and year ﬁxed eﬀects (θt) to adjust for aggregate
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changes in fertility or family formation over time. As is well-known, one cannot
separately identify cohort of arrival, current year and general assimilation eﬀects
because of multicollinearity (see, e.g., Borjas, 1985; 1995). To control for the general
assimilation eﬀects, we therefore include a second-order polynomial of years since
migration (Y SMat, Y SM2at). Along the same logic, one cannot include a full set of
year of birth, age and calendar year ﬁxed eﬀects. We therefore include a second-order
polynomial in age (Agebt, Age2bt). Additional controls Xit are immigrant's education
and region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects to allow naturalization propensities to diﬀer across
education groups and source countries. To capture diﬀerences in fertility, family
formation and matching of partners across regions and changes therein over time,
we further include state ﬁxed eﬀects and state-speciﬁc linear trends.
Conditional on cohort of arrival, year of birth and year ﬁxed eﬀects, the param-
eter of interest β in equation (1) is identiﬁed from the nonlinear interaction between
year of arrival, year of birth and year. The identifying variation is that there is no
diﬀerential birth cohort trend in our outcome variables across arrival cohorts con-
ditional on our second-order polynomials in age and years since migration. Finally,
we cluster the standard errors by Age ∗Coh to adjust for the level of aggregation in
the eligibility variable.
There are several potential threats to our identiﬁcation strategy: the ﬁrst one is
that age of arrival might bias our estimates. Immigrants who arrived at younger ages
invest more in host country-speciﬁc human capital like language skills and therefore
might integrate better along other dimensions as well (see Bleakley and Chin, 2010).
Since younger immigrants become eligible earlier under the 1991 reform, an omit-
ted age-of-arrival eﬀect would bias our estimates upward. Another concern about
our empirical strategy might be that we impose a speciﬁc functional relationship
how eligibility, assimilation and age aﬀect social and cultural integration outcomes.
There might also be selective outmigration of immigrants. If return migrants are
negatively selected from the pool of immigrants in the host country, return migra-
tion overestimates general assimilation eﬀects, for instance. It would however, not
aﬀect our eligibility variable as long as selection into return migration is similar for
adolescent and adult immigrants, across arrival cohorts or regions of origin. We
return to these issues in Section 4.5.3 after we discuss our main results.
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4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Eligibility for Citizenship and the Naturalization
Decision
We ﬁrst examine whether eligibility for citizenship has an eﬀect on naturalization
decisions. Without such a ﬁrst-stage relationship, it would be unlikely to observe any
impact on the social integration of immigrants.24 To study naturalization decisions,
we estimate two diﬀerent models. The ﬁrst model uses naturalization propensities as
the dependent variable. To implement this model, we convert the Microcensus into
a pseudo-panel for the 1985-2010 period. The dependent variable we use is equal
to one if an immigrant has naturalized in any year between 1985 and 2010 from
the reported year of naturalization. The main independent variable is eligibility
for naturalization which is zero prior to 1991 and calculated from information on
year of birth and year of arrival in Germany after 1991 (see the last section for
details). Finally, we assign education based on the information recorded in 2005-
2010; here, education refers to the highest educational degree attained rather than
the education level in a particular year. We then estimate a regression with the
same control variables as in equation (1) above for the pseudo-panel from 1985-
2010. Table 4.1 shows for male and female immigrants that eligibility does aﬀect
the naturalization propensities (see columns (1) and (2)). At the same time, the
eﬀects are with 2.9 percentage points for both men and women relatively modest.
Our second approach uses the Microcensus 2005-2010 with years since a person
has naturalized as the dependent variable and years of eligibility for citizenship as
the main independent variable. This speciﬁcation is closest to our reduced-form re-
lationship in equation (1) and reveals whether an additional year of eligibility speeds
up the timing of naturalization (and hence, how long she has been naturalized in
the 2005-2010 period). All control variables are deﬁned as in equation (1). Columns
(3) and (4) in Table 4.1 show that an additional year of eligibility raises the average
duration of naturalization by about 0.16 years for women; for men, the eﬀect is with
0.05 years both economically and statistically weaker than for women.
Table 4.1 then suggests that the citizenship reforms increased the propensity
of naturalizations and hence is in line with aggregate statistics on naturalizations
(discussed in Section 4.3.2). At the same time, the modest eﬀects raise the ques-
24There could still be an eﬀect if eligibility changes the behavior of citizens in the host country even in the absence
of higher naturalization rates among eligible immigrants.
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Table 4.1: The Link between Eligibility and Naturalization
Naturalized Years since Naturalized
Females Males Females Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eligible 0.029*** 0.029***
[0.007] [0.007]
Years since Eligible 0.158*** 0.051*
[0.030] [0.029]
Years in Germany 0.014*** 0.010*** -0.498*** -0.072
[0.001] [0.001] [0.090] [0.094]
Years in Germany Squared -0.000*** -0.000 0.022*** 0.010***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]
Age -0.004*** 0.002* 1.030*** 0.669***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.143] [0.143]
Age Squared 0.000*** -0.000*** -0.014*** -0.008***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002]
Sample: Pseudopanel 1985-2010 Microcensus 2005-10
Year of Arrival Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year, State FE and State Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37,822 38,564 19,850 18,994
R-Squared 0.079 0.088 0.334 0.335
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.070 0.069 4.12 4.09
Notes: The table reports results from a linear probability model for immigrant men and women. In columns (1)-(2), the dependent
variable is a binary indicator equal to one if a migrant has naturalized in a given year and zero otherwise; in columns (3)-(4), it is the
number of years since an immigrant has naturalized. The sample includes all ﬁrst-generation immigrants who are not ethnic Germans,
arrived in Germany between 1976 to 2000, are 16-30 years old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. The eligibility
indicator in columns (1) and (2) is equal to one if an individual is a) 16-22 years old and has lived in Germany for at least 8 years; b)
23-30 years old and has lived in Germany for at least 15 years in 1991-1999; or c) 23-30 years old and has lived in Germany for at least
8 years after 2000. Years since eligibility is the number of years since an immigrant is ﬁrst eligible for citizenship. All speciﬁcations
include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We
also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU member countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship); the
omitted region of origin are the EU-15 member states. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical
signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
tion why the take-up of citizenship is so low in Germany. We think there are two
potential explanations. The substantive reason why take-up of citizenship is lower
than in traditional immigration countries is that immigrants with few exceptions
have to renounce their original citizenship if they obtain a German passport. In
addition, the way we measure eligibility could be another factor in explaining the
low correlation between eligibility and naturalizations. One is that we abstract from
any other options to obtain German citizenship, for example, through discretionary
decisions by the bureaucracy (especially prior to 1991) or marriage with a German
partner. That would induce a negative relationship between eligibility (which is
zero before 1991) and naturalization. In addition, there is likely to be substan-
tial measurement error in the years in Germany variable which in turn enters the
calculation of the eligibility variable. Our calculation assumes, for instance, that
an immigrant has remained in Germany for the whole period since her arrival. If
there is circular migration between Germany and the source country, for example,
because the immigrant has family back home, we are likely to deﬁne eligibility too
early (because extended periods abroad do not count toward the resident require-
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ment). This upward bias in the eligibility variable is likely to be more important
for immigrant men who often arrived in Germany ﬁrst without their close family.
At the same time, there could be a time lag between becoming eligibility and actual
naturalization because of the time it takes the administration to process the applica-
tion for naturalization. In both cases, the statistical relationship between eligibility
and naturalization is weakened biasing our estimates to zero.25 We now turn to the
discussion of our main results.
4.5.2 Main Results on Social Integration
4.5.2.1 Fertility Choices
We start with an analysis of fertility choices among female immigrants. As a bench-
mark for comparison, we ﬁrst report the relationship between actual naturalization
and fertility (OLS results) followed by the reduced form estimates of how eligibility
for citizenship aﬀects fertility. Table 4.2 suggests that access to citizenship reduces
both, the likelihood of having at least one child and the number of children born
to immigrants. Ten years of eligibility reduces the probability of having children by
7 percentage points or about 11%. In our data, 66% of immigrant women have at
least one child, while only 45% of native women do, resulting in an immigrant-native
gap of 21 percentage points. How fast immigrants adjust to the native fertility level
when they have the option to naturalize? The likelihood of having children of immi-
grant women reduces by 0.05 percentage points (-0.007*7.17) after the mean years
of eligibility in our sample (7.2 years) - which closes around one-fourth (-0.05/0.205)
of the immigrant-native gap.
The number of children born to immigrant women reduces in the same time by
0.18 or about 13%. On average, immigrant women in our sample have 1.41 children,
while native women have 0.77 children - for an immigrant-native gap of 0.65 children.
After 7.2 years, immigrant women have reduced their fertility by 0.13 (-0.018*7.2)
or 20% (0.13/0.65) of the immigrant-native gap.
Because not all women in our sample have completed their fertility, the declining
number of children may reﬂect either a reduction in the total demand for children or
a postponement of birth among immigrants relative to natives. Columns (5) and (6)
of Table 4.2 indicates that immigrant women indeed postpone their ﬁrst birth: after
25The eﬀects become slightly stronger if we use lagged eligibility (by one or two years) to allow for a time lag
between satisfying the residency requirement, the application for naturalization and its approval.
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Table 4.2: Naturalization, Eligibility for Citizenship and Fertility Choices
Having Children Number of Children Age at First Birth Single Mother
Sample: Female Immigrants OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form OLS Reduced Form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Years since Naturalization 0.001 -0.001 0.057*** -0.003***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001]
Years since Eligible -0.007*** -0.018*** 0.141*** -0.001
for Citizenship [0.002] [0.007] [0.036] [0.003]
Years in Germany 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.077*** 0.084*** -0.040 -0.138** 0.003 0.005
[0.005] [0.005] [0.015] [0.015] [0.064] [0.070] [0.005] [0.005]
Years in Germany² -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Medium-skilled -0.158*** -0.156*** -0.623*** -0.624*** 2.566*** 2.634*** -0.000 -0.004
[0.009] [0.009] [0.020] [0.020] [0.088] [0.089] [0.008] [0.008]
High-skilled -0.370*** -0.369*** -1.173*** -1.176*** 6.429*** 6.483*** -0.039*** -0.043***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.032] [0.032] [0.225] [0.228] [0.014] [0.014]
Year of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18.534 18.534 18.516 18.516 12.667 12.667 12.152 12.152
R-Squared 0.422 0.422 0.422 0.422 0.287 0.284 0.041 0.039
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.657 0.657 1.414 1.414 23.35 23.35 0.141 0.141
Notes: The dependent variables are whether a female immigrant has any child (columns (1)-(2)); the number of children born to
the female immigrant (columns (3)-(4)); the age of the mother at the birth of her ﬁrst child (columns (5)-(6)); and whether she is a
single mother (columns (7)-(8)). Odd columns report OLS estimates of the relationship between years since naturalization and the
respective fertility outcome. Even columns report reduced form estimates of years since eligibility and the respective fertility outcome.
The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when
they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who
had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrant
became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms. All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of
birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region of origin
ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South
America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). The omitted education category is low-skilled
(without high school or vocational degree). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
10 years of eligibility for citizenship, the age at ﬁrst birth has increased by 1.4 years
or about 6% (10*0.141/23.35). We further ﬁnd that women with a college education
postpone their ﬁrst birth much more (by 0.245 years per year of eligibility) than low-
skilled women (by 0.09 years per year of eligibility); the stronger postponement is
in line with the potential higher opportunity costs of leaving a high-skilled job. To
put these estimates in perspective, we again compare how fast immigrant women
converge in their timing of birth to native women. In our sample, immigrant women
give birth to their ﬁrst child on average 4.3 years earlier than native women (23.35
years compared to 27.65 years). After the mean years of eligibility, the immigrant-
native gap has declined by 1.0 year or roughly one-fourth (0.141*7.17/4.3) of the
gap.
Hence, part of the decline in the demand for children is explained by a timing
eﬀect. And almost all of the decline in the number of children arises from immigrant
women postponing their ﬁrst birth and the extensive margin; we ﬁnd little evidence
that higher-order births are aﬀected. Overall, these results suggest that immigration
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is not a policy instrument to boost a host country's total fertility rate in the long-
run as immigrants adapt their behavior to those of natives. We explore potential
mechanisms for these changes in total fertility and the timing of birth in more detail
in Section 4.6.
4.5.2.2 Family Formation
We next investigate whether citizenship aﬀects family formation and the type of
partners that immigrant men and women choose. For both men and women, we ﬁnd
that access to citizenship reduces the likelihood of marriage - both the probability
of being currently married and the probability of ever being married. Eligibility
for citizenship seems to have no impact on the stability of marriage however. Both
female and male immigrants with access to citizenship are equally likely to be di-
vorced (see columns (3) and (7) of Table 4.3). The absence of an increased risk of
divorce is good news given that divorce often implies a higher risk of poverty for
children and for those without a full-time job. Similarly, access to citizenship does
not persistently shift the likelihood of cohabitation (see columns (4) and (8) of Table
4.3). Hence, the decline in marriage cannot be explained by immigrants choosing
alternative models of partnerships.
A third explanation for the decline in marriage could be that immigrants who get
eligible for citizenship postpone marriage because the value of searching for a mate
has increased. If the gains from search increase, we should see, for instance, that
immigrants with access to citizenship marry later. Unfortunately, our main data
source does not include information on the age at ﬁrst marriage. We do observe
the age at ﬁrst marriage in earlier Microcensus years (1999-2004) and in the Socio-
Economic Panel. Using the same estimation approach as in equation (1), Table
C.3 in the appendix shows that eligibility for citizenship increases the age at ﬁrst
marriage for women, but not for men. The result is mostly driven by women who
are still single when they get eligible for citizenship (see column (4)) which supports
the idea that women with access to citizenship search longer for a suitable mate.
What do these patterns for family formation imply for the social assimilation
process? To answer this question, we again compare the behavior of immigrants
to those of natives. Take the example of being currently married. On average,
64% of women and 55.4% of men in our immigrant sample are currently married
while among natives, the share is 54.4% and 45.8% respectively. On average, the
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Table 4.3: Citizenship and Family Formation
Female Immigrants Male Immigrants
Currently Ever
Divorced Cohabitation
Currently Ever
Divorced CohabitationMarried Married Married Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates
Years since Naturalization 0.001* 0.001 -0.001 0.001** -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 18,532 18,532 13,148 12,221 17,213 17,213 10,184 10,289
R-Squared 0.332 0.467 0.032 0.134 0.400 0.467 0.029 0.151
Reduced form Estimates Reduced form Estimates
Years since Eligible -0.006** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.003 -0.006*** -0.008*** 0.003 -0.001
for Citizenship [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Observations 18,532 18,532 13,148 12,221 17,213 17,213 10,184 10,289
R-Squared 0.333 0.468 0.032 0.133 0.401 0.467 0.029 0.151
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.639 0.709 0.099 0.085 0.554 0.592 0.063 0.112
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between years since naturalization and family formation in the top panel;
and reduced form estimates between years since eligibility and family formation in the bottom panel. The left-hand side (columns
(1)-(4)) reports results for female immigrants, the right-hand side (columns (5)-(7) for male immigrants. The dependent variables
are whether an immigrant is currently married (columns (1) and (5)); whether an immigrant has ever been married (columns (2) and
(6)); whether the immigrant is divorced (columns (3) and (7)); and whether an immigrant is cohabitating with a partner without
being married; the variable is zero if the person is married (columns (4) and (8)). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived
in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship in the
1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship
than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrant became eligible for naturalization after
the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms. All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state
ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new
EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet
Union republics, other or no citizenship). The omitted education category is low-skilled (without high school or vocational degree).
Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
immigrant-native gap is 9.5% (9.6%) for women (men). How fast does the gap close
with access to citizenship? Evaluated at the mean years of eligibility (7.2 years for
women and 8.0 years for men) in our sample, the share of currently married declines
in the immigrant population by 4.3% (women) and 4.8% (men). That implies that
the initial gap in marriage rates decreases by about 45.3% (women) and 50% (men)
with access to citizenship. While citizenship speeds up assimilation in terms of
marriage rates, we do not ﬁnd any assimilation in divorce rates or the propensity
of cohabitation after immigrants obtain access to citizenship (this is true even if we
condition on those married after 8 years in Germany; see Table C.3, column (5)).
As there are sizable immigrant-native gaps in divorce rates (immigrants are around
6% less likely to be divorced) and cohabitation rates (immigrants are about 15%
less likely to be cohabitating), it implies that both immigration but also immigrant
assimilation tend to reduce the growth in divorce and cohabitation rates in the host
country.
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4.5.2.3 Characteristics of Partner
Given that immigrants seem to search longer and marry later when they are eligible
for citizenship, we would expect that they also choose diﬀerent partners. Here, we
include all partners living in the same household as the immigrant, i.e. indepen-
dently of whether they are married or cohabitating. We ﬁrst analyze intermarriage
rates or the likelihood of having a German-born partner, a widely used indicator for
social assimilation (see Adsera and Ferrer, 2014). As discussed in Section 4.2, the
eﬀect of citizenship on intermarriage (or having a German partner) is theoretically
ambiguous. In our sample, around 20% of immigrant men and women have a Ger-
man partner, while slightly over 70% have a partner from the same region of origin
(which leaves between 8-10% who have a migrant partner from a diﬀerent origin).
These shares are substantially lower than in France or the Netherlands where about
one-third of immigrants have a native partner (Adsera and Ferrer, 2014). The share
of intermarriage among natives is with 3-4% much lower in the native population.
These numbers are also at the lower end in Europe where the share ranges from 5%
to 7%.
Table 4.4 shows in the top panel that immigrants who are actually naturalized
are more likely to have a native partner (and hence, less likely to have a partner from
the same region of origin). One explanation for the positive relationship between
actual naturalization and intermarriage could be reverse causality: immigrants in-
termarry because they want to get a German passport. Foreign spouses of citizens
can apply for naturalization after three years of residency in Germany.26 Even if
a German passport is not the primary motive for intermarriage, immigrants who
eventually naturalize might still be those that are most willing and most likely to
integrate in the host country society. The reduced form estimates in the bottom
panel tell however a diﬀerent story. Eligible women are less likely to have a German
native as partner (column (1) in Table 4.4). They are also less likely to have a
second-generation immigrant from the same region of origin (who need not to be
naturalized) as partner (not reported). At the same time, immigrant women are
not more likely to have a partner from the same region of origin (see column (2)).
These patterns suggest that access to citizenship does not increase intermarriage but
encourages relationships among immigrants from diﬀerent backgrounds. One likely
interpretation of the reduced intermarriage with natives is that women now have
26The immigrant has to be married for at least two years by the time he or she applies for naturalization; further-
more, the spouse has to have a German citizenship for at least two years. Finally, the couple has to have a
permanent resident permit.
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their own access to citizenship and hence, can choose their partner independently of
citizenship status. There is some evidence that access to citizenship makes eligible
immigrants a more attractive partner: partners of immigrant women with access to
citizenship have lived in Germany for a shorter time and are less likely to qualify
for citizenship on their own (see column (3) of Table 4.4). Interestingly, we see no
eﬀect of eligibility on the partner's characteristics for immigrant men.
Table 4.4: Citizenship and Characteristics of Partner
Female Immigrants Male Immigrants
Native Same Origin Partner's Years Education Age of Native Same Origin Partner's Years Education Age of
Partner Partner in Germany of Partner Partner Partner Partner in Germany of Partner Partner
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates
Years since 0.004*** -0.003*** 0.014 0.030*** -0.022* 0.006*** -0.006*** 0.033 0.041*** -0.001
Naturalization [0.001] [0.001] [0.018] [0.005] [0.013] [0.001] [0.001] [0.020] [0.006] [0.014]
Observations 10,932 10,932 8,467 10,741 10,901 9,164 9,164 6,951 8,979 9,116
R-Squared 0.265 0.298 0.253 0.291 0.376 0.168 0.194 0.195 0.286 0.411
Reduced form Estimates Reduced form Estimates
Years since Eligible -0.006** 0.002 -0.464*** 0.011 -0.115** 0.004 -0.004 0.042 -0.032 0.036
for Citizenship [0.003] [0.003] [0.087] [0.028] [0.056] [0.003] [0.004] [0.083] [0.025] [0.046]
Observations 10,932 10,932 8,467 10,741 10,901 9,164 9,164 6,951 8,979 9,116
R-Squared 0.262 0.297 0.256 0.288 0.376 0.161 0.189 0.194 0.281 0.411
Year of Arrival Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Trends
Mean of
0.195 0.726 19.90 12.47 35.97 0.204 0.705 16.19 11.88 30.80
Dependent Variable
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the relationship between years since naturalization and family formation in the top panel;
and reduced form estimates between years since eligibility and family formation in the bottom panel. The left-hand side (columns
(1)-(5)) reports results for female immigrants, the right-hand side (columns (6)-(10) for male immigrants. The dependent variables
are whether an immigrant has a German partner or spouse (columns (1) and (6)); whether the partner or spouse comes from the
same region of origin (columns (2) and (7)); whether the partner or spouse is a second-generation immigrant from the same region
of origin (columns (3) and (7)); the years of education of the partner or spouse (columns (4) and (9)); and the age of the partner
or spouse (columns (5) and (10)). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who
were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans,
i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible
denotes the number of years since an immigrant became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms. All
speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear
trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). The
omitted education category is low-skilled (without high school or vocational degree). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age
x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
Eligibility for citizenship might not only aﬀect the background of the partner. It
133
might also aﬀect assortative matching in the marriage (or partnership) market. The
assimilation literature has shown that immigrants often downgrade in the marriage
(or partnership) market. Hence, they are more likely to have a partner with lower
education; and female immigrants in particular are more likely to accept a larger
age diﬀerence. If access to citizenship improves the position in the marriage or
partnership market, it should not only prolong search but also allow immigrants to
select diﬀerent partners. With positive assortative mating we would expect that
citizenship increases the partner's education and reduces the partner's age. The
OLS estimates in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.4 exactly reﬂect this pattern for
immigrant men and women. Yet, most of these correlations are due to a selection
eﬀect; eligibility for citizenship only reduces the partner's age of female immigrants.27
Though the coeﬃcient on partner's education is positive for women, it is neither
economically nor statistically signiﬁcant.28
4.5.2.4 Eligibility as Instrumental Variable
We also implement a supplementary instrumental variable approach where we use
years of eligibility as an instrument for naturalization. Given the weak eﬀects found
for men, we focus on immigrant women here. Table 4.5 reports the results where
column (1) shows the ﬁrst stage and columns (2)-(7) show the second stage estimates
for fertility and marriage outcomes. We ﬁnd very similar patterns than for the
reduced form estimates though the eﬀects are unsurprisingly larger. At the same
time, the instrument is not very strong, for example, for the subset of women having
a child (see the reported F-statistic at the bottom of Table 4.5). As a result, the IV
estimate for age at ﬁrst birth is no longer statistically signiﬁcant; all other outcomes
remain statistically signiﬁcant however.
27If we look at age gaps between partners instead, the reduced-form coeﬃcients suggest a reduction in the age gap
for immigrant women and men; but none of the coeﬃcients reach statistical signiﬁcance (not reported). Since
we also observe that immigrant men and women marry later on average, these patterns suggest that immigrants
live together with their partner at younger ages, but marry later - which is a pattern we also observe among
natives.
28We also ﬁnd no eﬀect of citizenship access on the earnings of partners which seems a bit surprising because
citizenship does have monetary beneﬁts for the naturalized immigrant herself (Gathmann and Keller, 2015). One
possible explanation is that other changes in the partner market (like having a partner with foreign citizenship)
oﬀset the beneﬁcial eﬀect of access to citizenship on wages for the partner.
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Table 4.5: The Impact of Naturalization on Fertility and Family Formation
First Stage Second Stage
Female Immigrants
Years since Having # of Age at Currently Ever
DivorcedNaturalized Children Children First Birth Married Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Years since Naturalized -0.063** -0.156* 1.563 -0.059* -0.079** -0.016
[0.030] [0.080] [1.027] [0.031] [0.032] [0.012]
Years since Eligible for Citizenship 0.112***
[0.036]
Years in Germany -0.296*** 0.003 0.038 0.454 0.001 -0.008 -0.007
[0.094] [0.011] [0.030] [0.386] [0.011] [0.011] [0.005]
Years in Germany Squared 0.016*** 0.000 0.000 -0.026 0.000 0.001 0.000*
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.020] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Medium-skilled 1.168*** -0.083** -0.442*** 0.420 -0.019 -0.000 0.023
[0.097] [0.036] [0.097] [1.501] [0.037] [0.039] [0.018]
High-skilled 1.215*** -0.293*** -0.986*** 4.560*** -0.115*** -0.126*** -0.003
[0.227] [0.043] [0.108] [1.376] [0.041] [0.043] [0.021]
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,534 18,534 18,516 12,667 18,532 18,532 13,148
R-Squared 0.327
F-statistic First Stage 9.72 9.44 2.64 9.70 9.70 17.20
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.657 1.414 23.35 0.639 0.709 0.099
Notes: The table reports instrumental variable estimates of the eﬀects of the citizenship duration on fertility and marriage outcomes.
The ﬁrst stage estimates regress the years since naturalization on the years since eligible for citizenship and other control variables
(column (1)). The second stage estimates (shown in columns (2)-(7)) are for the outcomes shown in the top row. The sample includes
all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get
eligible for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster
access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrant became
eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms. All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed
eﬀects, calendar year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We further include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects
(traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America,
Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). The omitted education category is low-skilled (without high
school or vocational degree). We further include a linear and squared term for age and years in Germany. Standard errors in brackets
are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
4.5.3 Robustness Analysis
4.5.3.1 Speciﬁcation Checks
The empirical model in equation (1) allows for a full set of year of arrival, year of
birth and calendar year eﬀects, but imposes a second-order polynomial for general
assimilation eﬀects to avoid multicollinearity between calendar year, year of arrival
and years since migration. Given that adolescent immigrants not only get eligible
faster conditional on year of arrival but also have lived in Germany for a slightly
shorter period, we would have a downward bias in our estimates if we did not
adequately control for assimilation eﬀects. To test this, we allow for diﬀerent degrees
of polynomials in years since migration starting from a linear speciﬁcation up to
a fourth-order polynomial in years since migration. The dependent variables are
fertility choices, family formation and partner characteristics, while all other control
variables are the same as in the baseline model. The ﬁrst four columns of Table 4.6
show the results for immigrant women; the results for immigrant men are contained
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in Table C.4 in the appendix. The estimates for years of eligibility are sometimes
slightly larger and sometimes smaller than in the baseline with the second-order
polynomial. Yet, the AIC criterion reported at the bottom of each panel suggests
little improvements beyond the second-order polynomial for both women and men.
Hence, the necessary functional form assumption for general assimilation eﬀects does
not aﬀect our results.
Table 4.6: Speciﬁcation Checks
Sample: Diﬀerent Polynomials of Years Age of Arrival Eﬀects Diﬀerential Birth Year Eﬀects
Immigrant Women in Germany across Arrival Cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Number of Children
Years since Eligible -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.012* -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.019* -0.019*** -0.021***
for Citizenship [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.011] [0.007] [0.007]
R-Squared 0.427 0.428 0.428 0.428 0.429 0.428 0.428 0.429 0.428 0.428
AIC 53765.5 53725.1 53723.0 53720.6
(N=18,904)
Age at First Birth
Years since Eligible 0.150*** 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.166*** 0.108*** 0.149*** 0.225*** 0.225*** 0.141*** 0.146***
for Citizenship [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.037] [0.035] [0.040] [0.040] [0.038] [0.037]
R-Squared 0.287 0.287 0.287 0.288 0.288 0.291 0.289 0.289 0.288 0.288
AIC 72026.6 72025.1 72025.0 72011.9
(N=12,789)
Ever Married
Years since Eligible -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011***
for Citizenship [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
R-Squared 0.473 0.474 0.474 0.474 0.474 0.474 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.474
AIC 12198.4 12176.6 12176.4 12179.7
(N=18,921)
Native Partner
Years since Eligible -0.006** -0.006** -0.007** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005*
for Citizenship [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
R-Squared 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.263 0.263 0.263 0.262
AIC 7674.9 7673.0 7676.8 7670.5
(N=19,932)
Age of Partner
Years since Eligible -0.104* -0.115** -0.116** -0.117** -0.110* -0.110** -0.129** -0.096*** -0.146** -0.121**
for Citizenship [0.056] [0.056] [0.057] [0.057] [0.059] [0.056] [0.060] [0.026] [0.062] [0.059]
R-Squared 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376 0.376
AIC 71005.7 71005.0 71007.0 71007.0
(N=10,901)
Years in Germany Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
Cohort Controls Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE
Age of Arrival Controls No No No No Under 11
10-year
No No No NoFE
Arrival Cohort-Speciﬁc
No No No No No No Linear Quadratic No NoYob Trends
Arrival Cohort x Year
No No No No No No No No 10-year 5-yearof Birth FE
Notes: The table reports alternative speciﬁcations of the reduced-form for female immigrants. The dependent variables are fertility
choices (number of children, age at ﬁrst birth), family formation (whether an immigrant has ever been married) and partner char-
acteristics (whether the partner is a native as well as partner age). The ﬁrst four speciﬁcations (columns (1)-(4)) include diﬀerent
polynomials in years in Germany. Columns (5)-(7) test for the inﬂuence of age of arrival eﬀects: (5) adds a dummy for immigrants
which were under the age of 11 when they arrived in Germany; (6) include separate dummies for age of arrival (10-year bands).
Columns (7) and (8) include linear and quadratic birth year trends separately for each arrival cohort. Columns (9) and (10) include
arrival cohort x year and birth cohort ﬁxed eﬀects (for 10-year and 5-year year of birth groups). The sample includes all immigrants
who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the
1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship
than regular immigrants. All speciﬁcations also include education and ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new
EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet
Union republics, other or no citizenship). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
Another concern is that adolescent immigrants (the treatment group) arrived in
Germany at a younger age compared to adult immigrants (the control group) con-
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ditional on year of arrival. Research in psychology suggests that immigrants who
arrive at younger ages are more likely to learn the host country's language than
immigrants arriving at an older age (e.g., Birdsong, 2006; Johnson and Newport,
1989; Newport, 2002). In particular, psychologists speak of a sensitive period for
learning foreign languages that ends around age 10 or 11. As a result, immigrants
arriving before the age of 11 might also be better integrated into the host society
because better language skills facilitate the social contact with natives, for example.
If age of arrival eﬀects indeed matter conditional on our control variables, the esti-
mated returns to citizenship would be upward biased because adolescent immigrants
arrived in Germany at a younger age. We can assess this concern by following a
similar strategy than Bleakley and Chin (2004): we generate a variable equal to one
if an immigrant arrived prior to age 11 and zero if she arrived in Germany at a later
age.
The results in column (5) of Table 4.6 (and Table C.4 for men) show that
the coeﬃcient becomes somewhat smaller for some fertility choices like number of
children or age at ﬁrst birth; it has little eﬀect on partner characteristics like whether
the partner is a native or the age of the partner. As an additional test, we include
7-year dummies for age of arrival in addition to all other control variables; now, the
coeﬃcient on years since eligibility is identiﬁed from groups in the same 10 years of
arrival which limits the amount of remaining variation we can use for identiﬁcation.
Column (6) shows that this very ﬂexible model reduces the coeﬃcient but also the
precision of our estimates.
Our identifying assumption would also be violated if birth cohort eﬀects (or age
eﬀects) diﬀer across arrival cohorts. In that case, our eligibility variable which is
identiﬁed from the interaction between year of arrival, year of birth and calendar
year would also pick up diﬀerential trends in birth cohorts for subsequent arrival
cohorts. Note that we cannot include a full set of birth cohort trends for each
year of arrival because the set of interaction between year of arrival and birth year
available in our data is limited. If we regress years of eligibility for naturalization
on all control variables in the Microcensus, we get a R2 of 0.93 for both men and
women. Given the limited variation left conditional on our control variables, we ﬁrst
include diﬀerential birth year trends for groups of arrival cohorts: 1976-82, 1983-89,
1990-95 and 1996-2000. The identifying assumption is now that birth cohort eﬀects
are stable within these arrival cohorts but allowed to vary across these groups. The
results for a linear year of birth trend and quadratic year of birth trend for each
arrival cohort in columns (7) and (8) of Table 4.6 (and Table C.4) are similar to
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the baseline. Alternatively, we include for each arrival cohort separate dummies
for 10-year birth cohorts (in column (9)) and even 5-year birth cohorts (in column
(10)). Again, the results remain unchanged which suggests that our baseline sample
is fairly homogeneous conditional on cohort of arrival and therefore not subject to
diﬀerential year of birth trends over time.
4.5.3.2 Level versus Growth Eﬀects and Selective Return Migration
Our empirical model (in equation (1)) identiﬁes persistent eﬀects on fertility, family
formation and partner choice (a slope eﬀect). Citizenship will have permanent eﬀects
if, for instance, immigrants invest more in human capital after naturalization. Our
empirical model does however not identify any eﬀect of citizenship on outcome levels.
The reason is that by 2005, the ﬁrst year of our data from the Microcensus, the
control group of adult immigrants has become eligible for German citizenship as
well. To test whether citizenship shifts outcomes immediately after naturalization
(a level eﬀect), we make use of additional waves of the Microcensus covering the years
1999-2010. In the earlier years of the Microcensus, a large number of observations
becomes eligible for the ﬁrst time which allows us to disentangle a level from a growth
eﬀect. We capture the level eﬀect by an indicator variable measuring whether an
individual is eligible in the current year. As before, we identify the slope eﬀect by
including the years since eligibility for citizenship. Table C.5 shows the respective
results. Access to citizenship has not only persistent growth eﬀects, it also has a
one-time eﬀect on the levels. The growth eﬀects that we measure remain signiﬁcant
even if we include the indicator variable. Yet, our baseline speciﬁcation is capable
to capture the largest part of the overall eﬀect of eligibility. Whereas the total eﬀect
of eligibility on the probability of being married is -0.05, our baseline speciﬁcation
estimates a slightly smaller eﬀect of -0.03.29, Our main results are thus only a lower
bound of the true eﬀect of citizenship. As an additional test, we follow the idea of a
regression discontinuity design and reduce the age window around the cutoﬀ age in
which immigrants become eligible (columns (3) to (5)). Even if we narrow the age
window, the coeﬃcients of the slope and the level eﬀect remain highly signiﬁcant.
Another issue we need to address is selective dropout from our sample because
29 We calculate the sum of level and slope eﬀect: (-0.0322474-7.16*0.0027393) and compare it to the slope eﬀect
(-7.16* 0.0037158)
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of selective mortality or emigration. As the immigrant sample is relatively young
(between 16 and 49 years-old), survivor bias due to mortality is of minor concern.
A more important issue is selective out-migration. Return migration seems highest
in the ﬁrst years and levels oﬀ after about eight years in the host country (see, e.g.,
Dustmann and Göhrlach, 2014). Yet, our sample of immigrants has spent at least
ﬁve years in Germany but most immigrants have been in the country for many more
years - the mean is around eighteen years. Return migration during the 2005-2010
period is therefore unlikely to be a major issue.
However, return migration prior to our sample period could still produce a se-
lected sample. If there is negative selection in out-migration and adolescent immi-
grants (who get eligible faster conditional on the cohort of arrival) are more (less)
likely to return than adult immigrants, then we would get an upward (downward)
bias in the estimated return to citizenship eligibility. If both groups are equally
likely to leave Germany conditional on our control variables, there would be no bias
in our estimates. In sum, it is not obvious how return migration before our study
period would aﬀect our estimates. While we cannot assess return migration in the
repeated cross-sections of the Microcensus, we can test for selective dropout from
our sample in the SOEP panel. We take the probability of attrition from our sample
(either due to mortality, emigration or other dropout) as the dependent variable and
test whether attrition depends on eligibility. All regressions include the same set of
control variables as before. The right-hand side of Table C.6 suggests that selective
attrition from the sample is not related to eligibility or years since eligibility for im-
migrant men and women. Based on this evidence, return migration seems unlikely
to bias our results.
4.5.4 Alternative Samples and Controls
Finally, we investigate whether our results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions of
our sample. As a ﬁrst test, we restrict our sample to Turkish immigrants which has
been the largest sending country prior to 1990. While the coeﬃcients show a similar
pattern for Turks, most coeﬃcients are no longer statistically signiﬁcant (see ﬁrst
row of Table C.7) - with the exception of age at ﬁrst birth and partner age. Immi-
grants in our sample may also qualify for citizenship through marriage to a German
citizen. To check whether the fast track aﬀects our results, we drop in the second
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row all immigrants who report having a German spouse in 2005-2010.30 A related
issue is that the 2000 reform not only changed the resident requirement for adult
immigrants but also granted citizenship to children born in Germany to foreign-born
parents. Immigrants with dependent children therefore have a higher incentive to
naturalize prior to 2000 because they could include spouses and dependent children
in their application. After 2000, newborn children were eligible for German citi-
zenship independently of their parents. Hence, the beneﬁts of citizenship might be
smaller after 2000 for parents with very young children. Controlling for the presence
and age structure of children (in the third row) in the household does however not
change our results. We also rerun our analysis dropping all immigrants with children
under ten in the household. In the remaining sample, children in eligible households
were all born prior to 2000 and hence not directly aﬀected by the reform.31
Our sample could also be aﬀected by changes in the inﬂow of refugees and
asylum seekers. After the opening of the Iron Curtain, large numbers of asylum
seekers and ethnic Germans began to arrive in Germany. Faced with ever-increasing
numbers of refugees, the federal government restricted access to political asylum in
1993.32 Hence, the selection of refugees arriving in Germany might have changed
substantially over time, especially after 1993. Refugees who are granted political
asylum face the same naturalization criteria as all other immigrants in Germany. In
some cases, however, the resident requirement might be reduced to six years. As
such, some refugees might have naturalized earlier than our deﬁnition of eligibility
indicates. Unfortunately, as in most data sources, our data do not record whether
an immigrant arrives in Germany as a refugee or applies for asylum. As a proxy
for refugee status, we therefore rerun our baseline (in the ﬁfth row) after dropping
all immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia and the Middle East which formed the largest
30Note that we only observe their current spouse, not the spouse or partner an immigrant had when they ﬁrst
lived in Germany. Some immigrants we drop from the sample might have naturalized through the provisions
of the 1990 or 2000 reforms but married a German citizen only afterward. And some immigrants might have
naturalized through a German spouse, but got divorced before we observe them in the 2005-2010 sample period.
We think that the number of immigrants we misclassify should be small relative to the number of immigrants
with a German spouse in the 2005-2010 period. We ﬁnd similar results if we use the SOEP where we have
annual information on the immigrant's partner from 1984-2009 (not reported).
31The 2000 reform also included a transitory provision: Parents with children born between 1990 and 1999 could
apply for German citizenship for their child between 2000 and 2001. The parent had to fulﬁll the other require-
ments of the 2000 reform granting citizenship by birthplace (most importantly, an 8-year resident requirement).
In practice, less than 10 percent of parents did apply which suggest that children older than ten in 2010 have
mostly not beneﬁted from the citizenship by birthplace reform. In addition, if we drop immigrants with children
younger than 15, we ﬁnd again very similar results (not reported).
32After 1993, immigrants from source countries that are considered safe, or those arriving from safe third countries
(which included all of Germany's geographic neighbors) could no longer apply for political asylum in Germany.
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groups of refugees over our sample period. In addition, our sample might still
contain some ethnic Germans who are not directly aﬀected by the immigration
reforms. We therefore restrict our data in the sixth row to the 2007-10 Microcensus;
in those years, immigrants were asked explicitly whether they were eligible as ethnic
Germans. Finally, changes in the German economy more broadly might inﬂuence
our results. Germany's labor market experienced a substantial inﬂow of migrants
after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the Iron Curtain. In addition,
wage inequality in Germany increased in the late 1990s and 2000s with substantial
net gains for the high-skilled but net losses for the low-skilled. In principle, these
changes might be absorbed by year dummies or state-speciﬁc trends. Our reduced-
form estimates would however be biased if business cycle eﬀects or secular wage
changes aﬀect adolescent immigrants diﬀerently than adult immigrants. The seventh
row then drops all East German states because immigration ﬂows and labor market
dynamics diﬀer substantially between East and West Germany. Alternatively, we
include state-level unemployment rates and GDP growth rates to our speciﬁcation
in the eighth row. In all cases, we ﬁnd that our estimates for fertility choices and
family formation are very robust to alternative samples. In contrast, the coeﬃcients
for partner characteristics do vary across speciﬁcations for immigrant women (while
men had few eﬀects even in the reduced form).
4.6 Potential Mechanisms
4.6.1 The Role of Income
As discussed in the introduction, access to citizenship improves the labor market
position of eligible immigrants. In Germany, female immigrants especially beneﬁt
from citizenship with higher wages and more stable jobs (Gathmann and Keller,
2014). We ﬁrst explore whether changes in labor market income may explain our
results on the speed of social integration. Unfortunately, we do not observe earnings
prior to eligibility. Therefore, we need to be careful with the interpretation as better
social integration, for example, because of intermarriage, may also improve wages
(see Meng and Gregory, 2005).
The upper part of Table 4.7 shows the baseline estimates for employed women,
while the lower part shows the reduced form estimates conditional on personal in-
come. Personal income is signiﬁcantly associated with all dependent variables. Im-
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migrant women with higher personal income delay and decrease their fertility, imply-
ing that the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect. Conditional on personal
income, the size of the eligibility coeﬃcient is substantially smaller for the demand
for children than unconditionally: from -0.008 to -0.006 for the propensity to have
kids and from -0.02 to -0.015 for the number of kids. This reduction implies that 25
percent of the eﬀects of access to citizenship on the static demand for fertility can be
explained by changes in personal income (columns (1) and (2)). However, economic
forces cannot explain much of the postponement of births, since the coeﬃcient of
our eligibility variable for age at ﬁrst birth is almost unchanged when conditioning
on personal income (column (3)). For the family formation outcomes, the personal
income of female immigrants is negatively associated with the probability of being
married and positively related with the probability of being divorced or cohabitat-
ing with a partner (columns (4)-(8)). Conditioning on personal income reduces the
eligibility eﬀect on currently married by more than 40 percent. The eﬀect for ever
married declines by 11 percent suggesting that higher personal income postpones
marriage but does not reduce the incidence of marriage. For partner characteristics,
personal income has little eﬀect and cannot explain the eﬀects of eligibility (columns
(9)-(13)).
4.6.2 Cultural Inﬂuence of the Source Country
Our results show substantial eﬀects of access to citizenship on social integration
outcomes. Yet, do these integration forces work for all immigrants in a similar
way; or, do some immigrants integrate faster than others? Immigrants, especially
in the ﬁrst generation, are imprinted with the norms and values of their country
of origin. That inﬂuence vanes only slowly with time in the host country. In our
case, there is an obvious distinction between EU immigrants who come in many
cases from a very similar cultural background and immigrants from outside the
EU who mostly come from very diﬀerent cultural backgrounds. In recent years,
the epidemiological approach has provided convincing evidence that the norms and
values of the source country still inﬂuence immigrants' behavior in the host country.
Using this approach, recent studies show, for instance, that immigrant women who
come from countries with high fertility rates have more children than immigrants
from low-fertility countries (see, e.g., Fernández and Fogli 2009 for the US; Stichnoth
and Yeter, 2013 for Germany). Most studies also report a decline in the immigrant-
native gap in fertility or labor force participation with time in the host country
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though full convergence might take several generations (e.g., Ben-Porath, 1973; and
Blau et al., 1992 for the US; Mayer and Riphahn, 2000 for Germany).
Little is known however, whether norms and values of the source country also
aﬀect the speed of integration through citizenship. To investigate the link between
cultural heritage and access to citizenship, we use the epidemiological approach on
our sample of ﬁrst-generation immigrants. First-generation immigrants who might
not be a random sample of the population in their country of origin. However, this
potential bias is not such an issue here as we focus on the assimilation process of
immigrants (and not on the eﬀect of immigrant culture for a random individual in
the source country). A second concern could be that ﬁrst-generation immigrants
might experience a disruption or delay in their fertility or family formation because
of migration. Yet, this delay should be less of an issue because our sample of migrants
has lived in the host country for many years (17 years for women and 18 years for
men). In addition, we only compare immigrants from the same arrival cohort who
should have experienced the same delay in their choices.33
In Table 4.8 and Table 4.9, we investigate the link between country of origin
characteristics and the eﬀect of citizenship on fertility and family formation choices,
respectively. When analyzing the eﬀect of cultural heritage on the speed of assim-
ilation with respect to fertility outcomes, the total fertility rate of the country of
origin serves as the origin country characteristic. For analyzing family formation
outcomes, we use the female labor force participation rate in the country of origin.
The top panel of both tables shows the baseline results for the sample of immigrants
for which we could merge source country characteristics to our data. In the bottom
panel, we add the source country characteristic within the ﬁve years before migra-
tion to our speciﬁcation as well as an interaction term with our eligibility variable.
The main eﬀect of the source country characteristic shows whether cultural heritage
aﬀects fertility or family formation choices; the interaction eﬀect in turn indicates
whether access to citizenship reduces the cultural inﬂuence of the source country.
We ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity with respect to cultural values in the country of
origin.
As in the previous literature, we ﬁnd that fertility is substantially higher for im-
migrant women from high-fertility regions. Furthermore, they have children earlier
33There is a counteracting force where immigrants reduce or at least postpone their fertility until after their
relocation or until they get settled in the host country. Fertility might then be lower shortly after arrival
because of the disruption of migration. This eﬀect should not be an issue in our setting however, since most
immigrants have been in the country for several years (the average duration of residence is 17 years for women
and 18 years for men).
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Table 4.8: The Role of Culture for Fertility Choices
Fertility Choices
Sample: Female Immigrants Having Kids Number of Kids Age at 1st Birth Single Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since Eligible -0.007*** -0.018** 0.178*** -0.000
[0.003] [0.007] [0.039] [0.003]
Observations 15,544 15,529 10,882 10,452
R-Squared 0.431 0.432 0.289 0.041
Years since Eligible -0.001 -0.009 0.134*** -0.004
[0.003] [0.009] [0.045] [0.004]
Years since Eligible*Fertility Origin -0.002*** -0.003** 0.014* 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.007] [0.001]
Fertility Country of Origin 0.041*** 0.100*** -0.455*** -0.035***
[0.008] [0.024] [0.100] [0.009]
Observations 15,544 15,529 10,882 10,452
R-Squared 0.432 0.433 0.291 0.042
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable (Total Sample) 0.657 1.414 23.35 0.141
Mean of Dependent Variable (Sample used) 0.673 1.448 23.29 0.137
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates for fertility choices of female immigrants. The top panel shows the baseline estimates
for the subsample for which we have valid information on the fertility rates in the country of origin prior to immigration. The bottom
panel augments the basic model with the fertility rate in the country of origin in the year prior to emigration as well as that variable
interacted with years since eligible. All speciﬁcations include the same controls as in previous tables. See notes to Tables 2-4 for
details. Standard errors are clustered at the age x arrival year level. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
and are less likely to be single mothers. More surprisingly, our results indicate that
assimilation in fertility behavior is faster for women originating from high-fertility
countries as the interaction terms are negative in columns (1) and (2), and positive
in column (3). Taking the diﬀerence between the fertility rate in the source coun-
try between the 25th (1.84 children) and the 75th percentile (3.7 children) which is
similar to the diﬀerence between Italy and Turkey, one can see that eligibility for
citizenship reduces the likelihood of having children and the number of children for
women from Turkey (roughly the 75th percentile) faster than for women from Italy
(roughly the 25th percentile). Women in the 75th percentile also postpone their
ﬁrst birth more than women in the 25th percentile. After 10 years of eligibility, the
woman in the 75th percentile decreases the diﬀerence between her and the woman
in the 25th percentile by 3.7 percentage points in the probability to have children,
by 0.06 children and by 0.26 years with respect to the age at ﬁrst birth. These
integration eﬀects do not change much when controlling for personal income. That
suggests that economic and cultural inﬂuences have largely independent eﬀects on
fertility choices.
While these results seem somewhat surprising at ﬁrst, note that immigrant
women from high-fertility countries also have the most room for adjustment. In
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addition, the institutional and economic constraints of women in high-fertility coun-
tries are probably very diﬀerent from the institutions and family policies in Germany
and other low-fertility countries. As such, we would expect that the response to the
changing incentives should be largest among immigrants from countries that are
very diﬀerent from Germany both socially and economically. Interestingly, our re-
sults are diﬀerent from Blau et al. (2011) who ﬁnd that the speed of the assimilation
in working hours is very similar for immigrants from very diﬀerent cultural back-
grounds. While women from areas with high female employment work on average
more than women from countries with low female employment, the speed of assimi-
lation is very similar for the two groups of women. We, in contrast, ﬁnd that women
from high-fertility countries adjust faster than immigrant women from low-fertility
countries.
Table 4.9: The Role of Culture for Family Formation
Female Immigrants
Currently Married Ever Married Divorced Cohabitation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since Eligible -0.006** -0.009*** -0.004* -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Observations 14,679 14,679 10,736 9,918
R-Squared 0.340 0.484 0.032 0.150
Years since Eligible -0.024*** -0.024*** 0.002 0.007*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Years since Eligible*Female LFP Origin 0.037*** 0.031*** -0.013** -0.017**
[0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007]
Female LFP Origin -0.280*** -0.264*** 0.056 0.241***
[0.065] [0.058] [0.062] [0.064]
Observations 14,679 14,679 10,736 9,918
R-Squared 0.341 0.486 0.032 0.152
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable (Full Sample) 0.639 0.709 0.099 0.085
Mean of Dependent Variable (Sample used) 0.658 0.731 0.099 0.078
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates of marriage outcomes for immigrant women. The top panel shows the baseline for
the subsample for which we have valid information on the female labor force participation rates in the country of origin. The bottom
panel adds the female labor force participation in the country of origin just prior to emigration and that variable interacted with
the years since eligibility. All speciﬁcations include the same variables in previous tables. See notes to Tables 2-4 for further details.
Standard errors are clustered at the age x arrival year level. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
With respect to the family formation choices of immigrant women, we ﬁnd that
women from countries with high female labor participation have a lower probability
to be married, and are more likely to cohabitate. This corresponds to the expecta-
tion that a high female labor force participation rate is a proxy for more modern
norms regarding gender roles and the family model. The coeﬃcients of the interac-
tion terms show in the opposite direction of the eﬀect of citizenship for all family
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formation outcomes. This indicates that assimilation in family formation behavior
is faster for women from countries with a lower female labor participation rate. Tak-
ing again the diﬀerence between the female labor force participation in the origin
country between the 25th (0.367) and the 75th percentile (0.574), women in the
25th percentile are less likely to be married, and have a higher probability to be
divorced and cohabitating than women from the 75th percentile. After 10 years of
eligibility, the woman in the 25th percentile decreases the diﬀerence between her
and the woman in the 75th percentile by 7.6 percentage points in the probability
to be currently married, by 6.4 percentage points in the probability to ever have
been married, by 2.6 percentage points in the probability of being divorced, and by
3.5 percentage points in the probability of cohabitating. The results for immigrant
men do not reﬂect this pattern. While men from countries with higher female labor
force participation are more likely to be married, they are less likely to be divorced.
However, the interaction eﬀects are all insigniﬁcant, and cultural distance thus does
not foster assimilation for immigrant men. As for the fertility outcomes, controlling
for personal income does not change these assimilation results a lot.
4.7 Conclusion
Germany has accumulated a sizable immigrant population over the past decades and
continues to do so today. In international comparison, Germany has ranked second
as destination country for immigrants - just behind the United States but before
other traditional immigration countries like Australia and Canada. The large stock
and rising inﬂow of immigrants raises important questions on how to integrate the
new members into the host society - both in economic terms but also along social
dimensions. Along both lines, Germany has traditionally had a relatively weak
record compared to traditional immigration countries. In recent years however,
substantial progress has been made in facilitating naturalization. Beginning in the
early 1990s, Germany has moved from a country where citizenship was closely tied
to ancestry to a more liberal understanding of citizenship and naturalization.
To identify the eﬀects of citizenship acquisition on social integration, we exploit
age-dependent resident requirements in Germany's reforms and the fact that many
immigrants get eligible when the reforms are implemented. Our intention-to-treat
eﬀect shows that access to citizenship does have an impact on the marriage and
fertility patterns of immigrants. The option to naturalize delays marriage to later
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ages and reduces the likelihood of marrying someone from the country of origin.
Female immigrants also have lower fertility overall and tend to postpone their ﬁrst
birth, especially when they are high-skilled. An analysis of the potential mechanisms
suggests that higher earnings are important for fertility and marriage choices. And
while immigrants from a more traditional cultural background have overall higher
fertility and marriage rates, they also assimilate faster than immigrants from EU
member countries.
Overall, naturalization appears to be one channel to improve the social integra-
tion of immigrants even in countries where access to citizenship has traditionally
been very restrictive. The beneﬁts of a more liberal immigration policy seem to ma-
terialize especially if immigrants have the human capital necessary to succeed in the
host country's labor market - a condition more recent immigrants to Germany seem
to satisfy. As such, the substantial inﬂow of immigration over the past decade is
likely to provide large ﬁscal and labor market beneﬁts for Germany. Yet, our results
also caution that a more liberal access to citizenship does not work automatically
for everybody and for all integration outcomes.
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4.8 Appendix
Table C.1: Summary Statistics of the Microcensus
Female Immigrants Male Immigrants
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Having Children 0.657 0.475
Total Number of Children 1.414 1.318
Age at Birth of First Child 23.35 4.739
Single mother 0.141 0.348
Currently Married 0.639 0.480 0.554 0.497
Ever Married 0.709 0.454 0.592 0.492
Divorced 0.0994 0.299 0.0634 0.244
Cohabitating 0.0848 0.279 0.112 0.315
Partner: German 0.195 0.396 0.204 0.403
Partner: Same Origin 0.726 0.446 0.705 0.456
Partner: Same Origin (2nd Generation) 0.0872 0.282 0.119 0.324
Partner: Years in Germany 19.90 9.221 16.19 9.163
Partner: Age 35.97 7.878 30.80 7.277
Partner: Age Gap 3.969 6.444 -2.638 5.708
Partner: Years of Education 12.47 3.207 11.88 3.224
Partner: Years of Education Gap 0.732 3.104 -0.030 3.210
Share Naturalized 0.365 0.481 0.381 0.486
Years since Naturalized 3.684 6.368 3.778 6.417
Years since Eligible for Citizenship 7.169 5.137 8.003 5.285
Years in Germany 16.86 6.937 18.07 7.112
Age 30.29 6.460 30.53 7.010
Low Education 0.549 0.498 0.497 0.500
Medium Education 0.391 0.488 0.449 0.497
High Education 0.060 0.237 0.054 0.226
Region of Origin
Traditional EU member States (EU-15) 0.094 0.291 0.116 0.320
New EU Member States (EU-12) 0.140 0.347 0.093 0.290
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.125 0.331 0.145 0.352
Turkey 0.335 0.472 0.333 0.471
Middle East 0.068 0.251 0.086 0.281
Africa 0.039 0.193 0.047 0.211
Asia 0.049 0.216 0.042 0.200
America 0.020 0.14 0.014 0.118
Former Soviet Union (without EU-12) 0.117 0.321 0.109 0.311
Other or No Citizenship 0.013 0.115 0.016 0.127
Observations 18.534 17.216
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who
are 16-30 years old in the post-reform period (1991-2009). A person is eligible if (a) she has lived in Germany for at least 8 years
in 1991 or later and is then 16-22 years-old; (b) she has lived in Germany for at least 15 years in the period 1991-1999 and is then
23-30 years-old; or (c) she has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and the year is 2000 or later and she is then 23-30 years-old.
Low-skilled individuals are those without a highschool degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with a highschool degree
or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with a college degree.
Source: Microcensus 2005-2010.
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Table C.2: Summary Statistics of the Socio-Economic Panel
Male Female
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Married 0.530 0.499 0.701 0.458
Divorced 0.0210 0.143 0.0422 0.201
Age at ﬁrst Marriage 22.19 3.077 20.00 2.870
German Spouse 0.0729 0.260 0.0938 0.292
Years since Eligible 2.354 3.665 2.611 3.860
Years in Germany 12.24 6.256 12.09 6.476
Years in Germany Squared 189.0 189.3 188.2 192.7
Year of Arrival 1985 6.807 1986 6.945
Age 26.11 6.107 26.28 5.798
Age Squared 718.9 339.9 724.1 321.6
Low Education 0.540 0.498 0.647 0.478
Medium Education 0.434 0.496 0.316 0.465
High Education 0.0258 0.158 0.0376 0.190
Region of Origin
Traditional EU member States (EU-15) 0.053 0.224 0.0930 0.291
New EU Member States (EU-12) 0.131 0.337 0.142 0.349
Ex-Yugoslavia 0.095 0.293 0.091 0.288
Turkey 0.487 0.500 0.461 0.499
Middle East 0.006 0.078 0.007 0.085
Africa 0.008 0.089 0.002 0.040
Asia 0.004 0.063 0.006 0.075
America 0.003 0.053 0.002 0.046
Former Soviet Union (without EU-12) 0.211 0.408 0.194 0.396
Other or No Citizenship 0.003 0.053 0.003 0.054
Observations 3.259 3.751
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for ﬁrst-generation immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who
are 16-30 years old when becoming eligible. A person is eligible if an individual is (a) aged 16-22, has lived in Germany for at least
8 years and the year is 1991 or later; (b) aged 23-30, has lived in Germany for at least 15 years in the period 1991-1999; or (c) aged
23-35, has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and the year is 2000 or later. Low-skilled individuals are those without a highschool
degree or vocational degree; medium-skilled are those with highschool degree or vocational degree; high-skilled are those with college
degree. Individuals are in school if they still attend school over the past four weeks.
Source: SOEP (1984-2009).
Table C.3: Citizenship and Additional Marriage Outcomes
Female Immigrants Male Immigrants Female Immigrants
Age at First Marriage Age at First Marriage Divorced
(Full Sample) (Single after 8 Yrs) (Married after 8 Yrs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years since Eligible 0.289*** -0.031 0.190*** 0.134** 0.000
for Citizenship [0.036] [0.038] [0.043] [0.066] [0.006]
Observations 8,864 6,479 2,930 1,450 1,576
R-Squared 0.268 0.236 0.507 0.611 0.250
Dataset Microcensus 1999-2004 Socio-Economic Panel 1984-2009
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of Dependent Variable 19.90 22.28 20.38 21.67 0.03
Notes: The table reports reduced form estimates between years since eligibility and family formation. The left-hand side (columns
(1)-(2)) reports results for the Microcensus (1999-2004), the right-hand side (columns (3)-(5) for the GSOEP. Columns (1) and (3)-
(5) for female immigrants, column (2) for male immigrants. The dependent variables are the age an immigrant ﬁrst gets married
(columns (1)-(4)); and whether an immigrant is divorced (columns (5). Columns (4) focus on immigrants who are single after 8 years
in Germany; column (5) is restricted to immigrants who were married after 8 years in Germany. The sample overall includes all
immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible
for citizenship in the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to
German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes the number of years since an immigrant became eligible for
naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms. All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects,
current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional
EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and
other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). For the Microcensus before 2005, we do not have this information and
replace the region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects by recent citizenship ﬁxed eﬀects (same categories including one category for German). The
omitted education category is low-skilled (without high school or vocational degree). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age
x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (1999-2004); Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2009).
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Table C.4: Speciﬁcation Checks for Immigrant Men
Sample: Diﬀerent Polynomials of Age of Arrival Eﬀects Diﬀerential Birth Year Eﬀects
Immigrant Men Years in Germany across Arrival Cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Married
Years since Eligible -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.008* -0.008*** -0.008***
for Citizenship [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
R-Squared 0.399 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.401
AIC 16217.1 16177.5 16172.1 16175.3
(N=17,213)
Ever Married
Years since Eligible -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.007* -0.009*** -0.009***
for Citizenship [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
R-Squared 0.465 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467 0.467
AIC 13820.8 13778.5 13772.5 13771.6
(N=17,213)
Native Partner
Years since Eligible 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.006* 0.006* 0.003 0.007**
for Citizenship [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]
R-Squared 0.160 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.162 0.162 0.163 0.163 0.163 0.161
AIC 7955.4 7946.7 7950.3 7948.7
(N=9,164)
Age of Partner
Years since Eligible 0.040 0.036 0.035 0.038 -0.007 0.035 0.097* 0.097* 0.016 0.015
for Citizenship [0.046] [0.046] [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.046] [0.054] [0.054] [0.055] [0.050]
R-Squared 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.411 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.413 0.412
AIC 57428.5 57426.9 57430.8 57428.4
(N=9,116)
Years in Germany Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic
Cohort Controls Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE Year FE
Age of Arrival
No No No No Under 11
10-year
No No No NoControls FE
Arrival Cohort-
No No No No No No Linear Quadratic No NoSpeciﬁc Yob Trends
Arrival Cohort x
No No No No No No No No 10-year 5-yearYear of Birth FE
Notes: The table reports alternative speciﬁcations of the reduced-form for male immigrants. The dependent variables are family
formation (whether an immigrant is currently married or has ever been married) and partner characteristics (whether the partner is
a native and partner age). The ﬁrst four speciﬁcations (columns (1)-(4)) include diﬀerent polynomials in years in Germany. Columns
(5) and (6) test for the inﬂuence of age of arrival eﬀects: (5) adds a dummy for immigrants which were under the age of 11 when they
arrived in Germany; (6) include separate dummies for age of arrival (10-year bands). Columns (7) and (8) include linear and quadratic
birth year trends separately for each arrival cohort. Columns (9) and (10) include arrival cohort x year and birth cohort ﬁced eﬀects
(for 10-year and 5-year year of birth groups). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000
and who were between 16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. We exclude ethnic Germans,
i.e. immigrants with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. All speciﬁcations also
include education and ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects (traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey,
Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America, Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship).
Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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Table C.5: Additional Speciﬁcation Checks
Functional Form Age Window Used for Estimation
Sample: Immigrant Women Baseline + eligible-Dummy Ages 19-27 Ages 21-25 Ages 22-23
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Having children
Years since Eligible for Citizenship -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.013*** -0.016** -0.018
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.007] [0.020]
Eligible -0.057*** -0.045*** -0.054** -0.058
[0.012] [0.016] [0.025] [0.039]
Observations 35,341 35,341 17,584 8,799 3,433
R-Squared 0.413 0.414 0.287 0.246 0.274
Currently Married
Years since Eligible for Citizenship -0.004** -0.003 -0.011*** -0.015** -0.021
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.006] [0.021]
Eligible -0.032*** -0.019 -0.042** -0.045
[0.011] [0.015] [0.020] [0.035]
Observations 35,354 35,354 17,589 8,800 3,433
R-Squared 0.333 0.334 0.189 0.143 0.138
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports alternative speciﬁcations of the reduced-form for female immigrants using the Microcensus years from 1999
to 2010. The dependent variables are fertility choices (having children) and family formation (whether an immigrant is currently
married). The ﬁrst set allows for both a level and slope eﬀect of eligibility: column (1) shows the baseline speciﬁcation with a slope
eﬀect only, while column (2) also includes a dummy variable whether the individual is eligible for naturalization (level eﬀect). The
second set of results reduces the window of ages that are included in the estimation: column (3) only include immigrants between 19
and 27 years-old when ﬁrst eligible for citizenship; column (4) immigrants between 21-25 years-old and column (5) immigrants aged
22-23 when ﬁrst eligible. The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between
16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible during the 1991-2010 period. All speciﬁcations control for year of birth and year
of arrival ﬁxed eﬀects as well as calendar year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc trends. We further include education
dummies and linear and quadratic terms of current age and years in Germany. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x
arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (1999-2010).
Table C.6: Selective Attrition
Female Immigrants Male Immigrants
Selective Attrition Selective Attrition
(Mortality or Emigration) (Mortality or Emigration)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since Eligible for Citizenship 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.002]
Eligible for Citizenship 0.004 -0.003
[0.005] [0.007]
Observations 5,308 5,308 4,767 4,767
R-Squared 0.055 0.055 0.053 0.053
Year of Arrival Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the probability of attrition due to outmigration or mortality (in columns (1)-(2) for women and
columns (3)-(4) for men). The sample includes all immigrants who arrived in Germany between 1976 and 2000 and who were between
16 and 30 years-old when they ﬁrst get eligible for citizenship in the 1991-2009 period. We exclude ethnic Germans, i.e. immigrants
with German ancestry who had faster access to German citizenship than regular immigrants. Years since eligible denotes the number
of years since an immigrant became eligible for naturalization after the 1991 or 2000 immigration reforms; eligible is an indicator
equal to one if an immigrant may naturalize and zero otherwise. All speciﬁcations include year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed
eﬀects, current year and state ﬁxed eﬀects as well as state-speciﬁc linear trends. We also include ten region of origin ﬁxed eﬀects
(traditional EU countries, new EU entrants (EU-12), ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, Africa, North and South America,
Russia and other former Soviet Union republics, other or no citizenship). The omitted education category is low-skilled (without high
school or vocational degree). Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (1984-2009).
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Table C.7: Alternative Samples
Female Immigrants Male Immigrants
Fertility Choices Family Formation Partner Family Formation Partner
Number Age at Currently Ever Native Age Currently Ever Native Age
of Kids 1st Birth Married Married Married Married
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Restrict Sample to -0.015 0.217*** -0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.134** -0.004 -0.005 0.005 0.059
Turkish Immigrants [0.012] [0.050] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.067] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.067]
Drop Immigrants with -0.018*** 0.125*** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.010*** -0.177 -0.002 -0.015*** -0.001 -0.036
German Partners [0.004] [0.041] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.255] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.203]
Control for Children in -0.019*** 0.165*** -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.005** -0.133 -0.007*** -0.017*** 0.004 -0.144
Household (2000 Reform) [0.003] [0.027] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.127] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.119]
Drop if Children under -0.018*** 0.185*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.001 -0.139 -0.012*** -0.018*** 0.003 -0.124
Age 10 (2000 Reform) [0.004] [0.070] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.127] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.119]
Drop Ex-Yugoslavia -0.017*** 0.172*** -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.004 -0.087 -0.007*** -0.019*** 0.007** -0.144
and Middle East [0.004] [0.037] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.146] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.128]
Drop All Ethnic Germans -0.023*** 0.152*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.007** -0.263* -0.008*** -0.021*** 0.004 -0.294**
[0.004] [0.042] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.158] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.146]
Drop East German States -0.018*** 0.133*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.005* -0.147 -0.006*** -0.018*** 0.004 -0.141
[0.004] [0.034] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.128] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.119]
Add State Economic -0.025*** 0.148*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.005 -0.374* -0.009*** -0.022*** 0.000 -0.447**
Conditions [0.005] [0.048] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.208] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.177]
Years in Germany Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Arrival FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year of Birth FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region of Origin FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-speciﬁc Linear Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates where the dependent variables are fertility choices (columns (1) and (2)), family
formation (columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8)) and characteristics of the partner (columns (5)-(6) and columns (9)-(10)). The left-hand side
shows the results for female immigrants, the right-hand side for male immigrants. The key independent variables are the number of
years since a person is eligible for naturalization. The ﬁrst row restricts the sample to immigrants from Turkey. The second row drops
immigrants with a German spouse in 2005-10. The third row includes controls for the number and age structure of children in the
household. The fourth row drops immigrants with children under 10 who might have beneﬁtted from the introduction of birthright
citizenship in 2000 for all children born on or after January 1, 2000. The ﬁfth row excludes all immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia and
the Middle East; the sixth row restricts the sample to the 2007-10 Microcensus where we can directly identify and exclude ethnic
Germans. The seventh row drops observations from East German states except Berlin, while the last row adds labor market controls
(a linear and squared term in state unemployment rate and the state GDP growth rate). See notes to previous tables for the deﬁnition
of the sample. All speciﬁcations include the same individual characteristics as before (year of arrival and year of birth ﬁxed eﬀects, a
second-order polynomial of years in Germany, education), state and year ﬁxed eﬀects, state-speciﬁc linear time trends and ten region
of origin ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in brackets are clustered by age x arrival year. Statistical signiﬁcance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Source: Microcensus (2005-2010).
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